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1998] COURT REFORM IN FAMILY LAW 
I am-I make no secret of it-a reformer .... I see grave defects in 
some of the ways in which courts operate, defects that I believe can be 
eradicated, but that will never be intelligently dealt with unless they are 
publicized. On the other hand, I have no fatuous notion that the judicial 
process can be made perfect. It is a human process, involving inherent 
human failings and weaknesses. Yet its substantial betterment is never-
theless possible. Indeed, to better it, requires a recognition of its un-
avoidably human, fallible, character. The illusion that it either is, or can 
be, super-human constitutes one of the chief hindrances to its substantial 
reform. 
INTRODUCTION 
Jerome Frank 
Courts on Trial 
471 
Family law l cases focus on some of the most intimate, emotional, and 
all-encompassing aspects of parties' personallives.2 Adjudication of these 
cases challenges the "human" component of the court process in a manner 
unmatched by court involvement in almost any other area of law.3 The 
1. Family law in this Article means a comprehensive approach to family law subject matter 
jurisdiction, including: jurisdiction over cases involving divorce, annulment, and property distribu-
tion; child custody and visitation; alimony and child support; paternity, adoption, and termination of 
parental rights; juvenile causes (juvenile delinquency, child abuse, and child neglect); domestic vio-
lence; criminal nonsupport; name change; guardianship of minors and disabled persons; and withhold-
ing or withdrawal of life-sustaining medical procedures, involuntary admissions, and emergency 
evaluations. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 921-928 (Supp. 1996). See also D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-
1101 (1995), §§ 16-2301 to 16-2365 (1997); HAw. REv. STAT. §§ 571-11 to 571-14 (1993); NEV. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 3.223 (Michie Supp. 1995); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4A-24 (West 1987); R.I. GEN. 
LAWS § 8-10-3 (Supp. 1996); and S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-736 (Law Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 1996). 
2. See Steven H. Hobbs,In Search of Family Value: Constructing a Frameworkfor Jurispru-
dential Discourse, 75 MARQ. L. REv. 529, 530 (1992). Hobbs describes the character of family law 
jurisprudence: 
Id. 
Each case is the real-life drama of a family working out what is valuable and important to it, 
while at the same time remaining within the bounds of the law. When our lives interact with 
the law, a discourse arises about who we are, what our hopes and dreams are for our family, 
how we form companionate relationships, and how we view raising children. 
3. See Michael J. Albano, Children-The Innocent Victims of Family Breakups: How the 
Family Law Attorney, the Courts, and Society Can Protect Our Children, 26 U. TOL. L. REv. 787 
(1995). Albano summarizes the predominant negative atmosphere of family law adjudication: 
The litigants do not want to be there, and usually believe that someone has taken advantage 
of them. Judges do not want the assignment, not because other cases are more important, 
but because the cases drain them both physically and emotionally. The remainder of the le-
gal profession looks down on family law cases. 
Id. at 787. See also Naomi R. Cahn, Family Law, Federalism, and the Federal Courts, 79 IOWA L. 
REv. 1073, 1091 (1994). Cahn comments on state courts' handling offamily law matters: 
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volume and scope of family law cases in contemporary American society, 
as well as their iudeterminate nature both individually and systematically, 
exacerbate the difficulty of their resolution.4 
[T]he judicial system present in most states ... contributes to the demise 
of the family unit. Under the current system, it is not uncommon to have 
a family involved with one judge because of an adult abuse proceeding, 
a second judge because of the ensuing divorce, with still another judge 
because of child abuse and neglect allegations, and a fourth judge if the 
abuse allegation led to criminal charges. The fragmented judicial system 
is costly to litigants, inefficient in the use of judicial resources, and can 
result in the issuance of diverse or even conflicting orders affecting the 
family. Also, "too often courthouse resolutions resolve only the legal 
conflicts, leaving unaddressed the underlying personal relationship and 
psychological disputes."S 
Complicating this situation is the fact that almost half of all family 
law litigants are not represented by attomeys,6 primarily due to the liti-
[S]tate courts have developed specialized methods for handling domestic relations cases, 
including family court-related social services agencies. Yet complete, unquestioned deferral 
to the expertise of these courts may not always be warranted. The exact nature of their ex-
pertise has been questioned, and state family law courts have been criticized for their failure 
to develop sufficient mechanisms to handle family law cases. Not only do many judges dis-
like serving on the family courts, but also, judges in many state domestic relations courts 
rotate through a family calendar, remaining for only one year before moving on to a criminal 
ealendar. Even within the family calendar, there will be cases ranging from adoption to do-
mestic violence to equitable distribution at divorce. 
[d. (citations omitted). 
4. See H. TED RUBIN & VICroREUGENEF'LANGO, COURT COORDINATION OF FAMILY CASES 7 
(1992). See also ST. JUSTICE INST., STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS ANNUAL REPORT 1992 
(1994), cited in Amy Stevens, The Business of Law: Lawyers and Clients, WAll ST. J., July I, 1994, 
at B6 (revealing that family law cases constitute abo\lt thirty-five percent of the total number of civil 
cases handled by the majority of our nation's courts, a percentage which constitutes "the largest and 
fastest growing part of the state civil caseload"). Cf. JOHN HUBNER & JILL WOLFSON, SOMEBODY 
ELSE'S CHILDREN: THE COURTS, THE KIDS, AND THE STRUGGLE TO SAVE AMERICA'S TROUBLED 
FAMILIES 141 (1996) (acknowledging the disproportionate effects of socioeconomic status and roce in 
some aspects of family law adjudication by finding that "cases involving families from the higher so-
cial strata rarely corne to trial because the family has financial resources") (emphasis in original); 
Monmd G. Paulsen, Juvenile Courts, Family Courts, and the Poor Man, 54 CAL. L. REV. 694, 701 
(1966) ("Because juvenile courts and family courts serve large numbers of the poor, the poor experi-
ence, in full force, the troubles raised by the problems of those courts."). 
5. Paul A. Williams, A Unified Family Court for Missouri, 63 UMKC L. REV. 383, 383-84 
(1994) (citation omitted) (quoting Ann L. Milne, Family Law From a Family System Perspective-
The Binary Equation, 21 PAC. L.J. 933, 934 (1990» (detailing Missouri's recent legislative efforts to 
create a unified family court). 
6. See Jane C. Murphy, Access to Legal Remedies: The Crisis in Family Law, 8 BYU J. PUB. 
L. 123, 124 (1993) (citation omitted). See also ADVISORY COUNCIL ON FAMILY LEGAL NEEDS OF 
LoW INCOME PERSONS, INCREASING ACCESS TO JUSTICE FOR MARYLAND'S FAMILIES 49 (1992) 
(finding that in 1991, only about 20% oflow-income litigants in family law cases likely received legal 
assistance); Karen Czapanskiy, Domestic Violence, the Family, and the Lawyering Process: Lessons 
from Studies on Gender Bias in the Courts, FAM. L.Q., Summer 1993, at 247, 273-74 (indicating that 
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gants' inability to afford private counselor to secure free legal services. 
As a result, the issue of access to the courts for family law adjudication 
also presents a compelling problem? 
The "crisis in family law,,8 has triggered the need for court reform in 
this area. Organized bar associations at the local, state, and national levels 
have addressed court reform in family law with increasing frequency. One 
concept receiving consideration in family law court reform is the notion of 
a unified family court. 
[A unified family court is] a single court system with comprehensive ju-
risdiction over all cases involving children and relating to the family. 
One specially trained and interested judge addresses the legal and ac-
companying emotional and social issues challenging each family. Then 
under the auspices of the family court judicial action, informal court 
processes and social service agencies and resources are coordinated to 
produce a comprehensive resolution tailored to the individual family's 
legal, personal, emotional, and social needs. The result is a one family-
one judge system that is more efficient and more compassionate for 
families in crisis.9 
Based on its study of the unmet legal needs of children and their 
families, the American Bar Association has recommended the establish-
women comprise the majority of poor people); James Podgers, Chasing the Ideal, A.B.A. J., Aug. 
1994, at 56,58 (discussing the lack of access to legal services and to the justice system for persons at 
and above the poverty line). 
7. See Murphy, supra note 6, at 123. 
8. ld. See Richard L. Marcus, Of Babies and Bathwater: The Prospects for Procedural Prog-
ress, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 761, 762-67 (1993) (defining the court crisis rhetoric to include the litigation 
explosion image, the need for control over litigation by means of court rules, and the seeming indif-
ference of the litigation process to the merits of a case); Donald B. King, Accentuate the Positive-
Eliminate the Negative, 31 FAM. & CONCILIATION CIS. REv. 9 (1993). The author argues for court 
reform in the family law area: 
ld. 
Our present family law court system is one with which neither litigants, attorneys, nor 
judges are happy .... [A]n entirely new process is necessary to handle these most difficult 
cases in a more sensitive and responsive way, a process geared toward helping litigants al-
ready traumatized by the breakup of their marriage, not one that treats them as incremental 
parts on a mass production assembly line. Because the law compels citizens ending their 
marriages to go through the judicial system, government has a duty to provide a system that 
can handle the task in a way that helps its citizens, not one that leaves them worse off finan-
cially and emotionally than when they entered it, not one that costs so much that only the 
wealthy can afford it, and certainly not one that has become so complex that few lawyers, 
fewer judges, and no legislators understand it. We should have a system that helps those we 
require to use it. 
9. WiIIiarns, supra note 5, at 384 (citations omitted). 
474 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:469 
ment of unified family courts in all jurisdictions. 1O Through a two-year 
project funded in late 1996 entitled "Communities, Families, and the Jus-
tice System,"ll the American Bar Association is helping to establish uni-
fied family courts in six cities.12 A recent national conference of bar 
presidents also has called for the creation of unified family courts. 13 This 
notion of specialized subject matter courts,14 such as unified family courts, 
already has resulted in the creation of business courts,15 adult drug 
courts,16 juvenile drug courts,17 teen courts,18 domestic violence courts, 19 
and custody courts.20 
10. See A.B.A. PRESIDENTIAL WORKING GROUP ON THE UNMET LEGAL NEEDS OF CHILDREN 
AND THEIR FAMILIES, AMERICA'S CHILDREN AT RISK: A NATIONAL AGENDA FOR LEGAL ACTION 54 
(1993) [hereinafter A.B.A. PRESIDENTIAL WORKING GROUP]. See also Williams, supra note 5, at 384. 
II. R. William Ide III, ABA News Center-From the Chair, UNIFIED FAM. CHRON., May 1997, 
at 2. 
12. See Unified Family Site Update, UNIFIED FAM. CHRON., May 1997, at 1. See also Patricia 
G. Bames, It May Take A Village . .. Or a Specialized Coun to Address Family Problems, A.B.A. J., 
Dec. 1996, at 22. 
13. See Mary Wechsler, Unified Family Courts, THE CONFERENCE CALL, Summer 1995, at 1. 
14. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Two Cheers for Specialization, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 67, 69-71 
(1995) (defining specialized courts as courts with specialized, restricted subject matter jurisdiction in a 
single area of law, even where the subject matter jurisdiction is not exclusive, and advocating the 
benefits of specialized state courts in areas of excessive litigation). 
IS. See id.; Ad Hoc Committee on Business Courts, Business Courts: Towards a More Efficient 
Judiciary, 52 BUS. LAW. 947, 961 (1997) (reporting on the high success rate of established business 
courts and recommending the creation of such courts in jurisdictions with a high volume of complex 
commercial cases); Margaret M. Eckenbrecht, A Commercial Venture, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1996, at 35 
(reporting that fifteen states have or plan to have business courts to handle complex commercial 
cases). 
16. See James R. Brown, Drug Diversion Couns: Are They Needed and Will They Sl/cceed in 
Breaking the Cycle of Drug-Related Crime?, 23 NEW ENG. J. CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 63, 84, 93-
98 (1997) (describing the goals of drug courts genernlly and the operations of drug courts in Miami, 
Florida, and Boston, Massachusetts); William D. McColl, Comment, Baltimore City's Drug Treatment 
Court: Theory and Practice in an Emerging Field, 55 MD. L. REV. 467, 468, 470 (1996) (reviewing a 
drug court operating in Baltimore, Maryland, one of at least 35 such courts operating in the United 
States whose purpose is to attempt to treat or rehabilitate addicts rather than to punish them, and find-
ing that the guiding philosophy for drug treatment courts is primarily therapeutic or medical in na-
ture); Michael J. Sniffen, University Study Finds Drug Courts Working for Nonviolent Offenders, TilE 
DAILY REC. (Baltimore), May 10, 1996, at 10 (reporting that an American University study revealed a 
decreased recidivism rate of less than 4% for nonviolent drug offenders who were ordered into treat-
ment for their addictions rather than incarcerated). 
17. See Marilyn Roberts, Jennifer Brophy & Caroline Cooper, The Juvenile Drug Court Move-
ment, FACi' SHEET #59 (Office of Juv. Just. and Delinquency Prevention), Mar. 1997, at I, 2 
(discussing the development and operation of juvenile drug courts). 
18. See Allison R. Shiff & David B. Wexler, Teen Coun: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Per-
spective, 4 CRIM. LAw BULL. 342, 343 (1996) (reporting that more than ISO teen courts exist nation-
wide where teens who commit their first misdemeanors appear in a court setting controlled by their 
peers as an alternative to juvenile court and with the goals of effective intervention and decreased re-
cidivism). 
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Grappling with the subject of court reform in family law presents 
complex and daunting challenges.21 The traditional adversarial nature of 
court systems is inappropriate for the resolution of family legal matters. 
As Professor Menkel-Meadow has stated, 
[t]he binary nature of the adversary system and its particular methods 
and tactics often may thwart some of the essential goals of any legal 
system .... 
Modem life presents us with complex problems, often requiring complex 
and multifaceted solutions. Courts, with ... their "limited remedial 
imaginations," may not be the best institutional settings for resolving 
some of the disputes that we continue to put before them.22 
Court involvement in family law necessitates that the parties frame 
social problems as legal issues and that the court assign fault or blame, 
thereby complicating any solution that is mutually acceptable to the liti-
gants.23 Moreover, court reform is hampered further by how judges and 
legislators historically have attempted to impose their personal sense of 
morality in the determination of family legal issues rather than to decide 
19. See Art Barnum, DuPage Total Crimes Drop, But Robberies Increase 49%, CHI. TRIB., 
Apr. 27, 1997, at 1 (referring to the opening of a special domestic violence courtroom due to an in-
crease in the number of domestic violence cases); Christopher Downey, New Bronx Courtroom Seeks 
to Speed Resolution of Domestic Violence Cases, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 22, 1992, at I (describing a special-
ized court designed to process criminal domestic violence cases more quickly in an effort to assist 
victims). See also Brown, supra note 16, at 99 (arguing that drug courts can operate as prototypes for 
domestic violence courts, another form of specialty court offering intensive treatment of offenders). 
20. See Christina P. Burnham, Connecticut's Child Custody Court, FAM. ADVOC., Spring 1997, 
at 43, 43-45, 62 (detailing the recent creation and success of Connecticut's Regional Family Trial 
Docket as a potential settlement mechanism for the resolution of complex custody cases through ful1-
day and interdisciplinary pretrial conferences with a team of two special masters, one family law at-
torney, and one family therapist). 
21. See Jean Koh Peters, Jose and Sarah's Story: The Usefulness of Roleplay in an Ethical/y-
Based Evaluation of the Present and Future Family Court, 21 PAC. L.J. 897 (1990). 
22. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversary System in a Postnwdem, Multicul-
tural World, 38 WM. & MARY L. REv. 5, 5-7 (1996) (arguing that the adversary system is inadequate 
to satisfy many important dispute resolution goals, such as determining facts and learning the truth). 
See also King, supra note 8, at 10. King provides a description of the adversary system: 
Id. 
[T]he adversary system is a monster with a life and a momentum of its own that too often 
places the case beyond the control of the parties, their attorneys, and the judges. The system 
creates an accusatory atmosphere that destroys communication and cooperation. The adver-
sary system works wel1 for litigants who will never see each other again, but it is too slow, 
too expensive, and too impersonal and does not help divorcing spouses who will have to re-
main in contact with each other for years because of children or support obligations. 
23. See Ralph Cavanagb & Austin Sara!, Thinking About Courts: Toward and Beyond a Juris-
prudence of Judicial Competence, 14 L. & SOC'Y REv. 371, 395 (1980). 
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cases based upon the realities of families' lives.24 Such processes have 
contributed to ineffective family justice. Family law adjudicatory systems 
thus must transform in order to resolve disputes in a manner consistent 
with the dramatic changes in family structure and family function in 
America over the last few decades.25 
This Article evaluates how America's courts adjudicate family law 
matters and advocates systemic change by offering an interdisciplinary 
ecological and therapeutic approach26 to the creation of unified family 
courts. The proposed model structure equips the courts with a dispute 
resolution system that helps judges and other court professionals under-
stand and address the many influences on human behavior and family life, 
24. See Gary B. Melton & Brian L. Wilcox, Changes in Family Law and Family Life: Chal-
lenges for Psychology, 44 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1213, 1214 (1989). See also Frances E. Olsen, The 
Myth of State Intervention in the Family, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 835, 854-55 (1985) (suggesting 
that courts decide family law cases based on policy considerations such that the deeisions then affect 
the family roles and relationships). See generally Robert Rubinson, The Polyphonic: Courtroom: Ex-
panding the Possibilities of Judicial Discourse, 101 DICK. L. REV. 3, 4 (1996) (stating that "Uudicial] 
opinions are typically monologues which reject exploration of complex issues of meaning in favor of 
the simple exercise of justifying a result") (citation omitted). 
25. See Lee E. Teitelbaum, The Family as a System: A Preliminary Sketch, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 
537, 539-40. Teitelbaum summarizes changes in family structure and family function: 
[T]he sharp decline in marriage rates during the 1970s and 1980s is a striking phenome-
non--especially coupled with the concomitant sharp increase in nonmarital cohabitation. A 
substantially increasing rate of premarital sexual relations has been documented, resulling in 
an increase in nonmarital childbearing among young women. And although rates of marital 
dissolution are not very much higher than they were at the end of the nineteenth century, the 
causes of family disruption have changed dramatically. The rate of dissolutions caused by 
death of a husband or wife has declined sharply, but it has been matched (indeed, somewhat 
overmatched) by an increase in divorce rates that now reaches half of all marriages con-
tracted during the 1970s .... 
. . . The assumption by public agencies of substantial, if partial, responsibility for "family" 
functions, and the perception that families no longer discharge important social functions, 
are themselves important aspects of change. Another important, and related, area of change 
concerns the legal and normative approach to families. The decline in the perceived func-
tional importance of families and the positivization of law-that is, the reassignment of 
regulatory responsibility from families and other social systems to specialized bodies of law 
and organizations not based on kinship-have had significant implications for how we un-
derstand the family and, cO{lSequently, for family law and policy. 
Id. at 539-40 (citations omitted). See also Barbara A. Babb, An Interdisciplinary Approach to Family 
Law Jurisprudence: Application of an Ecological and Therapeutic Perspective, 72 IND. L.J. 775, 777-
80 (1997) (detailing changes in the structure and function of the American family in the past few dce-
ades); Gary B. Melton, Children, Families, and the Courts in the Twenty-First Century, 66 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1993, 1994-2002 (1993) (describing the transformation of family life in the United States during 
the last thirty years). 
26. See Babb, supra note 25, at 807 (describing an ecological and therapeutic approach to fam-
ily law jurisprudence as one which "enables judges to develop a holistic assessment of the family's 
legal and social needs and to devise more comprehensive legal remedies"). See also infra Part 111 
(explaining and discussing an interdisciplinary ecological and therapeutic approach to the creation of 
unified family courts). 
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thereby resulting in more pragmatic and effective dispositions of contem-
porary family legal issues. 
Part I of the Article reviews existing family law adjudicatory schemes 
by means of a systems analysis, a methodology designed to manage 
complicated issues in a manner subject to objective verificationP Sys-
tems analysis allows a structured review of court operations. This type of 
analysis determines the parts of the system, examines the relationship of 
the parts to the whole, and evaluates how to ensure that the system's fimc-
tioning is more efficient, consistent, and improved.28 The author presents 
a comprehensive overview of the results of her nationwide survey deter-
mining how each state's courts handle family law matters, including an as-
sessment of the court structure, the subject matter jurisdiction, the term 
length of judges, and the case assignment method. The survey results, re-
vealing a striking amount of variety and inconsistency in how America's 
courts process family law cases, illustrate the dramatic need for "a funda-
mental rethinking and restructuring of the legal system.,,29 
Part II provides a theoretical perspective on court reform and analyzes 
the salient issues relevant to family law adjudicatory system reform. 
These issues include a philosophy of court reform, managerial considera-
tions incidental to the court reform process, the value of specialized courts 
and specialized judges, and the roles of other court system professionals. 
Part III proposes a design to create a unified family court based upon 
an interdisciplinary ecological and therapeutic approach to family law ad-
judication.3o The ecology of human development,31 a social science re-
search paradigm, provides the framework to construct the court. Incorpo-
27. See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Systems Approach to Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 479, 480-81 
(1997) (describing systems analysis methodology and some examples of systems projects, particularly 
in the fields of debtor-creditor and bankruptcy law). See also Susan L. Brooks, A Family Systems 
Paradigm for Legal Decision Making Affecting Child Custody, 6 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'y 1 
(1997) (advocating a systems approach to child custody decisionmaking based upon a nonjudgmental 
consideration of the child in the context of the family and the family's interaction); Teitelbaum, supra 
note 25, at 537-41 (describing the family as an interactive economic, moral, and educational system in 
its internal operations and its relation to society). 
28. See LoPucki, supra note 27, at 487. 
29. Brooks, supra note 27, at 5. See also Edward P. Mulvey, Family Courts: The Issue of Rea-
sonable Goals, 6 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 49,50 (1982) ("[T]rue adoption ofa family perspective by the 
legal system will involve more than a mere semantic shift."). 
30. See Babb, supra note 25, at 801-07 (proposing a paradigm for family law jurisprudence that 
utilizes an interdisciplinary ecological and therapeutic perspective for family law decisionmaking). 
31. See generally URIE BRONFENBRENNER, THE ECOLOGY OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT (1979); 
infra Part lll.A (explaining the ecology of human development). 
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ration of therapeutic jurisprudeuce32 as the underlying goal of the court's 
operation provides an organizational philosophy around which to design 
the system's components. The proposal details the structure, jurisdiction, 
staffing, procedure, and function of this court. This archetypic unified 
family court, which considers a family's problems in a comprehensive and 
coordinated manuer, should serve as a blueprint for nationwide family law 
court reform. Adopting this model can promote dispute resolution out-
comes which euable individuals and families to address more effectively 
their underlying family legal issues and to improve their functioning. 
I. SETIING THE STAGE FOR COURT REFORM 
A. A HISTORY OF THE FAMILY COURT 
"'Family court' is a term with no agreed meaning."33 Many courts 
call themselves "family courts" without fully considering the implications 
of that term, while others consolidate their treatment of family legal mat-
ters without specifically calliug themselves "family courtS."34 The notion 
of a family court suggests a separate court or a separate division of a state 
court of general jurisdiction that exercises comprehensive subject matter 
jurisdiction35 over all legal issues related to children and families.36 De-
fiued most simply, a family court is a single forum within which to adjudi-
cate the full range of family law issues,37 based on the notion that court ef-
32. David Wexler conceptualizes therapeutic jurisprudence as follows: 
Therapeutic jurisprudence is the study of the role of law as a therapeutic agent. It looks at 
the law as a social force that, like it or not, may produce therapeutic or anti-therapeutic con-
sequences. Such consequences may flow from substantive rules, legal procedures, or from 
the behavior of legal actors (lawyers or judges). 
David B. Wexler, Putting Mental Health Into Mental Health Law: Therapeutic Jurisprudence, ill 
EsSAYS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE 3,8 (David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick eds., 1991) (cita-
tion omitted). 
33. LINDA SZThfANSKI, THERESA HOMISAK & E. HUNTER HURST, III, POUCY ALTERNATIVES 
AND CURRENT COURT PRACTICE IN THE SPECIAL PROBLEM AREAS OF JURISDICTION OVER THE FAMILY 
6 (1993). Accord Robert W. Page, Family Courts: An Effective Judicial Approach to the Resolutio/l 
of Family Disputes, Iuv. & FAM. CT. I., 1993Nol. 44:1, at 7. 
34. See William C. Gordon, Establishing a Family Court System, Iuv. lUST., Nov. 1977, at 9. 
See also Robert E. Shepherd, Ir., The Unified Family Court: An Idea Whose Time Has Finally Come, 
CRIM. lUST., Fall 1993, at 37, 37-38 (discussing the variety among family courts regarding their sub-
ject matter jurisdiction and indicating that the meaning of "family court" is unclear). 
35. See supra note 1 (defining comprehensive subject matter jurisdiction). 
36. See SANFORD N. KATZ & JEFFREY A. KUHN, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A MODEL FAMILY 
COURT 1 (1991). 
37. See SZYMANSKI ET AL .• supra note 33, at 1. 
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fectiveness and efficiency increase when the court resolves a family's legal 
problems in as few appearances as possible.38 
Historically, the concept of a family court evolved about the same 
time as the juvenile court movement.39 While Chicago inaugurated the 
first juvenile court in 1899,40 society's concern with the effects of a 
broader range of family legal proceedings on families' lives led to the 
creation of another category of specialized courts as a means to improve 
38. See id. at 5. 
39. See Henna Hill Kay, A Family Court: The California Proposal, 56 CAL. L. REV. 1205 
(1968). See also RUBIN & RANGO, supra note 4, at 63; Leonard P. Edwards, The Relationship of 
Family and Juvenile Courts in Child Abuse Cases, 27 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 201, 205-06 (1987) 
(distinguishing family courts, which provide primarily a private dispute resolution service for the liti-
gants, from juvenile courts, which involve the court's child protection function through both child 
abuse and neglect and juvenile delinquency jurisdiction). While an analysis of the juvenile justice 
system is beyond the scope of this Article, investigation and evaluation of that system abounds. See, 
e.g., Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-Imagining Childhood and Reconstructing the Legal Order: The Case for 
Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1083 (1991) (describing changes experienced by the 
juvenile court, along with factors contributing to those changes, and advocating the abolition of the 
juvenile court); Janet E. Ainsworth, Youth Justice in a Unified Court: Response to Critics of Juvenile 
Court Abolition, 36 B.C. L. REV. 927 (1995) (advocating the complete abolition of the juvenile justice 
system and calling for the creation of a unified criminal justice system); Bruce A. Boyer, Jurisdic-
tional Conflicts Between Juvenile Courts and Child Welfare Agencies: The Uneasy Relationship Be-
tween Institutional Co-Parents, 54 MD. L. REv. 377 (1995) (analyzing the potentially conflicting re-
lationship between the juvenile court system and child welfare agencies regarding child-related 
decisionmaking and suggesting a conflict resolution technique to address this situation); Leonard P. 
Edwards, The Juvenile Court and the Role of the Juvenile Court Judge, JUV. & FAM. Cr. J., 1992/Vol. 
43:2, at I (describing comprehensively the history and functions of the juvenile court and arguing for 
its continuation and improvement); Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court, 75 
MINN. L. REV. 691 (1991) (examining contemporary juvenile courts by analyzingjurisdictional,juris-
prudential, and procedural refonns); Barry C. Feld, Violent Youth and Public Policy: A Case Study of 
Juvenile Justice Law Refonn, 79 MINN. L. REV. 965 (1995) (analyzing juvenile courts through cases 
studies and analyzing proposed legislative initiatives representing states' responses to juvenile crime); 
Gary B. Melton, Taking Gault Seriously: Toward a New Juvenile Court, 68 NEB. L. REV. 146 (1989) 
(arguing, on the basis of social science knowledge, for the creation of an entirely new juvenile court to 
protect juveniles); Michael Kennedy Burke, Comment, This Old Court: Abolitionists Once Again Line 
Up the Wrecking Ball on the Juvenile Court When All It Needs Is a Few Minor Alterations, 26 U. TOL. 
L. REV. 1027 (1995) (addressing claims of juvenile court abolitionists and suggesting new procedures 
to correct juvenile justice system inadequacies); John N. Kane, Jr., Note, Dispositional Authority and 
Decision Making in New York's Juvenile Justice System: Discretion at Risk, 45 SYRACUSE L. REV. 
925 (1994) (evaluating legislative and policy changes to New York's juvenile justice system and pro-
posing solutions to improve decisionmaking in this system); Cynthia R. Noon, Comment, Waiving 
Goodbye to Juvenile Defendants, Getting Smart vs. Getting Tough, 49 U. MIAMI L. REV. 431 (1994) 
(examining Florida's juvenile justice system and suggesting the reduction of juvenile crime by focus-
ing on its sources); Michael Riley, Corridors of Agony, TiME, Jan. 27, 1992, at 48 (studying the op-
eration of the Baltimore City Juvenile Court in Maryland as a representative of similar courts across 
the country and documenting the extreme nature of the system's problems). 
40. See HUBNER & WOLFSON, supra note 4, at 5, 69. 
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court performance.41 Beginning in 1914, in Cincinnati, Ohio, courts with 
jurisdiction over both children's and families' cases began to appear. They 
also appeared in other selected cities, including Des Moines, Iowa; St. 
Louis, Missouri; Omaha, Nebraska; Portland, Oregon; Gulfport, Missis-
sippi; and Baton Rouge, Louisiana.42 
In 1959, three working groups collaborated to produce the Standard 
Family Court Act ("the Act"), designed to assist states interested in creat-
ing family COUrts.43 These drafters defined the purpose of the Act as fol-
lows: 
The purpose of a family court act is to protect and safeguard family life 
in general and family units in particular by affording to family members 
all possible help in resolving their justiciable problems and conflicts 
arising from their interpersonal relationships, in a single court, with one 
specially qualified staff under one leadership, with a common philoso-
phy and purpose, working as a unit, with one set of family records, all in 
one place, under the direction of one or more specially qualified 
judges.44 
The Act described the family court as a tribunal that could, if neces-
sary, deviate from traditional adversary procedures to resolve family con-
flicts, while decreasing litigants' hostility.45 In addition, a significant fea-
ture of family courts as defined in the Act was their ability to integrate 
child and family legal proceedings in an effort to administer justice more 
efficiently in these cases.46 This followed from the belief that a court with 
a comprehensive view of all of a family's legal problems could resolve 
that family's legal issues more quickly and capably than could a system 
requiring the family to appear in several different tribunals for adjudica-
tion of similar matters.47 
41. See SZYMANSKI ET AL., supra note 33, at 3. 
42. See RUBIN & FLANGO, supra note 4, at 63. 
43. Seeid. 
44. Committee on the Standard Family Court Act of the National Probation and Parole Asso-
ciation, Standard Family Court Act-Text and Commentary,S NAT'L PROBATION & PAROLE ASS'N J. 
99, 106 (1959) [hereinafter Standard Family Court Act]. 
45. See RUBIN & FLANGO, supra note 4, at 64. 
46. See id. at 65. See also Roscoe Pound, The Place of the Family Court in the Judicial System, 
5 NAT'L PROBATION & PAROLE ASS'N J. 161, 164 (1959). Pound defines the need for integrated 
handling of child and family legal proceedings: 
ld. 
Treating the family situation as a series of single separate controversies may often not do 
justice to the whole or to the several separate parts. The severnl parts are likely to be dis-
torted in consid~ring them apart from the whole, and the whole may be left undetermined in 
a series of adjudications of the parts. 
47. See RUBIN & FLANGO, supra note 4, at 65. 
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The articulated purpose of the Standard Family Court Act presumed 
that judges with a particular qualification and expertise in child and family 
legal matters would hear these cases and would provide continuity for the 
determination of a single family's case. The Act acknowledged the need 
to assist these judges by providing the family court with a case manage-
ment system capable of containing the family's entire court records in an 
easily accessible database.48 
After the Act's publication, several states created statewide family 
courts. Rhode Island began its family court in 1961, New York began a 
separate family court in 1962, and Hawaii established its family division in 
1965.49 Over the next several decades, Connecticut, Delaware, South 
Carolina, New Jersey, and Vermont established statewide family courts.50 
During this same time period, other states passed legislation creating per-
missive family courts in certain areas within their geographic jurisdic-
tions.51 In addition, some states began the family court process by expand-
ing their juvenile courts to include determination of other family.issues, 
thereby transforming them into family courts. 52 
As early as 1959, then, with the pUblication of the Standard Family 
Court Act, policymakers offered a valuable court reform proposal struc-
tured to allow one court the opportunity to consider and to resolve all of a 
family's related legal problems. Drafters of the Act foresaw the expertise 
of the judges sitting in this court and the social services available to the 
families as features necessary to improve the lives of individuals and 
families. 
48. See id. See, e.g., SZYMANSKI ET AL., supra note 33, at 11. The authors discuss FACTS 
(Family Automated Case Tracking System), a modem, computerized statewide case management 
system operating in New Jersey: 
[This case tracking system is] designed to be easily accessible to judges and staff, as well as 
court and non-court agencies, by remote tenninals tied into the computer-based system. 
This system contains a family file of all infonnation developed as a result of previous and 
pending court appearances of each family member. This file provides the court with infor-
mation about the strengths, weaknesses, and capabilities of the family as a unit. 
[d. (citation omitted). See also RUBIN & FLANGO, supra note 4, at 11-12,36 (discussing the operation 
of FACTS). 
49. See RUBIN & FLANGO, supra note 4, at 63-64. See also infra Appendix A; Kay, supra note 
39, at 1225-32 (detailing an early family court proposal for California emanating from the California 
Governor's Commission on the Family). 
50. See RUBIN & FLANGO, supra note 4, at 64. See also infra Appendix A. 
5 I. See RUBIN & FLANGO, supra note 4, at 64. See also infra Appendix B. 
52. See Shepherd, supra note 34, at 37. 
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In order to assess whether our nation's court systems have achieved 
the laudable goals articulated in the Standard Family Court Act of 1959, or 
whether those systems must change again to resolve more effectively fam-
ily legal matters, one must examine how courts currently address the many 
challenges presented by family law decisionmaking. A review of the 
author's survey results of how each of the fifty states and the District of 
Columbia presently adjudicates family law matters, depicted in Appendi-
ces A through D, guides this analysis. The survey was conducted through 
telephone interviews with court personnel in the fifty states and the Dis-
trict of Columbia from 1995 through 1997. In the interviews, the author 
sought to: (1) identify for each jurisdiction which court or courts decide 
family law matters; (2) understand each system's goals by assessing how 
comprehensively the system defines family law adjudication; and (3) de-
termine each system's function by describing judicial and case assigument 
methods employed in the system.53 
1. Court StructureJor Family Law Decisionmaking 
The survey begins by identifying for each jurisdiction both the court 
or courts that decide family law matters and the structure of those courts.54 
Does the system provide a separate, distinct forum to determine family le-
gal matters, or do several tribunals exist within each system to resolve 
these issues? Is the family law adjudicatory system a separate court, a 
separate component of an existing trial court, or a part of the court's gen-
eral civil trial docket? The results of this analysis reveal both whether the 
court system offers a coordinated approach to family law adjudication and 
whether the system ascribes a sense of importance to the processing of 
family law cases. 
At present, only eleven jurisdictions in the United States determine 
family law matters for the entire jurisdiction within a separate family court 
or within a separate family division or department of an existing trial 
53. See LoPucki, supra note 27, at 497-505 (explaining in detail each step of a multi-step proc-
ess of systems analysis methodology as applied to legal systems). See also infra Appendix E 
(detailing the survey questions asked of court personnel). 
54. See, e.g., Cahn, supra note 3, at 1097. Cahn comments on the relative importance that 
court systems ascribe to family law cases: "Family law has a comparatively low status in the hierarchy 
of cases, in both federal and state courts, and domestic relations cases are perceived as involving 
'burdensome, fact-bound and often protracted ... disputes.'" ld. (citation omitted). 
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court.55 Among these eleven jurisdictions, five states have a completely 
separate and distinct family court.56 Five other jurisdictions handle family 
law matters within a separate division of a trial court,57 and one state as-
signs family law cases to a separate department of a trial court.58 
Fourteen states, on the other hand, manage family law cases within a 
separate family court or within a separate family division of an existing 
trial court only in selected areas of the state.59 Among these fourteen 
states, two states have created separate family courts in those limited geo-
graphic areas,60 nine states have created family divisions within existing 
55. These jurisdictions are Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, Massachusetts, 
New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Vermont, and Washington. See DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 10, §§ 901-1077 (1974 & Supp. 1996); D.C. Code Ann. § 11-902 (1995); In re Report of the 
Comm'n on Family Courts, 588 So. 2d 586 (Fla. 1991); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 571-1 to 571-87 (1997); 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 215, §§ 1-63 (1989 & Supp. 1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:4A-20 to 2A:4A-91 
(\Vest 1987 & Supp. 1997); N.Y. FAM. CT. Acr §§ 11 1-1211 (McKinney 1987 & Supp. 1997); R.I. 
GEN. LAWS §§ 8-10-1 to 8-10-45 (1985 & Supp. 1997); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 20-7-736 to 20-7-780 
(Law Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 1996); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, §§ 451-467 (Supp. 1997); WASH. REV. 
CODE ANN. §§ 26.12.010 to 26.12.240 (West 1997). See also Appendix A. 
56. These states are Delaware, New York, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Vermont. See 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 901-973 (Supp. 1996); N.Y. FAM. CT. Acr §§ 111-1211 (McKinney 1983 
& Supp. 1997); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 8-10-1 to 8-10-45 (1985 & Supp. 1996); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 20-7-
736 to 20-7-780 (Law Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 1996); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, §§ 451-467 (Supp. 1997). 
57. These jurisdictions are the District of Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, New Jersey, and Washing-
ton. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-902 (1995); In re Report of the Comm'n on Family Courts, 588 So. 2d 
586 (Fla. 1991); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 571-1 to 571-87 (1997); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:4A-20 to 
2A:4A-91 (\Vest 1987 & Supp. 1997); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 26.12.010 to 26.12.240 (West 
1997). 
58. This state is Massachusetts. See MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 211B, § 1 (1989 & Supp. 1996). 
59. These states are Alabama, Colorado, Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, 
New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Wisconsin. See ALA. CODE § 12-
17-24.1 (1995); Telephone Interview with Cheri Kester, Office of the Colorado State Court Adminis-
trator (Apr. 10, 1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 20-438 (1995); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:1401 to 
13:1410 (\Vest 1983 & Supp. 1997); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 43-23-1 to 43-23-55 (1993 & Supp. 1997); 
MO. REV. STAT. §§ 487.010 to 487.190 (Supp. 1997); NEV. REv. STAT. §§ 3.0105-3.5000 (Supp. 
1995); Telephone Interviews with Delores Saaverda, Clerk of the New Mexico Court (May 7, 1996), 
and Fern Goodman, Staff Attorney, Administrative Office of the New Mexico Courts (Mar. 27, 1997); 
Telephone Interviews with Doug Stephens, Project Manager of Ohio Family Court Feasibility Study 
(May 8, 1996; Apr. 24, 1997); Telephone Interviews with Sheila Sewell, Deputy Director of the Okla-
homa Administrative Office of the Courts (May 7, 1996; Mar. 27, 1997); OR. REV. STAT. § 3.405 
(1995); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 951 (West 1981); TEx. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 24.601 (West 1988); 
Telephone Interviews with Ron Witkowiak, Wisconsin District Court Administrator (Aug. 28, 1995), 
and Cindy Hapka, Office of Wisconsin District Court Administrator (Mar. 20,1997). See also infra 
AppendixB. 
60. These states are Louisiana and Mississippi. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:1407 (\Vest 
Supp. 1997); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-23-1 (1993). 
484 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:469 
trial courts,61 two states utilize departments of existing trial courts to hear 
family law matters,62 and one state has separate courts in larger counties 
and divisions of existing courts in smaller counties.63 
Nine states have planned or currently operate pilot family court proj-
ects in an effort to explore new ways to handle family law matters.64 
Seven states among the nine already operate pilot family court projects,65 
six as divisions of existing trial courts and one as a separate family court.66 
Two other states must design and implement family courts, having re-
ceived legislative mandates to do SO.67 One of these states plans to operate 
the court as a division of the trial court,68 and the other state expects to es-
tablish a separate family court.69 
61. These states are Alabama, Colorado, Missouri, Nevada, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, 
Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. See ALA. CODE § 12-17-24.1 (1995); Telephone Interview with Cheri 
Kester, Office of the Colorado State Court Administrator (Apr. 10, 1997); Mo. REV. STAT. § 487.010 
(Supp. 1997); NEV. REV. STAT. § 3.0105 (Supp. 1995); Telephone Interviews with Fern Goodman, 
Staff Attorney, Administrative Office of the New Mexico Courts (June 5,1996; Mar. 27, 1997; Apr. 
24, 1997); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.011 (Anderson 1996); Telephone Intcrview with Sheila 
Sewell, Deputy Director of the Administrative Office of the Oklahoma Courts (Mar. 27, 1997); 42 PA. 
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 951 (West 1981); Telephone Interviews with Ron Witkowiak, Wisconsin District 
Court Administrator (Aug. 28, 1995), and Cindy Hapka, Office of Wisconsin District Court Adminis-
trator (Mar. 20,1997). 
62. These states are Kansas and Oregon. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 20-438 (1995); OR. REV. 
STAT. § 3.405 (1993). 
63. This state is Texas. See Telephone Interview with Jim Hutchinson, Texas Supreme Court 
Administration (Mar. 27,1997). 
64. These states are California, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, New 
Hampshire, and Virginia. See CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 20000-20043 (\Vest 1994 & Supp. 1997); STATE 
BAR OF GA. COMM'N ON FAMILY COURTS, REpORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS (1995) [hereinafter GA. 
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS]; Telephone Interview with Joy L. Lee, Court Administrator, Sixth 
Municipal District, Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois (Aug. 1, 1997); Kuprion v. Fitzgerald, 888 
S.W.2d 679 (Ky. 1994); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 451 (West Supp. 1995); 1993 Md. Laws 198, 
1996 Md. Laws 13, 1997 Md. Laws 3, and MD. CT. RULE 16-204 (effective July 1, 1998); MICH. 
COMPo LAWS ANN. §§ 600.1001-600.1043 (West Supp. 1997) (effective January 1, 1998); 1995 N.H. 
Laws 152; VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16.1-226 to 16.1-348 (Michie 1996 & Supp. 1997). See also infra Ap-
pendix C. 
65. The seven states are California, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, and New 
Hampshire. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 20000-20043 (West 1994); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-5-26 (Supp. 
1997); Telephone Interview with Joy L. Lee, Court Administrator, Sixth Municipal District, Circuit 
Court of Cook County, Illinois (Aug. 1, 1997); Kuprion v. Fitzgerald, 888 S.W.2d 679 (Ky. 1994); 
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, §§ 1,451 (West Supp. 1995); 1993 Md. Laws 198, 1996 Md. Laws 13, 
and 1997 Md. Laws 3; 1995 N.H. Laws 152:2. 
66. This state is New Hampshire. See 1995 N.H. Laws 152:2. 
67. These two states are Michigan and Virginia. See MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 600.1001 
(West Supp. 1997); Telephone Interview with Lelia Hooper, Director, Virginia Family Court Project 
(May 29,1997). 
68. This state is Michigan. See MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 600.1003 (West Supp. 1997). 
69. This state is Virginia. See VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-241 (Michie Supp. 1997). 
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The remaining seventeen states do not possess any specialized or 
separate system to handle family law matters; instead, these states process 
family law cases as part of the general civil trial docket.7o 
70. These states are Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Minnesota, 
Montana, Nebraska, North Carolina, North Dakota, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, West Virginia, 
and Wyoming. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 22.10.020, 22.15.030 (Michie 1996), ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.65 
(Michie 1995), Telephone Interviews with Stephanie Cole, Deputy Director, Administrative Office of 
the Alaska Courts (July 11, 1995; Mar. 5, 1997); ARIZ. CONST. art. VI, §§ 14, 15, ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 25-311 (\Vest Supp. 1997J, ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-202 (West Supp. 1996), ARIZ. REv. 
STAT. ANN. § 8-102.1 (West 1989), Telephone Interviews with Mary Lou Quintana, Arizona Division 
Director (July 11, 1995), and Agnes Felton, Division Director of Arizona Court Services (Mar. 5, 
1997); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-306 (Michie Supp. 1995), ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-13-201 (Michie 
1994), ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-12-301 (Michie 1993), ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-1-104 (Michie 1987), 
Telephone Interviews with James D. Gingerich, Director of Arkansas Administrative Office of the 
Courts (June 23,1995), and Leslie Steen, Clerk of the Arkansas Supreme Court (Mar. 5, 1997); CONN. 
GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 46b-42, 46b-93, 46b-I21, 46b-174, 46b-I80 (West 1995), Telephone Interviews 
with Robert Tompkins, Deputy Director of the Family Division, a social services arm of the Superior 
Court in Connecticut (Aug. 16, 1995), and Paula Campo, Connecticut Family Division Administrator 
(Mar. 5, 1997); IDAHO CODE § 32-715 (1996), IDAHO CODE §§ 16-2002(a), 20-502, 20-503 (Supp. 
1996), IDAHO CODE §§ 16-1602, 16-1603 (1979 & Supp. 1997), Telephone Interviews with Thomas 
Frost, Legal Counsel, Administrative Office of the Idaho Courts (July 7,1995), and Jana Saxton, As-
sistant to Mr. Frost (Mar. 20, 1997); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-2-1.1 (Michie Supp. 1996), IND. CODE 
ANN. §§ 33-4-4-3, 33-8-2-9, 33-8-2-10 (Michie 1992), IND. CODE ANN. §§ 33-5-4.5-1 to 33-5-50-11 
(Michie 1992 & Supp. 1996), Telephone Interviews with Jack Stark, Staff Attorney, Division ofIndi-
ana State Court Administration (July 17, 1995; Mar. 27, 1997), and Jeff Berkovitz, Director ofIndiana 
Probate and Juvenile Services (July 3, 1997); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 598.2, 600.3, 602.7101 (West 
1997), IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 232.61, 232.109 (West 1994 & Supp. 1997), Telephone Interviews with 
David Ewert, Director ofIowa Appellate Screening (July 7, 1995; Mar. 20, 1997); MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 260.019, 260.021 (\Vest 1992), MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.111 (West 1992 & Supp. 1997), MINN. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 518.002-518.66 (West 1990 & Supp. 1997), Telephone Interviews with Steve Forest-
ell, Director of Minnesota Judicial Advisory Service (July 27, 1995; Apr. 3, 1997); MONT. CODE ANN. 
§§ 40-4-104, 40-6-109, 41-3-103, 41-5-203 (1997), Telephone Interviews with Chris Wethern, Staff 
Attorney, Administrative Office of the Montana Courts (June 29, 1995; Mar. 20, 1997); NEB. REv. 
STAT. §§ 24-517 (1995 & Supp. 1996), NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 42-348, 43-247 (1993 & Supp. 1996), 
Telephone Interviews with Joseph C. Steele, Nebraska Court Administrator (June 29, 1995), and 
Sherry Lampe, Assistant Nebraska Court Administrator (Mar. 27, 1997); N.C. CONST. art. VI, § I, 
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7A-5I7(9), 7A-523, 50-4 (1995), Telephone Interviews with Fred M. Morelock, 
North Carolina District Court Judge (June 29, 1995), and Betty Wall, Assistant Clerk of the North 
Carolina Supreme Court (Mar. 20, 1997); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-04 (1989), N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 
14-12.1-02, 14-15-01 (1981), N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-03 (1974), Telephone Interviews with Sherry 
Mills Moore, Chair of Ad Hoc Commission on North Dakota Family Law (Aug. 30, 1995), and Keithe 
Nelson, North Dakota Courts Administrator (Mar. 27, 1997); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 25-3-1, 25-5A-
5,25-6-6, 26-7A-2 (Michie 1992), S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 25-10-2, 26-7A-1 (Michie 1992 & Supp. 
1997), Telephone Interviews with Michael Buenger, South Dakota State Court Administrator (Aug. 
30, 1995), and Ken Olander, South Dakota State Court Administrator's Office (Apr. 3, 1997); TENN. 
CODE ANN. §§ 37-1-103, 37-1-104, 37-1-203, 37-1-205 (1996), TENN. CODE ANN. § 16-15-406 
(1994), Telephone Interviews with Jean Stone, Staff Attorney, Tennessee Administrative Office of the 
Courts (June 29, 1995), and Jona Coppola, Assistant to Director of Tennessee Administrative Office 
of the Courts (Mar. 20, 1997); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-3a-17, 78-3a-l04 (1996), UTAH CODE ANN. § 
30-3-16.1 (1995), Telephone Interviews with Brant Johnson, Acting General Counsel, Utah Adminis-
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2. Operational Aspects of Family Law Adjudicatory Systems 
In addition to comprehending the court's general structure, it is im-
portant to examine in more detail the function of a state's family law ad-
judicatory system. Answering the following questions for each jurisdic-
tion assists with an uuderstanding of the system's goals and performance 
related to family law decisionmaking. Does the court with subject matter 
jurisdiction over family law cases have comprehensive jurisdiction to hear 
a broad range of family legal issues, or is the subject matter jurisdiction 
limited to certain types of family law cases? How long do judges sit on the 
family law docket and thereby have the potential to develop a degree of 
specialization in family law decisionmaking? Are cases assigned in a 
manner that allows one judge to hear a family law case from beginning to 
end, or do the litigants appear before several judges for determination of 
the same or related legal issues, such that all the judges may lack familiar-
ity with the litigants and their family legal matters? This analysis can 
clarify the extent to which the system offers a comprehensive and coordi-
nated approach to family law decisionmaking. 
The family law subject matter jurisdiction of the eleven statewide 
family law adjudicatory systems varies considerably. Six jurisdictions71 
assign comprehensive jurisdiction 72 to the courts, thereby enabling the 
courts to decide a broad range of family legal issues. The remaining five 
states limit the courts' jurisdiction to hear various aspects of family law 
cases.73 For example, the New York Family Court does not have jurisdic-
trative Office of the Courts (July 27, 1995), and Cheryll May, Utah Public Infonnation Officer (Mar. 
20, 1997); W. VA. CODE §§ 48-2-5, 48-4-14, 49-5-2 (1996), Telephone Interviews with Penny Cran-
dall, Assistant Director for West Virginia Family Law Master Program (Aug. 17, 1995; Mar. 21, 
1997); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-22-104, 5-5-135, 14-1-203, 14-2-106, 14-6-203, 20-2-104 (Michie 
1997), Telephone Interviews with Allen Johnson, Senior Staff Attorney, Wyoming Administrative 
Office of the Courts (July 27, 1995), and Elaine Kirby, Fiscal Specialist for Wyoming Administrative 
Office of the Courts (Mar. 20, 1997). See also infra Appendix D. 
71. These jurisdictions are Delaware, the District of Columbia, Hawaii, New Jersey, Rhode Is-
land, and South Carolina. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 921-928 (Supp. 1996); D.C. CODE ANN. § 
11-1101 (1995), D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-2301 to 16-2365 (1997); HAW. REv. STAT. §§ 571-11 to 571-
14 (1997); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4A-24 <,Vest 1987); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-10-3 (Supp. 1996); S.C. 
CODE ANN. § 20-7-736 (Law Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 1996). 
72. See supra note 1 (defining comprehensive jurisdiction). 
73. These states are Florida, Massachusetts, New York, Vennont, and Washington. See In re 
Report of the Comm'n on Family Courts, 588 So. 2d 586 (Fla. 1991); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 215, § 3 
(1989); N.Y. FAM. Cr. Acr § 115 (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1997); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 454 
(Supp. 1997); WASH. REv. CODE § 26.12.010 (1997). 
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tion over a divorce action, although it maintains jurisdiction over support, 
child custody, and distribution of marital property proceedings.14 
The eleven jurisdictions with fully operational statewide family 
courts, divisions, or departments also differ with regard to the length of a 
judge's term in this setting, as well as with regard to their method of as-
signing cases to a judge. The length of a judge's term within these systems 
varies from nine months 75 to a life term upon appointment to the court.16 
Five states among the eleven generally assign family law cases to the 
judges for the duration of the case,77 including any motions or modifica-
tions related to the case.18 One state assigns a particular family to a spe-
cific judge, so that each time family members appear in court on any fam-
ily law matter, they appear before the same judge.19 One state's preferred 
method is to assign a particular family to a specific judge, although each 
74. The New York Family Court has jurisdiction over the following: child abuse and neglect 
proceedings, support proceedings, child custody, distribution of marital property, conciliation, pro-
ceedings concerning physically handicapped and mentally defective or retarded children, paternity, 
termination of custody based on neglect, proceedings concerning whether a person is in need of su-
pervision, and proceedings concerning juvenile delinquency. See N.Y. FAM. cr. Acr § 115 
(McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1997). 
75. Judges in the District of Columbia sit in the Family Division for nine mouths. Within the 
Family Division, judges hear particular types of cases, with assignments made by the chief judge and 
ranging from ninety days to nine months. See Telephone Interview with Edward Ricks, Director of 
the District of Columbia Family Division (June 27, 1997). 
76. Judges in Massachusetts and Rhode Island serve for life terms. See Telephone Interview 
with William F. Ryan, Jr., Assistant Court Admiuistrator, Probate and Family Court of the State of 
Massachusetts (May 7, 1997); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-16.1-7 (Supp. 1996). 
77. These states are Hawaii, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont. See Tele-
phone Interview with Richelle Kawasaki, Clerk to Judge Michael Town in Hawaii (Aug. 2, 1995); 
Telephone Interview with Marie Pirog, Staff Attorney for the New Jersey Family Law Division (May 
19, 1997) (In the smallest counties of New Jersey, one judge hears all cases; thus, the one judge/one 
family model applies. In slightly larger counties, one judge is assigned specifically to the Family Di-
vision, and that judge hears all family law cases, again corresponding to the one judge/one family 
model. In the larger counties, the systems vary. In some counties, iudividual judges specialize in one 
aspect of family law and only hear cases on that particular issue, suggesting a one judge/one case ap-
proach. In other counties, the cases are assigned on a rotational basis, corresponding to a traditional 
calendar assignment.); Telephone Interview with Andrea Hoyt, Court Aualyst for the New York Of-
fice of Court Administration (May 7, 1997); Telephone Interview with Anthony Panichas, Deputy 
Administrator for the Rhode Island Family Court (May 19, 1997); Telephone Interview with Lee 
Suskin, Vermout State Court Administrator (May 23, 1997). 
78. See Joseph A. Trotter, Jr. & Caroline S. Cooper, State Trial Court Delay: Efforts at Reform, 
31 AM. U. L. REV. 213, 223, 223 n.55 (1982) (describing this type of case assigument as an 
'''individual' system," a type of assignment that calls for more accountability for each case by the par-
ticular judge to whom the case is assigned). 
79. Delaware assigns one judge to all family law proceediugs involviug the same family. See 
Telephone Interview with Michael Arrington, Director of Delaware Special Court Services (June 26, 
1997). 
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judicial circuit may adopt its own case assignment method.8o Four juris-
dictions81 assign family law cases to judges in the same manner as other 
civil assignments, on a daily, weekly, monthly, or other regularly sched-
uled basis;82 thus, one judge may not hear a case from start to fmish. 
Of the fourteen states with separate family courts, divisions, or de-
partments within selected areas of the state, only one state authorizes com-
prehensive subject matter jurisdiction.83 The term length for a judge as-
signed to a family law tribunal in one of these fourteen states ranges from 
two years84 to an indeterminate assignment.85 Four states among the 
fourteen assign family law cases to judges in the traditional manner of civil 
assignment at regular intervals, so that the potential exists for more than 
one judge to hear aspects of the same case.86 Four states assign one judge 
to a family for all family law proceedings involving the family,87 and three 
80. The Supreme Court of Florida strongly suggests one judge/one family. See In re Report of 
the Comm'n on Family Courts, 633 So. 2d 14, 17 (Fla. 1994). Eachjudicial circuit may adopt its own 
case assignment method, however. See Telephone Interview with Gwen Stewart, Senior Attorney for 
the Florida Family Court (Apr. II, 1997). 
81. These jurisdictions are the District of Columbia, Massachusetts, South Carolina, and 
Washington. See Telephone Interview with Christopher Brown, Clerk to Judge George Mitchell in 
the District of Columbia (July I, 1996); Telephone Interview with WiIIiam F. Ryan, Jr., Assistant 
Court Administrator, Probate and Family Court of the State of Massachusetts (May 7, 1997); Tele-
phone Interview with Mary Schroeder, Deputy Director of South Carolina Court Administration (May 
19,1997); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2.08.060-2.08.064 (West 1988 & Supp. 1997). 
82. See Trotter & Cooper, supra note 78, at 223 & n.54 (terming this type of case assignment 
the "'master' system," with advantages such as "maximum use of available judge time; uniform ap-
plication of policies; [and] development by judges of specialization in particular departments, i.e., 
settlement conferences, complex motions, juvenile matters, etc."). 
83. This state is Nevada. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 3.223 (Supp. 1995). 
84. The judge's term is two years in New Mexico. See Telephone Interview with Fern Good-
man, Staff Attorney, Administrative Office of the New Mexico Courts (June 5, 1996). 
85. At present, the one judge appointed to the Family Department of the District Court in 
Douglas County, Kansas, can serve as the Family Department judge as long as she pleases. See Tele-
phone Interview with Kathy Kirk, Kansas Judicial Center (Aug. 4, 1997). 
86. These states are Louisiana, Nevada, Ohio, and Oregon. See Telephone Interview with Julie 
Ray, Family Court Administrator for East Baton Rouge Parish, Louisiana (May 20, 1997); Telephone 
Interview with Kathy Harrington, Assistant Law Librarian, Office of Washoe County, Nevada, Family 
Court Judge Scott Jordan (Apr. 10, 1997); Telephone Interview with Doug Stephens, Project Manager 
of Ohio Family Court Feasibility Study (May 27, 1997); Telephone Interviews with Susanne Kolar, 
Lead Worker for Oregon Family Law Domestic Relations Department (May 21,1997; June 26, 1997). 
87. These states are Kansas, Mississippi, Oklahoma, and Pennsylvania. See Telephone Intcr-
views with Kathy Kirk, Kansas Judicial Centcr (May 7, 1996; Apr. 3, 1997); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-
23-1 (1993); Telephone Intcrviews with Dave Hill, Court Administrator for Tulsa County, Oklahoma, 
and Robert Martin, Trial Court Administrator for Oklahoma County, Oklahoma, District Court (May 
27, 1997); Telephone Interview with Don Harris, Director of Policy, Rcscarch and Statistics for the 
Administrative Office ofPcnnsylvania Courts (May 28, 1997). 
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states assign one judge per family in some areas of the state.88 Three states 
follow the one judge/one case method of case assignment, where one judge 
may complete a case yet may not hear another family law proceeding in-
volving the same family.89 
Among the nine states that recently have begun the process of imple-
menting pilot or planned family courts,90 four states have chosen to offer 
comprehensive subject matter jurisdiction,91 and five have assigned limited 
family law subject matter jurisdiction.92 The term length for judges in 
these courts can vary from one or several d ays93 to permanent judicial as-
signments.94 Four of the seven states currently operating pilot family court 
projects assign cases by the one judge/one family method.95 One pilot 
88. These states are Colorado, Missouri, and Texas. For instance, in Colorado Springs County, 
Colorado follows the one judge/one family method of case assignment, if possible, while Denver 
County follows the traditional calendar method. See Telephone Interview with Cheri Kester, Office of 
the Colorado State Court Administrator (Apr. 10, 1997). In Missouri, case assignment varies by cir-
cuit. See Telephone Interview with Gary Waint, Director of Missouri Juvenile and Family Court Pro-
grams (May 20, 1997). In Texas, assignment of cases varies by individual counties. Thus, courts use 
both one judge/one family and the traditional calendar assignment. See Telephone Interview with Jim 
Hutchinson, General Counsel, Office of the Texas Court Administrator (May 28, 1997). 
89. These states are Alabama, New Mexico, and Wisconsin. See Telephone Interview with Peg 
Walker, Director of Research and Planning at the Alabama Administrative Office of Courts (May 20, 
1997); Telephone Interview with Belinda Demaree, Office of Judge Anne Kass, presiding New Mex-
ico Family Court Judge, 2nd Judicial District (May 27, 1997); Telephone Interview with Cindy 
Hapka, Office of Wisconsin District Court Administrator (May 27, 1997). 
90. The nine states are California, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, 
New Hampshire, and Virginia. See infra Appendix C. 
91. The four states are Georgia, Maryland, Michigan, and Virginia. See GA. REPORT AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 64, at 5-6; 1993 Md. Laws 198 and MD. Cr. RULE 16-204 (effective 
July 1, 1998); MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 600.1021 (\Vest Supp. 1997) (effective Jan. 1, 1998); VA. 
CODE ANN. § 16.1-241 (Michie Supp. 1997). 
92. The five states are California, minois, Kentucky, Maine, and New Hampshire. See CAL. FAM. 
CODE §§ 20010-31 (\Vest 1994 & Supp. 1997); John Flynn Rooney, 5th Municipal District Opens Unified 
Family Court Project, DAILY L. BULL., July 22, 1997, at 1; Telephone Interviews with Jim Binningham, 
Kentuck-y Family Court Administrator (May 8, 1996), and Carla Prather, General Counsel for the Jeffer-
son County, Kentucky, Family Court (Apr. 24, 1997); Telephone Interviews with Judge Joyce A. 
Wheeler, Director of Maine Family Court Pilot Project (Aug. 18, 1995; Apr. 3,1997); 1995 N.H. Laws 
152:2. 
93. In Maine, only one judge for each pilot project site sits primarily in the Family Court Pilot 
Project; other judges usually sit from one to several days at a time. See Telephone Interviews with 
Judge Joyce A. Wheeler, supra note 92. 
94. In Kentucky, there are nine judges assigned to the Jefferson County Family Court Pilot 
Project. Four of these positions are permanent assignments to the Family Court Pilot Project. The 
remaining five judges can rotate out of the Family Court Pilot Project; only one judge has made such a 
choice since the inception of the project in 199 I. See Telephone Interview with Carla Prather, Gen-
eral Counsel for the Jefferson County, Kentucky, Family Court (Apr. 24, 1997). 
95. These states are California, minois, Kentucky, and New Hampshire. See Telephone Inter-
view with Julie Lara, Legal Clerk, Santa Clara County, California, Clerk's Office (June 4, 1997); 
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family court project assigns cases by the traditional manner of assignment 
at regnlar intervals.96 The remaining two pilot or planned family court 
projects have not determined how to assign cases.97 Two of the planned 
family courts have chosen to assign one judge to one family for all family 
law matters.98 
Seventeen states process family law cases as part of the court sys-
tem's general civil trial assignment, with no coordinated approach to fam-
ily law decisionmaking and with no foreseeable plan to alter this system.99 
In these states, family members can appear in as many as four courts for 
resolution of various family legal issues. loo Within these seventeen states, 
the average number of courts with jurisdiction over family law matters is 
twO. IOI 
C. THE NEED FOR REFORM 
This survey of court structure and operation illustrates the attempts 
some court systems have made to integrate and coordinate their handling 
of family and child legal proceedings. The survey also highlights the ex-
tent to which many adjudicatory systems retain fragmented, limited, and 
overlapping family law subject matter jurisdiction, therefore hindering the 
court's ability to address the special issues of family law decisionmaking. 
The problems that result from this lack of integration are extensive, and 
Telephone Interview with Joy L. Lee, Court Administrator, Sixth Municipal District, Circuit Court of 
Cook County, IIlinois (Aug. I, 1997); FAMILY Cr. NEWSLEITER: JEFFERSON COUNTY, PILOT PRO-
JECT, (Jefferson County, Ky., Family Court), Mar. 8, 1991, at 4; Telephone Interview with Craig 
Briggs, Administrator of New Hampshire Family Division Project (June 2, 1997). 
96. This state is Maine. See Telephone Interview with Diane Harvey, Clerk of Administrative 
Court and Clerk of Maine Family Court Pilot Project (May 28,1997). 
97. These states are Georgia and Maryland. See GA. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, slIpra 
note 64, at 5-6; Telephone Interview with Judith Moran, Family Division Case Coordinator, Baltimore 
City, Maryland (May I, 1997). 
98. These states are Michigan and Virginia. See MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 600.1023 (West 
Supp. 1997) (effective January I, 1998); Telephone Interview with Lelia Hooper, Director, Virginia 
Family Court Project (May 29,1997). 
99. These states are Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Minnesota, 
Montana, Nebraska, North Carolina, North Dakota, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, West Virginia, 
and Wyoming. See slIpra note 70. 
100. In Indiana, for example, the circuit court, superior court, municipal court, and county court 
aU possess family law subject matter jurisdiction. See Telephone Interviews with Jack Stark, Staff 
Attorney, Division of Indiana State Court Administration (July 17, 1995), and Jeff Berkovitz, Director 
of Indiana Probate and Juvenile Services (July 3, 1997). 
101. See infra Appendix D. 
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have been the focus of many studies at the national, state, and local lev-
els.102 
Traditionally, the legal system has separated civil and criminal mat-
ters, and it has distinguished among classes of cases within these catego-
ries.103 When applied to family law decisionmaking, this configuration 
has resulted in conflicting jurisdiction among courts, unpredictable deci-
sionmaking, a waste of judicial and litigant resources, successive appeals, 
and inefficient court administration. 104 Particularly for litigants experienc-
ing multiple family law problems, this traditional structure has created se-
rious negative consequences. According to an A.B.A. study, 
[i]n virtually all cases, in virtually all communities, the myriad courts 
and social service agencies do not communicate adequately with each 
other, resulting in unnecessary delay, duplication and contradictory rul-
102. See STEPHEN P. JOHNSON, JUST SOLUTIONS: SEEKING INNOVATION AND CHANGE IN THE 
AMERICAN JUSTICE SYSTEM (1994) (reporting on the American Bar Association's national conference 
in 1994 to encourage dialogue among lawyers, judges, and the public regarding needed justice system 
improvements); CAUFORNIA SENATE TASK FORCE ON FAMILY RELATIONS COURT, SENATE TASK 
FORCE ON FAMILY RELATIONS COURT: FINAL REpORT 1-6 (1990) (describing problems for family law 
litigants within California's court system such as multiple hearings, conflicting orders, unrealistic ex-
pectations, delay in receiving services, and inadequate allocation of court resources); GOVERNOR'S 
CONSTITUENCY FOR CHILDREN, A FAMILY COURT FOR FLORIDA 10-11 (1988) (defining high volume, 
delay, lack of coordination, and inconsistency as issues in Florida's handling of family law matters); 
GA. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 64, at 13-14 (summarizing problems of confusion, 
inefficiency, unnecessary adversarialism, delay, conflicting rulings, extended appeals, lack of services, 
and untrained or unqualified court personnel regarding the Georgia court system's handling of family 
law matters); E. HUNTER HURST & JEFFREY A. KUHN, A FAMILY DEPARTMENT FOR THE DISTRICT 
COURTS OF KANSAS: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION 5-6 (1993) (identifying the exces-
sive volume of juvenile and family legal matters, the need for a coordinated approach for the same 
child or children, and a lack of justice system resources for family law cases as the major problems 
plaguing Kansas' court system); JEFFERSON FAMILY COURT DEV. PROJECT, INTERIM REPORT TO THE 
COURT: JEFFERSON FAMILY COURT PILOT PROJECT 10 (1992-93) (describing the Kentucky court sys-
tem's treatment of family law matters as uncoordinated with overlapping jurisdiction and piecemeal 
decisionmaking); RHODE ISLAND FAMILY COURT STUDY COMM., REPORT OF THE FAMILY COURT 
STUDY COMMlTIEE 2-3, 5 (1957) (documenting Rhode Island's system of overlapping jurisdiction, 
inadequate court personnel, and lack of coordination in handling family law matters); VIRGINIA 
FAMILY COURT PILOT PROJECT ADVISORY COMM., REPORT ON THE FAMILY COURT PILOT PROJECT 21, 
28 (1992) (finding that Virginia'S court system is inconvenient, inefficient, uncoordinated, back-
logged, and unpredictable for family law litigants); KING COUNTY BENCHIBAR TASK FORCE, UNIFIED 
FAMILY COURT 8 (1994) (summarizing problems within the court system of King County, Washing-
ton, as barriers to access the system, lack of case finality, lack of specialized family law training for 
court staff, and ineffective coordination and sharing of information among court agencies and outside 
agencies). 
103. See Williams, supra note 5, at 385-86. 
104. See Pound, supra note 46, at 162. See also MAXINE BOORD VIRTUE, FAMILY CASES IN 
COURT (1956) (discussing an early comprehensive study of family law case handling by court systems 
in Chicago, Illinois; Indianapolis, Indiana; San Francisco, California; and Toledo, Ohio). 
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ings and recommendations. Moreover, the same family may have to ap-
pear in a family court, a juvenile court and a probate court, all of which 
are located in different parts of the community. This system wastes 
money and does not serve children well. 105 
A Maryland study identified impediments that are typical of those 
plaguing many court systems nationwide, for which many of those states 
seek a solution. 106 The report listed the following as the most pressing 
concerns: 
(1) the resolution process is often time-consuming, expensive, and cum-
bersome, with some aspects of the dispute being adjudicated more than 
once; 
(2) proper attention is not being given to child-related issues, which are 
being allowed to fester as part of other aspects of a family-law dispute; 
(3) there is inadequate systemic resort to non-judicial resolution tech-
niques (ADR) that might provide better, quicker, cheaper, and less acri-
monious solutions to many of these kinds of cases; 
(4) there is inadequate coordination and consolidation of litigation in-
volving the same family-a case, or several cases, involving the same 
family may be dealt with by different judges or masters, or even by dif-
ferent courts-thus inhibiting a rational, coordinated, stable approach to 
both the litigation and the problems that spawned it; 
(5) in some instances, judges sitting on family-law cases display either a 
lack of interest, a lack of temperament, or a lack of understanding with 
respect to these cases; and 
(6) the courts are not giving proper attention to the special needs of poor 
people, who often cannot afford representation by counsel and need, or 
desire, to proceed pro se.107 
The prevailing fragmented approach to family law adjudication in this 
country does not allow one court the opportunity to hear the total extent of 
a family'S problems, thereby depriving any court of the power to com-
105. A.B.A. PRESIDENTIAL WORKING GROUP, supra note 10, at 53-54. See a/so Williams, supra 
note 5, at 388. Williams provides an example of the negative consequences of judicial inconsistency: 
[I]n an abuse case the judge may have determined that a father has sexually abused his 
daughter and prohibited his future contact with the daughter. However, in the concurrent 
dissolution of marriage action between the child's parents, a second judge may have ex-
cluded evidence of the father'S sexual misconduct and ultimately ordered visitation between 
the father and daughter. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
106. See supra note 102; infra note 107. 
107. ROBERT C. MURPHY, REPORT OF THE FAMILY DIVISION REVIEW COMMITTEE 6-7 (1993) 
(reporting results of a legislatively mandated study summarizing two in-dcpth reports about Mary-
land's family law adjudicatory system). 
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pletely resolve family legal matters108 and exposing the system to manipu-
lation by the litigants.109 
The negative consequences of this approach to family law decision-
making become more apparent in light of the sheer magnitude of family 
law cases. Nationally, divorce cases constitute over 50% of all civil ac-
tions filed in trial courts.110 In the decade from 1984 until 1994, the num-
ber of juvenile cases has increased nationwide 59% and the number of 
family law cases has increased 65%.111 This staggering volume exposes 
the pressing need to reform the judicial system so that courts can resolve 
family law cases in a more comprehensive, coordinated, and effective 
manner. 112 
ll. A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE ON COURT REFORM 
A. PLANNED CHANGE AND A PROBLEM-ORIENTED ApPROACH 
The legal adjudication process in America is seriously overloaded, 
due to crowded dockets, inefficient operations, delay, and lack of re-
sources. ll3 Particularly in the area of family law, one must acknowledge 
that courts cannot resolve all the problems a family brings to the court 
system, especially when those problems may have had their genesis in the 
community, workplace, church, school, or other social institutionY4 Yet, 
108. See Dunn v. Wescott, 366 N.Y.S.2d 291, 296 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1975). A New York family 
court judge commented on the court's lack of power to resolve all the issues in the case: 
Id. 
The court regrets the delay created for the litigants because of our failure to dispose of all 
the issues raised. It is but another sad example of the unworkability of our present court 
system wherein there is a partial but not total overlap of authority and responsibility. This 
situation can only be corrected by knowledgeable and realistic court reform. 
109. See Williams, supra note 5, at 388 (suggesting that unhappy litigants can file successive 
actions in different courts in systems where fragmentation exists). 
110. See JanaB. Singer, The Privatization ojFamilyLaw, 1992 WIS. L. REv. 1443, 1562-63. 
Ill. See Bames, supra note 12, at 22. 
112. See Singer, supra note 110, at 1563. 
113. See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Admini-
stration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399 (1973) (applying economic theory to increase understanding of court 
operations). See also Gabrielle Tracey Letteau, Note, Crisis in California: Constitutional Challenges 
to Inadequate Trial Court Funding, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 557 (1995) (detailing the increase in 
recent case filings in California contrasted with decreased financial support for the judiciary and ad-
vancing four arguments in support of increased court funding). 
114. See MALCOLM M. FEELEY, COURT REFORM ON TRiAL: WHY SIMPLE SOLUTIONS FAIL xiii 
(1983). See also Steven Keeva, Demanding More Justice, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1994, at 46 (focusing on 
popular perceptions of and expectations from the justice system). 
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the court system can provide more assistance to efficiently resolve cases 
and to enhance the quality of families' lives than it presently offers. 
Court reform in family law must begin, like other court reform proj-
ects, as a planned process of change. lIS After demonstrating a need for 
change, or acknowledging problems connected to court operations,116 one 
must clarify and understand the context of the problems. This is a difficult 
task, however, for many reasons: 
Courts are not what they appear to be. The nature of their problems is 
not always evident. The law as written does not capture the real struc-
ture and operations of the courts. One of the central problems of the 
courts is that there is no agreement on what constitutes acceptable prac-
tice and hence no agreement on what improvements should be made. 
Practices that are regarded by some as signs of decline may, when seen 
through someone else's eyes, be seen as strengths.117 
In addition, large case volumes 11 8 necessitate a focus on changes de-
signed to increase court efficiency and on internal or management 
U5. See, e.g., Edward B. McConnell, Planning for the State and Federal COllrts, 78 VA. L. 
REV. 1849, 1849-50 (1992) (outlining five components of a planned change process, including assign-
ing responsibility for the plan to a specific individual or group; involving all of those who will be af-
fected by the result in the planning process; articulating the plan in writing; broadly disseminating and 
explaining the plan; and reviewing the plan periodically to revise it, if necessary). 
116. See Cavanagh & Sarat, sllpra note 23, at 375. The authors discuss specific court problems: 
Court capacity refers to the fit between what courts are and what they do: to the way in 
which the resources, expertise and procedures of courts bear on their ability to provide ef-
fective resolution of the cases they handle. Some issues and problems cannot, according to 
critics of the courts, be resolved through judicial procedures. Nonetheless, the "explosion" 
of law brings such matters into the courts. The result is a "crisis" of competence or capacity. 
Id. (citation omitted). The authors argue, however, that courts can cope with these problems of com-
petence or capacity by adapting but not significantly changing essential court functions of impartial-
ity, due process, and application oflegal rules to the facts of the case. See id. at 376-78. 
117. FEELEY, sllpra note 114, at xii. BlIt see, e.g., Margaret A. Jacobs, Reliable Data Abolll Vol-
lime of Lawsllits Filed Are Very Scarce, DAILY REc., July IS, 1995, at 13 (arguing that outdated court 
recordkeeping systems, particularly in state courts, preclude accurate assessment of numbers and types 
of civil case filings and that Congress should fund an improved data collection systcm to more accu-
rately assess courts' functioning). 
118. See sllpra note 4. BlIt see, e.g., Harry N. Scheiher, Innovation, Resistance, and Change: A 
History of JlIdicial Refonn and the California COllrtS, 1960-1990, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 2049, 2051 
(1993). Scheiber cautions that statistics about court caseloads may lead to false assumptions about the 
nature of problems of delay and congestion in the court system. See id. Accordingly, with regard to 
many procedural reforms aimed at eliminating delay and congestion, "the reforms have seldom becn 
truly successfuL" Id. at 2052 (citation omitted); Trotter & Cooper, sllpra note 78, at 213. Trotter and 
Cooper identify resolution of case delay as the major court reform activity and describe research proj-
ects focusing on delay, which they argue is a subjective term that avoids quantitative definition. See 
id. at 213, 220. The authors define court backlog, an issue related to case delay, "as that portion of a 
court's active caseload that could not be disposed of within the period of acceptable [or tolcrable] de-
lay." 1d. at 221 (emphasis in original). Their article elucidates the difficulties attendant to defining 
terms related to court reform, such as how to define a case. See id.; Posner, sllpra note 113, at 445-48 
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changes.H9 The adversary system itself can operate to inhibit reform, as 
the emphasis generally is on the individual litigants, rather than on sys-
temic issues. 120 
The planned change process can occur by applying a "problem-
oriented approach,,121 to the issue of court reform. This approach seeks to 
identify a problem within the court system "as perceived and actually ex-
perienced by those who daily use and work in the courts. It insists upon a 
realization and a sensitivity to the details of administration. As such, it can 
focus on solutions to concrete problems.,,122 
Invoking this involvement by participants in the court reform process 
can be difficult, however. A major obstacle in any court reform effort is 
the unwillingness to acknowledge the need for or to contemplate change, 
rather than the mere resistance to change itself. 123 The problem-oriented 
(conducting a cost-benefit analysis of durations of delay, analogizing the cost of delay with how par-
ties utilize time while waiting in line, and finding that delay can benefit parties if it encourages them 
to settle). 
119. See Martha J. Dragich, Once a Century: Time for a Structural Overhaul of the Federal 
Courts. 1996 WiS. L. REv. 11, 16-17. 
120. See Cavanagh & Sarat, supra note 23, at 384-85. The authors suggest that courts have dif-
ficulty resolving disputes where the parties maintain an interdependent or ongoing relationship, as in 
family legal proceedings. "This is an unfortunate approach to adjusting tensions within relationships 
involving trust, spontaneity, and reciprocity. Here adjudication has the tendency to disrupt rather than 
to heal, forcing people to cast their relationships in terms of rights and cognizable grievances." [d. 
(citation omitted). See also Scheiber, supra note 118, at 2071. Scheiber argues that court reform is 
not a popular issue among society in general. 
Indeed, programs of reform for court organization, structure, and procedure traditionally 
have not received much attention from even large segments of the bar, let alone the elector-
ate at large, except when issues surface in ways that directly threaten particular interests, or 
when the specter of higher taxes awakens general interest 
[d. (citation omitted). 
121. FEELEY, supra note 114, at 209. 
122. [d. at 210. Feeley contrasts this approach to court reform with an administrative approach, 
where improvements through court coordination and enhanced management are imposed on the bu-
reaucracy overseeing the justice system. See id. at 205. The proponents of administrative change of-
ten fail to understand the actual operations of the court and the substantive underpinnings of the jus-
tice system. See id. A problem-oriented approach to court reform differs from yet another type of 
court reform, namely, "rights-based reform." [d. at 206. Rights-based reform focuses on specific 
problems which translate into legally guaranteed rights, such as the right to a speedy trial in the crimi-
nal context This is an approach more compatible with the adversarial nature of our judicial system. 
See id. at 206-07. Both an administrative approach and a rights-based approach seem less comple-
mentary than a problem-oriented approach to the family ecological focus and to the therapeutic nature 
of the court reform discussed in this Article. 
123. See id. at 192. See also Scheiber, supra note 118, at 2114-15 (commenting on resistance to 
court reform efforts both nationally and in Califoruia and identifying court system professionals as the 
most focused opposition); Marcia M. McBrien, Governor Signs Law Creating Michigan Family 
Coun, MD. FAM. L. MONTHLY, Feb. 1997, at 25 (describing Michigan's family court reform effort 
that began in the 1940s and resulted in legislation in 1996 to create such a court); Scott Bassett, Legis-
496 SOUTHERN CAliFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71 :469 
approach to court reform in family law seeks to overcome this lethargy by 
actively focusing on the identification of systemic deficiencies and on sug-
gestions for improvements. This method also requires reformers to ensure 
that court employees, including judges, clerks, and court administrators, as 
well as diverse community representatives, share an understanding of the 
system's fundamental goals and recognize the need for change. 124 
For courts to accomplish the systemic goals of family law adjudica-
tion as articulated in the Standard Family Court Act, or to effectively re-
solve all of a family's legal matters in a coordinated and comprehensive 
fashion, it becomes critical for court professionals to become more insight-
ful about today's family. This requires acknowledging the interdepen-
dency between the family and the society at large. As one group of profes-
sors has argued: 
It is apparent that all families make use of (and many more are in need 
of) some form of outside help in raising their children, yet we stilI 
maintain a myth of self-sufficiency. Since in reality we are dependent 
on each other, it makes little sense to perpetuate the myth that we are 
not. Valuing independence stigmatizes those individuals who use family 
services as well as those individuals who provide them. A new concept 
of the way in which families (and individuals) should interact with each 
other and the other elements of society is imperative. Why not acknowl-
edge the interdependence that already exists? Why not see it as posi-
tive?125 
To accommodate the interdependent nature of the family when adju-
dicating its legal matters, the court reform process must structure courts to 
enable them to render services needed to assist litigants. Courts must have 
the ability to identify those services early in the court process and to seek 
and foster connections for the family with other parts of the community in 
order to strengthen the family members' functioning. The legal system 
also can consider shifting some responsibilities for decisions about fami-
lies to other institutions, such as religious organizations or schools. 126 The 
need to understand a family's connections to the community supports the 
design of a court system which can maintain an active involvement in a 
lature Creates Family Division of Circuit Court, 10 INST. OF CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. FOCUS ON 
MICH. L. PRAC., Jan. 1997, at I (recounting the heated nature of legislative debate in Michigan on 
proposed legislation to establish a family court). 
124. See JOHNSON, supra note 102, at 63. 
125. James Garbarino, Mario Thomas Gaboury, Florence Long, Patricia Grandjean & Elliot Asp, 
Who Owns the Children? An Ecological Perspective on Public Policy Affecting Children, in 5 LEGAL 
REFORMS AFFEcnNG CHILD AND YOUTH SERVICES 43, 46-47 (Gary B. Melton ed., 1982) (citations 
omitted) (emphasis in original). 
126. See id. at 59. 
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family's case sufficient to discern these linkages. A trained court profes-
sional may assume this role. An approach to court reform that focuses on 
the roles of court professionals, then, is most useful. 127 
B. THE ROLES OF COURT SYSTEM PROFESSIONALS 
A focus on the roles of court system professionals "yields a model of 
a court as an institutionalized human group, which relates the behavior of 
judges and other professionals to ... court structure and function."128 In 
order for the court system to operate in a coordinated manner, the system's 
professionals must understand one another's responsibilities and must 
communicate regularly regarding the system's effectiveness.129 Given the 
extraordinary power of judges to render decisions in family law cases that 
affect all aspects of people's lives, it is important to begin the examination 
of court system professionals by focusing on the role of judges. 
1. Managerial Judging 
The overwhelming volume of family law cases subject to adjudica-
tion130 presents an initial management challenge for court system profes-
sionals. Consideration of the emerging role of the federal judiciary offers 
assistance with this management task. In the federal context, as well as in 
many state courts, the judiciary have become "managerial judges."l3l This 
127. See Peters, supra note 21, at 897. The author suggests experiencing professionals' daily 
lives within an existing court system in order to challenge reformers' notions of reality. See id. at 898; 
Keith O. Boyum, A Perspective on Civil Delay in Trial Couns, 5 JUST. SYS. J. 170, 173 (1979). 
Boyum offers a definition of "role" in the context of the court system: 
Roles are prescriptions as to how a position occupant should go about fulfilling the functions 
of the position. Such prescriptions emerge from the expectations which occupants of other 
positions in the system hold for the behavior of a position occupant. But position occupants 
usually have role expectations for themselves, too. 
Id. (emphasis in original). 
128. Boyum, supra note 127, at 173. 
129. See FAMILIES IN COURT: RECOMMENDATIONS FROM A NATIONAL SYMPOSIUM 6 (Meredith 
Hofford ed., 1989) [hereinafter FAMILIES IN COURT]. 
130. See supra note 4. 
131. Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 376 (1982). The author charac-
terizes current roles of judges: 
In growing numbers, judges are not only adjudicating the merits of issues presented to them 
by litigants, but also are meeting with parties in chambers to encourage settlement of dis-
putes and to supervise case preparation. Both before and after the trial, judges are playing a 
critical role in shaping litigation and influencing results. 
Id. at 376-77. See also Marjorie O. Rendell, What Is the Role a/the Judge in Our Litigious Society? 
40 VILL. L. REv. 1115, 1130 (1995). Rendell analogizes judges to parents and, specifically, to moth-
ers: 
Judges are, like parents, overseers of the day-to-day activities-the case crises, as well as the 
progress-but at the same time, stewards of the environment, charged with preserving it for 
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new image of judging presents a model quite different from the traditional 
notion of a judge as a detached, impartial decisionmaker.132 An under-
standing of managerial judging can assist with the attempt to improve 
family law adjudicatory systems. Judges hearing family law cases often 
are not trained to oversee such an extraordinary number of cases, nor do 
they possess sufficient background to handle the breadth and diversity of 
the legal issues comprising the cases.133 
Judges have tended to practice managerial judging mostly at the pre-
trial and posttrial phases of litigation.134 The judges' management tech-
niques consist of informal meetings with litigants and attorneys designed 
to highlight the issues subject to litigation, to enhance opportunities for 
settlement, and to help implement provisions of orders or decrees. 135 In 
both the pretrial and posttrial contexts, judges often hear evidence other-
wise inadmissible in the traditional adversary courtroom setting,136 such as 
hearsay evidence. To assist judges in this managerial effort, federal courts 
have adopted an individual calendar system, under which a judge assumes 
responsibility for a case from beginning to end.137 Additionally, judges 
have received management assistance from enhanced computerization that 
permits extensive data collection and analyses about cases, as well as from 
court rules requiring parties to submit pretrial and trial litigation plans and 
case information sheets.138 
Id. 
the sake of future generations. Judges enjoy the role not only of ensuring that effective, 
quality justice is meted out in their courtrooms today, but that the system remains capable of 
providing a superior quality of justice in the years to come. 
132 See Resnik, supra note 131, at 380. Resnik describes the traditional notion of a judge: 
The idealized image of judicial behavior in the United States conforms to the symbolism 
implieit in these icons. The robes. the odd etiquette of the courtroom, and the appellation 
"your honor" all serve to remind both litigants and judges of the special nature-the essen-
tial estranged quality-of their relationship. Judges are exempt from the rules of normal 
social intercourse; they need not try to please litigants. Judges must dccide the facts and 
apply the law regardless of the displeasure they incur. Stoic goddess, scales, sword, and 
blindfold are accurate emblems of this hard-edged, uncompromising task. 
Id. at 383 (citation omitted). 
133. See Albano, supra note 3, at 787. See also GARY B. MELTON, LOIS A. WEITHORN & 
CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGlN, COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH CENTERS AND THE COURTS: AN 
EVALUATION OF COMMUNITY-BASED FORENSIC SERVICES 76, 79 (1985) (finding that a typical trial 
judge lacks knowledge of and interest in the social sciences and that mental health professionals have 
infrequent referrals from the courts). 
134. See Resnik. supra note 13I,at404. 
135. See id. at 404-05. 
136. See id. at413. 
137. Seeid.at399. 
138. See id; FED. R. CIV. P. 16(a)-(c) (requiring pretrial conferences and outlining objectives, 
scheduling, planning, and subjects for consideration at the conference). See, e.g., MD. R. P. 2-504 to 
2-504.2 (requiring scheduling orders and scheduling conferences in all civil matters, as well as per-
mitting pretrial conferences); Robert F. Peckham, A Judicial Response to the Cost of Litigation: Case 
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Active judicial participation in the case management process, how-
ever, carries some threats to traditional notions of justice. For example, 
active case management by judges expands their already significant 
power139 and may weaken litigants' satisfaction with and control over their 
cases. 140 In addition, the extensive case-related information judges re-
ceive, particularly at the pretrial phase, may heighten their personal biases 
and investments in the outcome of cases. 141 Finally, case processing can 
become the goal of litigation rather than a means to achieve the parties' 
wishes. 142 This exaggerated emphasis ou case processing can obfuscate 
effective case resolution and potentially can harm litigants.143 
Several alternatives exist to counteract the potential negative conse-
quences of judicial case management. One approach to managerial judg-
ing attempts to preserve judicial impartiality. This method involves as-
signing trials to judges other than those judges who managed the pretrial 
phases, although this means abandoning the individual calendar system. l44 
Another alternative removes judges from all management tasks, which 
Management, Two·Stage Discovery Planning and Alternative Dispute Resolution, 37 RUTGERS L. 
REV. 253, 254 (1985) (concluding that increased case management at the federal level has effectively 
reduced delay and litigation costs); Dick Thornburgh, America's Civil Justice Dilemma: The Pros· 
pectsfor Reform, 55 MD. L. REV. 1074, 1089·90 (1996) (advocating early and mandatory exchange of 
and dialogue about core discovery documents in civil lawsuits, along with court rules to that effect, in 
federal and state courts). 
139. See Resnik, supra note 131, at 425. See also Judith T. Younger, Marriage, Divorce, and 
the Family: A Cautionary Tale, 21 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1367, 1376 (1993) (discussing an experimental 
family law case management program initiated in California and also implemented in Minnesota 
which gives the presiding judge enhanced discretion and settlement powers, causing some to criticize 
its deemphasis of due process); Donald B. King, Judicious Intervention: What One California Judge 
Has Done to Expedite Settlement, FAM. ADvoc., Spring 1997, at 22,23,25,28,30 (1997) (describing 
the judicial intervention and case management system for Califoruia's family law cases). 
140. See Marcus, supra note 8, at 793. 
141. See Resnik, supra note 131, at 427. See also Jeffrey M. Shaman, The Impartial Judge: 
Detachment or Passion?, 45 DEPAUL L. REV. 605 (1996). Shaman argues that "[plure impartiality is 
an ideal that can never be completely attained. Judges, after all, are human beings who come to the 
bench with feelings, knowledge, and beliefs that cannot be magically extirpated." Id. He supports 
this notion by relying on the 1990 version of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which he interprets as ac· 
knowledging the need for judges to remain part of the community and to participate in activities con· 
tributing to the improvement of the justice system. See id. at 609. This active community involve· 
ment enhances the ability of judges to reflect notions of legal realism in their own jurisprudential 
philosophies. See id. at 615. 
142. See Resnik, supra note 131, at 431. 
143. See Peters, supra note 21, at 900, 926. See also Scheiber, supra note 118, at 2070·71 
(arguing that other disadvantages of increased managerial judging include movement by some liti· 
gants toward alternatives to the court system, along with "the diminishing judicial articulation of pub· 
lic values"). 
144. See Resnik, supra note 131, at 433·34. 
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other court personnel (such as case managers, mediators, or arbitrators) 
then handle, and employs judges only to resolve the traditional aspects of 
litigation.145 Also, in an effort to decrease the need for judicial manage-
ment, courts can adopt rules to resolve some of the issues that require 
management, such as limiting discovery .146 The extraordinary volume of 
family law cases that requires oversight by a court system professional, 
however, suggests considering judges for some portion of the case man-
agement task. 
2. Judicial Specialization and Specialized Courts 
A focus on the role of the judiciary in the court reform process also 
draws attention to the issue of judicial specialization, particularly when 
considering reform within the context of a specialized court,147 such as a 
unified family court. As the Ad Hoc Committee on Business Courts, an-
other type of specialized court, has noted, "it is clear that in almost every 
field of endeavor and in every profession, the need to master a body of 
knowledge and to gain experience in working with that body of knowledge 
has created a narrower focus over time for those who work within more 
broadly defined fields.,,148 Operation of a specialized court does not ne-
cessitate judicial specialization in that area of the law. Nonetheless, court 
organization influences judicial quality, and judicial specialization may 
enhance the entire adjudicatory system within which the specialized judge 
operates. 149 
145. See id. at 435-36. 
146. See id. at 443. See also JACK B. WEINSTEIN, REFORM OF COURT RULE-MAKING PRO. 
CEDURES 14 (1977). Weinstein discusses the value of court rules: 
Rules, like legislation, pennit a whole multitude of possible procedural and related issues to 
be decided at once, with a possible saving of judicial energy in individual cases. At the 
least, well-drafted rules should save judges and lawyers expensive case-law research time. 
A good set of rules should-in theory-also reduce appeals and reversals on nonsubstantive 
points. By providing more efficient court procedures, they allow courts and lawyers to ac-
complish more with the same expenditure of energy, enabling us to better meet the pressures 
of more, and more complex, litigation. 
[d. See Scheiber, supra note 118, at 2086 (recognizing the importance of the judicial rulemaking 
power). 
147. See Stempel, supra note 14, at 69-71 (defining specialized courts). 
148. Ad Hoc Committee on Business Courts, supra note IS, at 948. 
149. See Stempel, supra note 14, at 70-71. See also Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal 
Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1,73 (1989). Dreyfuss studies the 
patent jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, a specialized court cstablished in 
1982, and discusses general fonns of court specialization: 
There are many ways to create specialization. There are simple specialized courts, special-
ized courts with generalized judges, generalized courts with exclusive spccial jurisdiction, 
and panels with categorical case assignments. Within these paradigms there are several 
variations: specialization at both the trial and appellate levels; specialized trial courts with 
general appellate courts; or general trial fora reviewed by specialized appellate courts. 
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Traditionally, society has regarded specialized judges with less pres-
tige than their generalist counterparts. The public has perceived that spe-
cialized courts attract less qualified judges, that the judges become too 
isolated and narrowly focused, and that the court system becomes less 
adaptable to changing caseloads.150 
Techniques exist to help reformers overcome notions of the inferior 
status of specialized courts ~~)urists. To ensure that specialized courts 
and jurists have the same statul~~s their generalist counterparts, these spe-
cialized bodies must have the same resources, facilities, and support staff 
as the generalists. Specialized jurists also must receive the ~ame salary 
and benefits as generalists. 151 
Given the benefits of judicial specialization, particularly at the trial 
level,152 the legal system should not support any societal imposition or no-
tion of inferior status.153 According to Professor Stempel, 
[specialization provides] improved precision and predictability of adju-
dication; more accurate adjudication; more coherent articulation of legal 
standards; greater expertise of the bench; economies of scale that flow 
from division of labor, particularly including speed, reduced costs and 
greater efficiency through streamlining of repetitive tasks and wasted 
motions. 154 
In contrast to specialized jurists, generalist judges may confront the 
specialized subject matter infrequently, so that they may lack the experi-
ence and the time to grasp fully the intricacies of a body of law. 155 The 
practice of rotating panels of generalist judges into specialty courts for de-
fined time periods, as opposed to permanent judicial assignments of spe-
cialized judges, allows courts to achieve temporary specialization.156 On 
[d. (citation omitted). See LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE DiVORCE REVOLUTiON: THE UNEXPECTED 
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA 398 (1985) (urging 
that judges hearing family law cases demonstrate expertise in and enthusiasm for family law or, in the 
alternative, that judges receive mandatory training before hearing these cases and calling for the crea-
tion of specialized family law jurists); King, supra note 8, at 27-28 (advocating that family law judges 
possess a background in family law and that all family law judges undergo mandatory judicial educa-
tion to enhance case and court management skills). 
150. See Stempel, supra note 14, at 89-91. See also Dreyfuss, supra note 149, at 3. 
151. See Stempel, supra note 14, at 120-21. 
152. See id. at 112, 114 ("The specialist trial judge will be superior to the generalists in her abil-
ity to focus more quickly on the important factual issues and to apply the law with sensitivity in light 
of the court's institutional memory."). 
153. See id. at 83. 
154. [d. at 88-89 (citation omitted). See also Dreyfuss, supra note 149, at 2. 
155. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Specialized Adjudication, 1990 BYU L. REV. 377, 378. 
156. See Stempel, supra note 14, at 116. 
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the other hand, rotating judges cannot reap all the benefits of specializa-
tion, since they may not continue to apply or to develop their specializa-
tion beyond the rotations. I57 Comprehensive specialization, or permanent 
assignments of specialized judges, is preferable both to incompletely spe-
cialized courts and to those composed of rotating generalist judge pan-
els. 158 
In order for a specialized court to have a coherent function, reformers 
must determine whether the court has the \power to decide, to dispose of, 
and to supervise certain cases. 159 Limiting 'Subject matter jurisdiction to a 
particular s1!bstantive area of law can allow judges to "see the same issues 
repeatedly and thus have both the time and the motivation to do the re-
search and thinking needed to resolve them accurately.,,160 A proper de-
gree of subject matter specialization is required, however. If a court is too 
narrowly focused or specialized, inefficiency can result in that the issues 
contributing to the dispute may require litigation in several tribunals. 161 
The isolation of many specialized courts l62 suggests that judges sitting in 
these courts seek to interact meaningfully with their generalist colleagues. 
In short, as Professor Dreyfuss finds, "specialization is neither always 
good nor always bad."163 
On balance, specialization of some sort may endure because of its ef-
fectiveness. l64 Specialization provides an efficient manner to deal with 
157. See id. 
158. See id. at 127. 
159. See Dreyfuss, supra note 149, at 53. Dreyfuss discusses considerations regarding fonns of 
specialization: 
The fonn that specialization takes should, in short, depend on the reason that specialization 
is thought desirable. If the predominant interest is utilization of expertise, the implementa-
tion strategy should tum on where expertise is needed. When the law is clear but difficult to 
apply to complex factual situations, the place to specialize is at the trial. When the facts are 
clear but the law is complex, or in need of judicial elaboration, expertise would be more 
valuable at the appellate level where the court could make needed doctrinal innovations 
without concern for creating dis uniformity. 
Id. at 74. 
160. Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Forums of the Future: The Role of Specialized Courts in Resolving 
Business Disputes, 61 BROOK. L. REV. I, 16 (1995) (citation omitted). See also Dreyfuss, slIpra note 
ISS, at 409 ("The more intricate the law, the more likely it is that a generalist will get things wrong, 
confuse matters, and encourage additional litigation. The more complicated the facts of a case, the 
more the judge must master before the case can be decided at all."). 
161. See Dreyfuss, supra note 160, at 20. 
162. See id. at 17. 
163. Dreyfuss, supra note ISS, at 383. 
164. See Stempel, supra note 14, at 112. See also Robert Gottsfield, SlIperior COllrt-Family 
Division-It's Time for Specialized DR/Juvenile Judges in Populous Counties. ARIZ. ATT'y, Nov. 
1996, at 14 (urging the domestic relations and juvenile bars to work with the courts and devise a plan 
to recruit specialized judges for Arizona's Family Division). 
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complex legal matters,165 although any unique procedures designed for use 
in these courts must adhere to due process requirements and must avoid 
bias.166 The area of family law lends itself to adjudication within special-
ized courts and by specialized jurists. The need for a specialized family 
court derives, in part, from how families use the court system: They come 
to court for diverse reasons that are distinctive enough from other legal is-
sues to justify special treatment, and they frequently return to court on 
these issues. Therefore, it becomes advantageous for families and society 
to coordinate an approach to family cases.167 
C. EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF COURT REFORM PROPOSALS 
Whether court reform proposals can produce an improved context for 
decisionmaking, as well as more informed and effective outcomes for the 
participants, is difficult to determine, nor does much empirical research 
exist. 168 According to Professor Dreyfuss: 
One can measure the success of a court in a variety of ways. Objective 
factors, such as the court's docket-clearing rate, or the number of liti-
gants choosing the court rather than other tribunals with comparable ad-
judicatory authority form one standard. Subjective measures include the 
satisfaction that litigants express in the adjudication they received, the 
regard with which the court is held among lawyers, academics and 
judges; and the degree to which the citizens of the jurisdiction and those 
who consume the law the court administers accept the court's output. 169 
Three essential predictors of successful courts, however, include 
decisionmaking quality, efficiency, and due process.170 The objective 
165. See Ad Hoc Committee on Business Courts, supra note 15, at 949. 
166. See Dreyfuss, supra note 160, at 21. The author cautions about perceived lack of due proc-
ess in specialized courts under certain circumstances: 
[R]epeat players have an advantage over one-time litigants. This problem is exacerbated on 
a specialized bench, where repeaters sometimes know all of the judges, are well-acquainted 
with the eccentricities of the court's local rules and specialized law, and are positioned to 
find suitable vehicles for advocating changes in the law that they deem appropriate. One-
time litigants operate at a severe disadvantage. 
1d. at 22 (citation omitted). 
167. See SZYMANSKIET AL., supra note 33, at 3. See also RUBIN & FLANGO, supra note 4, at 75-
76 (finding from a study of court records that a significant proportion of families in court experience 
one or more of the following clustering of cases: delinquency, children in need of supervision, di-
vorce, delinquency of another child, and abuse and neglect; abuse and neglect, prior custody and di-
vorce; divorce and prior domestic assault or prior divorce). 
168. See Dreyfuss, supra note 160, at 11. 
169. 1d. 
170. See id. See also Marcus, supra note 8, at 774 (arguing that to design neutral procedures for 
litigation, the procedures must be accurate, allow for participation, and be efficient). 
504 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:469 
nature of these predictors renders them easy to apply in order to evaluate 
court reform efforts. 
Decisionmaking quality, the first objective predictor of court success, 
relates to whether the court's outcome accurately considers the underlying 
facts and addresses the particular situation of the participants.171 The ex-
tent to which the court fashions the same outcomes in factually and legally 
similar circumstances also reflects decision making quality; the parties can 
predict results in determining whether to utilize the court system to resolve 
their disputes.I72 Whether the court's decisions further consistent social 
policies is another important predictor of excellence. 173 
Efficiency of a court system, the second predictor of court success, 
relates to the timing of decisions relative to the litigants' need for resolu-
tion, the number of judges needed to resolve the cases, and the number of 
court appearances needed to resolve an entire dispute.174 Due process 
considerations, the third measure of court success, require that court proc-
esses include notice, an opportunity for a hearing, and a neutral decision-
maker. 175 
Applying these predictors of successful courts to existing specialized 
family law adjudicatory systems permits a useful means for evaluating the 
potential effectiveness of these courts. Some skeptics question whether 
such an extreme change in court structure and operation resulting from 
establishing a specialized family court can accomplish a coordinated ap-
proach to family law cases,176 although there is a paucity of empirical 
data. I77 Family court opponents argue that specialized family courts are 
expensive178 and unnecessary, suggesting that judges can obtain the skills 
171. See Dreyfuss, supra note 160, at 12. 
172. See id. at 12-13. See also Dreyfuss, supra note 149, at 8. 
173. See Dreyfuss, supra note 160, at 13. 
174. See id. at 14. See also Dreyfuss, supra note 149, at 23 (stating that relitigation of issues 
should occur less often in specialized courts). 
175. See Dreyfuss, supra note 160, at 15. 
176. See RUBIN & FLANGO, supra note 4, at 36. 
177. See Barnes, supra note 12, at 22. See also HURST & KUHN, supra note 102, at 7 (reporting 
on two documented studies evaluating the effectiveness of family courts, including a 1978 study of 
family courts in six states and a 1987 study offamily courts in four states). See generally CHARLES D. 
EDELSTEIN, THE FAMILY CIVIL DEPARTMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT: BLUEPRINT FOR CHANGE-A 
DISCUSSION DOCUMENT (1993) (outlining specifie recommendations to address problems in the op-
eration of Florida's family court, established in 1991); ROBERT W. PAGE, ROSALIE B. COOPER, 
HOWARD H. KESTIN, B. THOMAS LEAHY, BIRGER M. SWEEN, STEVEN YOSLOV & CAROL LESNIOWSKI, 
PATHFINDERS COMMITTEE REpORT (1989) (detailing the results of a comprehensive study of the first 
five years of New Jersey's family court, established in 1984). 
178. See HURST & KUHN, supra note 102, at 7. But see GOVERNOR'S COMM'N ON THE FAMILY, 
FINAL REPORT 13 (1966) (recommending a family court for California and responding to the argument 
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required to handle family matters in routine docket assignments of six 
months to one year.179 On the other hand, results of the empirical studies 
couducted to date indicate that family courts can increase efficiency, com-
petency, and coordination of decisionmaking; further, they can result in 
cost savings to attorneys, clients, and the court system, due largely to the 
specialization and increased efficiency of family court judges.ISO Thus, 
family courts appear to enhance decisionmaking quality, court efficiency, 
and due process. 
While the justifications for establishing a family court are convincing, 
the challenges to creating this court are complex. Court reform requires 
considering the effects of any reorganization of the court system on the 
operation of a system's other courts.l8l Reformers should not reorganize 
courts, therefore, without carefully defining their objectives and their im-
plementation plans.1S2 Within the past few years, driven by the need to 
remedy a multitude of problems beleaguering the court system, a renewed 
effort to address problems of family law adjudication has unfolded.1s3 
As demonstrated by the results of the nationwide survey of family law 
adjudicatory systems, some family law court reform initiatives are under-
way.1S4 Eleven jurisdictions already operate statewide family courts,lS5 
and fourteen states have established a family court in at least one area of 
about the expense of a family court as follows: "If by a proper handling of troubled families we can 
reduce the human wreckage of family disruption, the expense will be more than justified. We cannot 
afford to reckon the cost of such treatment in dollars; it is properly calculable only in the coin of indi-
vidual and social benefit"). 
179. See RUBIN & FLANGO, supra note 4, at 36. See also Hunter Hurst, Judicial Rotation in Ju-
venile and Family Courts: A View From the Judiciary, 42 JUV. & FAM. cr. J., 1991NoI. 42:3, at 13, 
15-20 (discussing judges' perceptions of the advantages and disadvantages of judicial rotation or as-
signment to the family court for set periods, as opposed to the notion of specialized family court 
judges). 
ISO. See HURST & KUHN, supra note 102, at 7. See also GOVERNOR'S CONSTITUENCY FOR 
CHILDREN, supra note 102, at 12-15 (summarizing in detail the results of two empirical studies of 
family court effectiveness); JEFFERSON FAMILY COURT DEV. PROJECT, supra note 102, at 73-77 
(describing the benefits of Kentucky's family court pilot project in Jefferson County); VIRGINIA 
FAMILY COURT PILOT PROJECT ADVISORY COMM., supra note 102, at iv, 49 (recommending that Vir-
ginia create one court with comprehensive jurisdiction over all family law cases). 
181. See RUSIN & FLANGO, supra note 4, at 65. 
182. See id. at 36. 
183. See Barnes, supra note 12, at 22. See also Junda Woo, More States Use Single Court in 
Family Feuds, WALL ST. J., June 25, 1992, at B1 (noting the nationwide trend to address problems 
within family law adjudicatory systems). 
184. See supra Part I.B (discussing pilot and planned family courts). See also Barnes, supra note 
12, at 22 (describing the existence of a nationwide trend toward some form of family court system). 
185. See infra Appendix A. 
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the state, although not for the entire state.186 Nine states plan to begin or 
have begun pilot family court projects.18? Given the wide variety of meth-
ods by which states have structured their family law adjudicatory systems, 
these accomplishments do not reveal sufficient systemic change. As Pro-
fessor Resnik observes, "unfortunately, these changes are being carried out 
piecemeal and with little reflection on their cumulative implications for the 
adversarial system.,,188 In addition, court reform efforts must include di-
verse groups outside the legal profession, such as legislators, government 
leaders, social services groups, and consumers,189 who are directly or indi-
rectly affected by the court's operation.190 As Judge Weinstein has ar-
gued: 
The courts' functioning must be put in a social context, as part of a web 
of institutions that enable people to live together peaceable [sic]. We 
have learned to see legal institutions as part of a larger ecology in which 
various dispute institutions interact and effect [sic] one another. As 
these interconnections become common knowledge, those who would 
design or justify legal institutions must accept responsibility not only for 
the small world of adjudication, but for the larger world of disputing and 
bargaining in which it is set.191 
Family law court reformers must structure the court system in a man-
ner that equips it to account for the web of institutions within which a 
family functions and to resolve a family's legal problems comprehen-
sively. A model unified family court, detailed in the following Section, 
would supply the means to accomplish this holistic treatment. A social 
science theoretical paradigm, the ecology of human development,192 super-
imposed to guide the construction of the unified family court can ensure 
that the court addresses the families' many interconnections. This eco-
logical approach to the family law decisionmaking process can lead to 
more effective, responsive justice for families and children. 
186. See infra Appendix B. 
18? See infra Appendix C. 
188. Resnik, supra note 131, at 444. 
189. See FAMILIES IN COURT, supra note 129, at 1 (summarizing suggested refonn proposnls for 
courts dealing with family legal mntters). 
190. See JOHNSON, supra note 102, at 9-10. See also Melton, supra note 25, at 2003·04 
(suggesting that courts become involved with community service agencies nnd the neighborhoods of 
which the courts are part nnd challenging courts to become community leaders). 
191. Jack B. Weinstein, Some Benefits and Risks of Privatization of Justice Through ADR, II OHIO 
ST. J. ONDISP. REsOL. 241, 248 (1996). 
192. See BRONFENBRENNER, supra note 31. See also infra Part III.A.I (explaining the ecology 
of humnn development paradigm). 
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ill. ENVISIONING A MODEL UNIFIED FAMILY COURT 
A. CONCEPTUALIZING AN ECOLOGICAL AND A THERAPEUTIC PARADIGM 
A research paradigm from the social sciences, known as the ecology 
of human development, provides a comprehensive analytical tool to design 
a family law adjudicatory system. To address the special needs of families 
who present themselves to the court system, a concept from mental health 
law, known as therapeutic jurisprudence, assists the court in understanding 
how it must intervene in the lives of families. Application of these two 
perspectives provides an interdisciplinary ecological and therapeutic 
framework in order to reform family law courts and create a model unified 
family court. This interdisciplinary approach helps judges and other court 
system professionals consider the many influences on human behavior and 
family life, thereby empowering the system to offer more pragmatic and 
effective solutions to contemporary family legal issues. 
1. The Ecology of Human Development 
According to Professor Urie Bronfenbrenner, who developed the 
ecology of human development theory, pursuing strategies designed to es-
tablish and to strengthen connections among all the competing influences 
on children's and families' lives can enhance their functioning. To ac-
count systematically for these competing influences, Bronfenbrenner ar-
ranges the settings within which individuals live their lives on a scale from 
smallest to largest. The most immediate context within which the individ-
ual experiences daily reality, such as the parent-child relationship and the 
husband-wife relationship, is the "microsystem.,,193 Relationships between 
the micro systems, such as the amount of interaction between a child's 
school and his home settiug, constitute the "mesosytem.,,194 
''Exosystems,,195 are the settings that have power over one's life, yet iu 
which one does not participate, such as the effect of a parent's place of 
employment on the child's life. Finally, Bronfenbrenner labels "the broad 
ideological and institutional patterns of a particular culture or subcul-
ture,,196 as the macrosystems. 
193. BRONFENBRENNER,supra note 31, at 7, 22. 
194. [d. at 7-8,25. 
195. [d. 
196. James Garbarino & Robert H. Abramowitz, The Ecology of Human Development, in 
CHILDREN AND FAMILIES IN A SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT 11,27 (James Garbarino ed., 2d ed. 1992). 
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According to Professors Garbarino and Abramowitz, "[t]he most im-
portant thing about this ecological perspective is that it reveals connections 
that otherwise might go unnoticed and helps us look beyond the immediate 
and the obvious to see where the most significant influences lie.,,197 For 
Bronfenbrenner, the crucial question becomes whether we can alter social 
institutions so that they can function as positive influences on family life 
by increasing the number and extent of individuals' and families' connec-
tions among the systems of this paradigm.198 
Any family law adjudicatory structure or setting must assist deci-
sionmakers in considering an expanded concept of the family by acknowl-
edging the "family ecology,"199 or the interdependent nature of the fam-
ily.200 Courts must view neighborhoods, religious organizations, and other 
associations or institutions within which family members participate as 
having the potential to influence the family's legal matters. Application of 
the ecology of human development paradigm201 can structure a family law 
adjudicatory system in a manner which enables the system to accomplish 
this task. 
Utilizing the ecology of human development as a framework to re-
structure courts means designing the system's operation and components 
in a manner that equips the entire adjudicatory process with a systematic 
approach to accommodate the complex factors affecting families' lives. 
As the author has commented elsewhere: 
[A]dvocates, parties, and human services providers must identify for 
decisionmakers the types and strengths of the microsystem relationships 
within which people function, or the relationships between and among 
family members. In addition, decisionmakers need to understand family 
members' meso system relationships, or relationships between individu-
als and aspects of their immediate environment, such as neighborhoods, 
schools, and religious organizations.202 
Likewise, court professionals must acknowledge the effects of macrosys-
197. Id. at 19. 
198. See American Families: Trends and Pressures, 1973: Hearings on Examination of the 111-
fluence That Governmelltal Policies Have Oil American Families Before the Subcomm. (}fl Childrell 
and Youth of the Sellate Comm. on Labor alld Public Welfare, 93rd Congo 31962, 31964-65 (1973) 
(statement of Urie Bronfenbrenner, Professor of Human Development and Family Studies and Psy-
chology, College of Human Ecology, Cornell University). 
199. MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW: STATE, LAW, AND FAMILY IN 
TIlE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE 308 (1989). 
200. See supra text accompanying note 125 (discussing the interdependent nature of today's 
family). 
20 I. See BRONFENBRENNER, supra note 3 I, at 21. 
202. Babb, supra note 25, at 802-03 (citation omitted). 
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tern influences, such as parental employment, on family legal matters.203 
Finally, an ecological framework instructs court professionals "to look 
beyond the individual litigants involved in any family law matter, to 
holistically examine the larger social environments in which participants 
live, and to fashion legal remedies that strengthen a family's supportive 
relationships."204 
This structured consideration of the family's ecology by all court pro-
fessionals facilitates problem-solving and enables family law decision-
makers to understand more completely the comprehensive nature of the 
family's functioning. An ecological structure to guide family law court 
reform leads to the design of a court system that empowers decisionmakers 
to apply the law in a manner that more effectively resolves the family's le-
gal issues. 
2. Therapeutic Jurisprudence 
When designing a model specialized court system, the need to reach 
agreement about the court's philosophy is critical: "[p ]ublic consensus on 
the goals of the law administered by the specialized tribunal 
emerges ... as one of the most striking contributions to the success of 
specialization."205 Since courts intervene daily in families' and children's 
lives, it is intrinsic to the family law decisionmaking process that 
"intervention ought to aim to improve the participants' underlying behav-
ior or situation."206 
The court's focus on achieving an outcome of family law adjudication 
which helps the individuals and families appearing before it represents the 
goal of therapentic jurisprudence, defined by Professor Wexler as follows: 
Therapeutic jurisprudence is the study of the role of the law as a thera-
peutic agent. It looks at the law as a social force that, like it or not, may 
produce therapeutic or anti-therapeutic consequences. Such conse-
quences may flow from substantive rules, legal procedures, or from the 
behavior of legal actors (lawyers or judges). 
The task of therapeutic jurisprudence is to identify-and ultimately to 
examine empirically-relationships between legal arrangements and 
therapeutic outcomes. The research task is a cooperative and thoroughly 
203. See id. 
204. [d. at 803. 
205. Dreyfuss, supra note 155, at 414. 
206. Boob, supra note 25, at 798. 
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interdisciplinary one .... Such research should then usefully inform 
policy determinations regarding law reform.207 
The sense of what constitutes a therapeutic outcome derives from the 
individual's own viewpoint, which courts must attempt to honor.2os On 
the other hand, "what is ultimately regarded as 'therapeutic' -and the 
law's role in promoting therapeutic aims-is a sociopolitical decision, de-
cided by legal-political decisionmakers, with ... important input given to 
consumers or recipients of the law's therapeutic aims.,,209 Therapeutic ju-
risprudence requires an examination of "the extent to which a legal rule or 
practice promotes the psychological and physical well-being of the people 
it affects."210 While the concept of therapeutic jurisprudence has emerged 
from the field of mental health law, it has received wide application in di-
verse legal areas, including family law.211 
How, then, does the notion of therapeutic jurisprudence contribute to 
court reform in family law? According to Professors Wexler and Winick, 
therapeutic jurisprudence is merely a "lens" designed to shed light on 
interesting and important empirical and normative issues relating to the 
therapeutic impact of the law. The therapeutic jurisprudence perspective 
sets the stage for the articulation and debate of those questions, ... but it 
does not itself provide any of the answers.212 
207. Wexler, supra note 32, at S (citation omitted). 
20S. See Bruce J. Winick, The Jurisprudence of Therapeutic Jurisprudence. in LAW IN A 
THERAPEUTIC KEy: DEVELOPMENTS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE 645, 653 (David B. Wexler & 
Bruck J. Winick eds., 1997). 
209. David B. Wexler, Reflections on the Scope of Therapeutic Jurisprudence. in LAW IN A 
THERAPEUTIC KEy: DEVELOPMENTS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE, sllpra note 20S, at SII. SI2 
(citations omitted). 
210. Christopher Siobogin, Therapeutic Jllrisprudence: Five Dilemmas to Ponder, in LAW IN A 
THERAPEUTIC KEy: DEVELOPMENTS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE, sllpra note 20S, at 763. 767 
(italics omittcd). But see Wexler, supra note 209, at S27 ("[R]esearch into the therapeutic or an-
titherapeutic consequences of various arrangements applying or administering existing law has not 
received very much attention. This is ... a most promising avenue of microanalytic therapeutic juris-
prudence."). 
211. See, e.g., LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEy: DEVELOPMENTS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE, 
supra note 20S, at vii-x (collecting articles about therapeutic jurisprudence as applicd to mental health 
law, correctional law, criminal law and procedure, sexual orientation law. health law, personal injury 
and tort law, evidence. labor arbitration law, contracts and commercial law. the legal profession, 
rights/justice issues, future challenges, and empirical explorations); Babb, supra note 25. at 79S-S01 
(applying the goal of therapeutic jurisprudence to family law decisionmaking). See also Shiff & 
Wexler, supra note IS, at 356 (suggesting a future comparative law approach to therapeutic jurispru-
dence in order to adopt creative rehabilitative features of other court systems). 
212. David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick, Patients, Professionals, and the Path of Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence: A Response to Petrila, in LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY: DEVELOPMENTS IN 
THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 208, at 707, 70S (citation omitted). 
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Resolving family legal disputes with the aim of improving the lives of 
families and children requires structuring the court system to enhance the 
system's potential to maximize the therapeutic consequences of court in-
tervention. To accomplish this goal, the court system must allow for the 
contemplation of alternative legal outcomes intended to produce more ef-
fective functioning on the part of families and children.213 As I have said 
before, "[i]n the field of family law, therapeutic justice should strive to 
protect families and children from present and future harms, to reduce 
emotional turmoil, to promote family harmony or preservation, and to 
provide individualized and efficient, effective family justice.,,214 On the 
other hand, Wexler and Winick properly caution that "[t]herapeutic juris-
prndence in no way suggests that therapeutic considerations should trump 
other considerations. Therapeutic considerations are but one category of 
important considerations, as are autonomy, integrity of the fact-fmding 
process, community safety, and many more.,,215 
In effecting a therapeutic approach to family law adjudication, some 
scholars have suggested a reimaging of the judge's role to one of 
"healer,,,216 or a participant "in a process that restores people to their in-
tegrity and overcomes undesirable conditions.,,217 This is in marked con-
trast to the popular concept of objective, nentral judging within our court 
systems:218 
The effort to provide an alternative to the traditional litigation process 
for the resolution of disputes is particularly relevant in courts where the 
parties would benefit greatly from judicial sensitivity, compassion, and 
individual attention. The courts where family matters are heard, such as 
divorce and child related concerns, and the juvenile jurisdictions, are 
natural arenas for a more humanistic approach [to judging].219 
Judges themselves can significantly shift their own judicial process to 
display a more therapeutic perspective toward families and children by af-
fIrmatively demonstrating respect and empathy for court participants and 
by supporting the adoption of appropriate alternative dispute resolution 
213. See \VIDick, supra note 208, at 655. 
214. Babb, supra note 25, at 800 (citation omitted). 
215. Wexler & WIDick, supra note 212, at 714. 
216. Susan Snow & Steve Friedland, The Judge as Healer: A Humanistic Perspective, 69 DENV. 
U. L. REV. 713, 713 (1992). 
217. ld. (citation omitted). 
218. See id. at 714. 
219. ld. at 718. 
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techniques.22o Despite these actions on the part of judges, however, "[t]he 
structure of the current system impedes a humanistic approach to judg~ 
ing.,,221 As Judge Snow and Professor Friedland have noted: 
The growing size and complexities of many court systems ... aggravates 
[sic] the perception that one is on an assembly line, since a given judge 
may only handle a small aspect of the case before it moves on through 
the system. This is less than satisfying for judges ... because they may 
never see or know the final outcome. Removed from the results of their 
own labors, as well as the people involved in the cases they have dealt 
with, it is understandable that judges come to feel disconnected from the 
individuals who appear in their courtroom. This disassociation helps the 
judge insulate him or herself from the frustration of working in a frag-
mented process.222 
Others have advocated specific therapeutic roles for court personnel 
in addition to judges, particularly for mental health professionals involved 
in the family law decisionmaking process such as court consultants, spe-
cial masters, arbitrators, mediators, divorce counselors, and various types 
of clinicians.223 Any individual or family interventions suggested by these 
personnel must exist as part of a comprehensive, thoughtfully conceived 
plan designed by the court to respond in a holistic manner to families' and 
children's problems.224 In keeping with a therapeutic jurisprudential goal, 
"[ d]efming and expanding the role of the mental health interventionist 
should be an integral part of the current family law reform movement.,,22S 
Adopting therapeutic jurisprudence as the goal of a model family law 
adjudicatory system requires careful consideration of the therapeutic im~ 
plications resulting from all aspects of the court process. Envisioning 
therapeutic jurisprudence as the outcome, however, encourages the discov~ 
ery of creative ways to effectively resolve family conflicts.226 In the words 
of Professor Winick: 
220. See id. at 719-21. 
221. Id. at 715 (citation omitted). See also Martin Buxton & Lawrence A. Dubin, Family Court 
Judges Are Only People: But More Is Required, 1 WHlTIIERL. REV. 177, 178 (1979) (arguing that the 
legal system impedes the humanity of judges by not acknowledging the difficulty of judges in ac-
counting for their own psychological biases in the family law decisionmaking process). 
222. Snow & Friedland, supra note 216, at 716 (citation omitted). 
223. See Lynne M. Kenney & Diane Vigil, A lAwyer's Guide to Therapeutic Interventions in Do-
mestic Relations Court, 28.ARIz. Sr. LJ. 629, 635-38 (1996). 
224. See id. at 641. 
225. Id. 
226. See David B. Wexler, Justice, Mental Health, and Therapeutic Jurisprudence. in LAw IN A 
THERAPEUTIC KEY: DEVELOPMENTS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 208, at 713,719. 
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[T]herapeutic jurisprudence helps to identify the path of true law refonn. 
By providing a new lens through which to examine law, it promises to 
produce new insights and a newly invigorated interdisciplinary approach 
to law that will enrich legal policy analysis and improve law's function-
ing and its ability to increase the well-being of our society.227 
B. A BLUEPRINT TO CONSTRUCT A UNIFIED FAMILY COURT 
513 
A unified family court is a court that coordinates the work of inde-
pendent agencies and tribunals, each with some limited role in resolving 
the controversies incident to a family's legal matters.228 By applying the 
ecology of human development as a framework for the court and by em-
bracing the goal of therapeutic jurisprudence, this Section seeks to provide 
a model version of a court which most accurately portrays the concept of 
and the purpose behind a unified family court. The ensuing discussion 
explains how this unified family court addresses the existing impediments 
to effective family law adjudication. There exists, however, "no one pana-
cea, solution, or process to offer-instead, ... we should contemplate a 
variety of different ways to structure process in our legal system to reflect 
our multiple goals and objectives.,,229 
The contributions of both the ecology of human development and 
therapeutic jurisprudence to structure court reform can transcend individ-
ual court system idiosyncrasies and, at the same time, can accommodate 
the multitude of social, legal, and political characteristics that embody the 
diversity of our society.23o Reformers following a problem-oriented ap-
proach to court reform should incorporate the specific unified family court 
features detailed in this Section. This process can enable reformers to 
construct a court system which approaches the model family law adjudica-
tory system proposed decades ago by the Standard Family Court Act231 
227. Winick, supra note 208, at 668. 
228. See Pound, supra note 46, at 16l. 
229. Menkel-Meadow,supra note 22, at 11-12. 
230. See Michael A. Town, The Unified Family Court: Therapeutic Justice for Families and 
Children 4 (Mar. 11, 1994) (transcript of address available from Chicago Bar Association). Town 
suggests "that each locale must come up with its own [family court] plan and there is no one perfect 
template for a unified family court system. Each community and legal or justice culture has its own 
way of conducting its affairs which should be respected." [d. See also Brown, supra note 16, at 84 
(advocating that the structure of existing drug courts varies and must depend on the unique character-
istics of the jurisdiction, including laws, resources, judges, and personnel); Trotter & Cooper, supra 
note 78, at 226 (discussing methodological foundations needed to launch a program designed to re-
duce court delay). 
231. See supra Part I.A (discussing the Standard Family Court Act). 
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and as yet unrealized by a majority of our nation's court systems.232 In 
addition, reformers can use this interdisciplinary framework to fashion a 
system most appropriate for the individuals and families appearing before 
their courts. 
1. Court Structure 
Consistent with the problem-oriented approach to court reform and 
with systems analysis, the primary determination when designing a family 
law adjudicatory system is how to structure it. This entails justifying the 
creation of a specialized court for family law adjudication. While there 
appears to be renewed interest in devising some form of specialized tribu-
nal for the resolution of family law cases,233 many states still have not cho-
sen this path.234 To encourage the construction of these separate and dis-
tinct systems, it is helpful to examine the theoretical foundation sur-
rounding the implementation of specialized courts. 
The field of family law appropriately lends itself to adjudication 
within a specialized court. While family law encompasses diverse legal 
issues,235 the effect of family law problems on the intimate aspects and the 
stability of people's lives represents a unifying theme that supports consid-
ering this body of law as a specialty area. This approach is consistent with 
an ecological focus. As Judge Arthur has noted, 
a single court could examine the entire relationship between parent and 
parent, parent and child, child and child, family and in-laws, and family 
and the public. And, having explored the whole complex of relation-
ships, a single court could provide consistent and continuing considera-
tion of each aspect of the problem.236 
A more difficult inquiry is whether judges assigned to specialized 
family courts must themselves be specialized family court jurists. The 
types of choices required by decisionmakers to resolve family legal mat-
ters compel the need for judicial specialization. Not only must these 
judges fully understand the intricacies of the entire body of family law, but 
they also must possess an appreciation for and understanding of the social 
settings within which family members function, including any problems 
232. See infra Appendices B, C, and D. 
233. See supra Introduction (documenting a national interest in unified family courts); infra Ap-
pendix C. 
234. See infra Appendix D. 
235. See supra note 1. 
236. Lindsay O. Arthur, A Family Court-Why Not?, 51 MINN. L. REV. 226 (1966) (citation 
omitted) (advocating, iu an early article, consolidation of family law litigation and court treatment of 
the entire family problem). 
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attendant to each of these settings, such as substance abuse and domestic 
violence.237 Judges can receive assistance in acquiring this social science 
background through mandatory interdisciplinary training.238 Family law 
decisionmaking that emanates from a jurist informed about relevant social 
science literature, including child development and family dynamics,239 
and about how that knowledge applies to family law decisionmaking 
would be likely to result in resolutions that more effectively promote the 
well-being of families and children-a therapeutic outcome.240 Special-
ized family law jurists also can enhance decisionmaking quality by their 
immersion in the family law subject matter area, which would permit them 
to focus more accurately and quickly on the underlying facts and to render 
decisions more efficiently-another therapeutic outcome.241 
In order to fully comprehend the breadth of family law proceedings, 
as well as to understand from an ecological focus the various settings 
within which family law litigants live their lives, family law judges must 
remain within the family court system for significant periods of time.242 
Rather than prescribe a designated time period for judicial service, this is-
sue seems best determined by each jurisdiction after assessing its required 
overall pattern of judicial assignment. 
Problems arise with this unified family court requirement of special-
ized jurists, however. Many judges prefer to avoid service on the family 
court because of the perceived lack of prestige accorded by this assign-
ment, as well as the possibility of emotional exhaustion resulting from the 
highly personal nature of family law cases.243 Procedures exist to mini-
mize the family court judge's risk of judicial fatigue.244 For example, 
237. See KATZ & KUHN, supra note 36, at 5-6. 
238. See FAMILIES IN COURT, supra note 129, at 6. See also Margaret Beyer & Ricardo Urbana, 
An Emerging Judicial Role in Family Court, PRAC. PAPER SERIES (Juv. Just. Project of Crim. Just. 
Sec. of A.B.A., Washington, D.C.), Aug. 1986 (describing a training program for family court judges 
that provides background in child development, family problems, and education). 
239. See KATZ & KUHN, supra note 36, at 5-6. 
240. See Babb, supra note 25, at 808. 
241. See id. at 800. 
242. See KATZ & KUHN, supra note 36, at 4-5 (estimating the minimum length of judicial as-
signment to a family court should be four years). But see RUBIN & FLANGO, supra note 4, at 77 
(estimating the minimum length of judicial assignment to a family court should be twelve months). 
243. See RUBIN & FLANGO, supra note 4, at 10. 
244. See KATZ & KUHN, supra note 36, at 5. See also Town, supra note 230, at 11. Town 
comments on the character of a family court: 
A unified family court can be very overpopulated with cases, staff and litigants as well as 
emotions. It represents the frontline of the judiciary and it is not unlike an emergency room 
or field hospital mentality at times. Such a situation must be met with training, encouraging 
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family court judges can rotate through all parts of the family court 
docket,245 or judges periodically can rotate out of the family division 
docket to another docket within the court system.246 The ability of family 
court judges to rotate through various assignments or dockets within a 
family court, as opposed to handling only a particular type of case, can 
provide a broader and more informed context for judicial decisionmak-
ing.247 
To deal with the potential problem of prestige surrounding the status 
of a specialized family court, it is imperative to structure a specialized 
family court at the same status level as a trial court of general jurisdic-
tion.248 This similar status ascribed to the family court reflects and pro-
motes the importance of family law matters within the overall administra-
tion of the justice system.249 Given the critical importance of the family's 
functioning to the socialization and development of productive members 
of society,25o family law cases must receive court treatment at least equal 
to that of other cases within the court system.251 Operating a specialized 
family law tribunal as a division of an existing court offers fewer financial 
and legislative challenges, as many courts already have the inherent 
authority to structure their dockets to accomplish the jurisdiction's own 
goals of judicial administration.252 The decision of whether to structure 
the specialized family court as a separate court, housed in separate facili-
Id. 
collegiality, rotation within and without family court and providing for down time where 
needed to prepare decisions. 
245. See KATZ & KUHN, supra note 36, at 4. 
246. See RUBIN & FLANGO, supra note 4, at 77. The authors summarize a study concerning the ef-
fects of judicial rotation: 
In his interviews with fourteen judges, Hurst (1991) found that rotation raised perspectives 
for judges, according to juvenile and family jurisdiction equal status with other jurisdictions, 
and had some value in preventing "dynasties." On the other hand, rotation had an equal 
number of shortcomings, including the "no one in charge" syndrome; discouragement of ca-
reer specialization; disincentive to training; less continuity in dealing with probation offi-
cers, lawyers, prosecutors, and social workers; and disadvantage for the judiciary in the 
competition for fiscal resources. 
Id. at 77. 
247. See S:lYMANSKIET AL., supra note 33, at 21-22. See also Hurst, supra note 179, at 15-20 
(discussing the advantages and disadvantages of assigning all the judges of a court of general jurisdic-
tion to the family court for specific time periods). 
248. See supra text accompanying notes 150-51 (explaining techniques to overcome notions of 
inferior status). 
249. See Standard Family Court Act, supra note 44, at 109. 
250. See S:lYMANSKI ET AL., supra note 33, at 3. 
251. See 1993 Md. Laws 198. 
252. See Steven J. Messinger, On Moving Toward a Family Court in Georgia Without tile Need 
for Constitutional Revision, 12 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 667 (1996) (examining constitutional and statutory 
barriers to the creation of a family court in Georgia). 
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ties, or to structure the tribunal as an autonomous division of an existing 
trial court depends, in large measure, on the financial resources available 
to create the specialized court system. 
Given the current volume and complexity of family law cases, crea-
tion of a specialized family court staffed with specialized family law ju-
rists must become the norm rather than the exception, even for the smallest 
jurisdictions. Whatever the particular form of specialized family law ad-
judicatory system, these courts must receive the same resources and sup-
port as the generalist courts.253 Also, wherever the location of the family 
court facility, it should possess child- and family-oriented features, includ-
ing appropriately designed waiting rooms for children and witnesses, in-
terview rooms for evaluations and meetings, and adequate security. 254 
2. Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
A problem-oriented approach to court reform requires focusing on 
another major difficulty encountered among our nation's family law adju-
dicatory systems. A recurring pattern within a majority of court systems is 
the fragmented manner in which courts attempt to resolve family legal 
matters, with more than one court often involved in determining a family's 
related legal issues.255 This fragmented decisionmaking process interferes 
with a major ecological goal of a family law adjudicatory system because 
it defeats the capacity of one court to examine the family holistically in or-
der to better understand its functioning and to treat it accordingly. From 
an ecological perspective, the fragmentation impedes any effort by court 
professionals to identify and to strengthen the family's interactions among 
the various systems in which family members participate. 
For the family court to coordinate mUltiple legal issues involving the 
same family and to monitor and enforce family court orders, a fundamental 
principle of any model unified family court must be the exercise of com-
prehensive family law subject matter jurisdiction over the full range of 
family law matters.256 The potential to completely resolve a family's re-
253. See Stempel, supra note 14, at 120-21. 
254. See KATZ & KUHN, supra note 36, at 3. See also Laura Duncan, Courthouse Day Care 
Programs Increasing, A.B.A. J., Oct 1995, at 22-23 (describing some features of the more than thirty 
child care centers within American courthouses and noting that California, Massachusetts, and New 
York have legislatively appropriated funding to construct these centers). 
255. See supra note 102 (identifying studies on problems within existing family law adjudicatory 
systems). 
256. See SZYMANSKIET AL., supra note 33, at 10; supra note 1 (defining comprehensive family 
law subject matter jurisdiction). 
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lated legal problems becomes a therapeutic consequence; this outcome en-
ables the participants to experience a sense of completion and to move 
forward with their lives, rather than remaining anchored to the court sys-
tem by various unresolved legal issues. 
In defining comprehensive subject matter jurisdiction, then, it is more 
prudent for court reformers to err on the side of overinclusive jurisdiction, 
as opposed to underinclusive jurisdiction; reformers must empower their 
unified family court to respond as comprehensively as possible to all of a 
family's related legal matters. This jurisdiction encompasses all divorce or 
dissolution and related matters, including distribution of marital property, 
separation, and anuulment; child custody, visitation, modification, and in-
terstate custody cases; child support establishment, modification, enforce-
ment, and uniform reciprocal support cases; determination of paternity; 
child abuse and neglect; termination of parental rights; domestic violence 
proceedings; adoption; juvenile delinquency proceedings; adult and juve-
nile guardianship and conservatorship; mental health matters, including 
civil commitment and confinement; legal-medical issues, including right to 
die, abortion, and living wills; emancipation; and name change.257 Experts 
differ, however, about whether to include criminal jurisdiction over intra-
familial matters, such as child abuse and domestic violence, within the 
family court's jurisdictiou.258 
257. See KATZ & KUHN, supra note 36, at 7-8. See also SZVMANSKIET AL., supra note 33, at 10. 
258. See KATZ & KUHN, supra note 36, at 8. The authors discuss the arguments for and against 
including criminal jurisdiction over intrafamilial matters as part of the family court: 
While proponents for inclusion of this jurisdiction in family court argued that such a system 
promotes coordinated delivery of services to the family and discourages mUltiple interview-
ing of victims, as well as fragmented delivery, those arguing against such jurisdiction cited 
possible due process violations and community pressure for a more punitive stance toward 
offenders as rendering such jurisdiction inappropriate for the family court. 
[d. at 8-9. See also SZYMANSKI ET AL., supra note 33, at 8-9. The authors suggest additional argu-
ments against including criminal jurisdiction in the family court. 
Inclusion of criminal jurisdiction within the family court can present a host of prob-
lems ... First, there is a philosophical divergence between juvenile court and criminal court. 
Juvenile court's intervention is justified on the basis of protecting the child and is not in-
tended as punishment but as remediation. Criminal proceedings seck to puniSh offcnders 
without regard to family interests. Adult criminal proceedings require the availability of 
jury trial with the increased administrative burden on the restructured court system, unless 
the criminal jurisdiction is limited to misdemeanors. 
[d. (citation omitted). See also Martin Guggenheim, Constitutional and Due Process Concerns: Ju-
venile and Family Courts of the Future, in FAMILIES IN COURT, supra note 129, at 179, 181 
(addressing constitutional and due process considerations for case management of family violence 
matters). 
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3. Case Management and Case Processing 
Presently, delay2S9 in processing and resolving family law cases is 
another problem characterizing many family law adjudicatory systems.260 
This delay interferes with a therapeutic outcome for individuals and fami-
lies, particularly in child-related cases, with respect to custody, child sup-
port, and termination of parental rights matters,261 by allowing the fami-
lies' problems to remain unresolved and potentially to escalate. Focusing 
on attempts to decrease delay requires improving the court's case man-
agement262 functions, or the method by which cases proceed from initial 
filing through resolution. Reformers must decide whether judges need to 
perform management functions within their unified family court or 
whether other court personnel can undertake the management tasks. An-
other issue reformers must address is how to manage, including an analysis 
of the role of alternative case processing methods that remove cases from 
the courtroom.263 Improved case processing, however, does not necessar-
ily mean more effective case resolution.264 Thus, the specific challenge for 
court reformers becomes how to process family law cases efficiently and 
effectively. 
259. See Trotter & Cooper, supra note 78, at 220-21 (defining "delay" as a subjective tenn inca-
pable of quantification and suggesting that some amount of case processing delay is unavoidable, 
while too much delay becomes intolerable). 
260. See supra note 102 (identifying studies on problems within existing family law adjudicatory 
systems). 
261. See A.B.A. PRESIDENTIAL WORKING GROUP, supra note 10, at 56 (explaining the effects of 
court delay on children). See also Lee M. Robinson, The View From the Minors, A.B.A. J., Sept 
1996, at 74, 76 (suggesting procedures for protecting children's interests in family law cases). 
ld. 
262. See Peckham, supra note 138, at 253-54 n.3. Peckham defines two-stage case management: 
Case management entails two basic phases of pretrial planning. In the first phase, the pre-
trial activity is planned. The device the court uses in this phase is the status conference, at 
which the court and the parties identify issues and schedule a discovery cutoff date, pretrial 
motions, and the trial date, among other things. At the status conferences, the trial judge can 
begin to introduce the possibility of settlement or any other alternative dispute resolution 
technique which might be suitable for the particular dispute. 
The second phase of pretrial case management involves planning the trial itself. In this sec-
ond phase, the parties prepare pretrial statements and set out anticipated evidentiary objec-
tions in advance of trial. Requiring the attorneys to analyze and evaluate their cases before 
the trial begins assures that attorneys are prepared for trial and further facilitates settlement 
discussions. 
263. See Scheiber, supra note 118, at 2092. Scheiber discusses the inadequacy of the traditional 
court system in resolving family law matters: 
ld. 
Some commentators and refonners ... depict the regular courts and their procedures as 
simply inadequate in their competence to meet special needs, such as those which arise in 
juvenile proceedings or in family law when intervention of social workers and other profes-
sionals is deemed more effective than what judges can accomplish in the courtroom. 
264. See Resnik, supra note 131, at 435-36. 
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Because parties in family law disputes generally seek a resolution of 
highly-charged, emotional matters, a therapeutic approach to structure 
court reform requires that these cases receive active, hands-on case man-
agement as early as possible. This type of case processing can result in 
more therapeutic outcomes for family law litigants, as it reduces the 
court's delay in attending to the families' problems and links the families 
as early as possible with appropriate social services. A judge, a profes-
sional court administrator, a trained intake worker,265 or a team of these 
personnel266 can evaluate each case filing or intake and can determine 
whether the parties require immediate court attention. The initial evalua-
tion process also can result in referral of the parties to appropriate serv-
ices,267 as well as scheduling an early status conference. At this confer-
ence, the parties, their attorneys, and the judge can frame the issues in the 
case, discuss settlement possibilities, and consider alternatives to an adver-
sarial trial or hearing.268 This case processing strategy requires managerial 
judging: "As a case manager, ... the trial judge becomes an active facilita-
tor of the lawsuit, shaping its structure and shepherding its expeditious 
completion.,,269 Family law case management becomes an ongoing proc-
265. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reflections on Judicial ADR and the Multi-Door CmmluJ/lse at 
Twenty: Fait Accompli, Failed Overture, or Fledgling Adulthood?, II OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 
297, 370 (I 996). Stempel defines the "screening clerk" as "a judicial officer of substantial tmining 
. and discretion" and ideally a lawyer. Id. See also A.B.A. PRESIDENTIAL WORKING GROUP, supra 
note 10, at 55 (detailing the opemtion of a family court intake unit). 
266. See Family Division Green Paper 20-21,42 (Jan. 28, 1993) (available at the office of the 
Assistant Director, New Jersey Family Division, Richard J. Hughes Justice Complex, Trenton, N.J.) 
(discussing the creation of case management teams in New Jersey's Family Division). BIIt see A.B.A. 
PRESIDENTIAL WORKING GROUP, supra note 10, at 54 (advocating that the most cost-effective role for 
judges is to resolve only those truly adversarial proceedings). 
267. See infra Part III.B.4 (describing the services component of a unified family court). See 
also A.B.A. PRESIDENTIAL WORKING GROUP, supra note 10, at 55. The authors provide an example 
of how a case management unit can opemte: 
Id. 
[Tlhe case management unit would refer a family to parent education, to mediation, or to a 
judge for a protective order. The unit would consolidate and coordinate all pending cases 
involving one family and insure that services ordered by the court are provided. It would be 
a primary resource for informing families about available community resources that the 
family might wish to use. Finally, the unit could assist those who do not have legal counsel. 
268. See Peckham, supra note 138, at 255. Peckham identifies alternatives to a merits trial, in-
cluding court-annexed arbitmtion, mediation, and referral to a master. See id. He also summarizes 
various alternative dispute resolution techniques. See id. at 269-77. See also A.B.A. PRESIDENTIAL 
WORKING GROUP, supra note 10, at 54-55 (describing various referrals to court personnel); Gladys 
Kessler & Linda J. Finkelstein, The Evolution of a Multi-Door Courth(}use, 37 CATH. U. L. REV. 577 
(1988) (describing Washington, D.C.'s dispute resolution center that offers litigants in civil actions, 
including domestic relations cases, several methods to resolve disputes). 
269. Peckham, supra note 138, at 254 n.3. See also Brown, supra note 16, at 86 (explaining the 
need for active judicial involvement in drug treatment courts which requires that judges possess 
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ess requiring both the coordination of court personnel and outside agen-
cies, and it necessitates constant monitoring.27o 
The one judge/one case approach to case management, or the individ-
ual assignment system,271 challenges judges to engage in more ecological 
and therapeutic decisionmaking by empowering them with a greater sense 
of responsibility for the effective and efficient resolution of a family's 
case.272 Ongoing involvement with a family's legal matters enables a 
judge to develop a more complete understanding of the comprehensive 
nature of the family's legal problems by allowing the judge to identify the 
many systems within which family members participate. This expanded 
knowledge permits judges to fashion more effective outcomes to resolve a 
family's problems. This type of case processing system tests the judge's 
ability to remain impartial.273 But, as Professor Peckham points out, 
"[a]lthough a judge must exhibit the qualities of dispassion and disen-
gagement, he or she need not be ignorant in order to be impartial, nor re-
mote in order to be dispassionate."274 Active case management and a one 
judge/one case approach to family law decisionmaking are critical features 
to the design of a model unified family court. 
The successful operation of a family court as described demonstrates 
the need for a high level of administrative organization both to manage 
cases and to coordinate services. The court management system, including 
nonjudicial personnel, must aim to resolve disputes in a timely manner, to 
supply and to coordinate efficiently the necessary resources or services, 
and to network appropriately with other courts in the system to share in-
formation about families that allows for consistent judicial decisionmak-
ing.275 To accomplish this coordinated management, all family court per-
sonnel must understand the goals and operation of the entire family court 
system.276 An administrative or presiding family court judge,277 who is 
"appropriate judicial temperament, strong interpersonal skills, and significant administrative abili-
ties"). 
270.' See Trotter & Cooper, supra note 78, at 224. 
271. See Peckham, supra note 138, at 257. 
272. See id. But see Trotter & Cooper, supra note 78, at 223 (defining a "master" system of case 
processing, where pooled cases reach different judges for separate phases of the same case). 
273. See Peckham, supra note 138, at 261. 
274. Td. at 262; Peckham also suggests that "[i]mpartiality is a capacity of mind-a learned abil-
ity to recognize and compartmentalize the relevant from the irrelevant and to detach one's emotional 
from one's rational faculties. Only because we trust judges to be able to satisfy these obligations do 
we permit them to exercise such power and oversight." Td. 
275. See KAn & KUHN, supra note 36, at 2. See also SZThfANSKI Ef AL., supra note 33, at 10. 
276. See KAn & KUHN, supra note 36, at 2. 
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responsible to the chief judge of either the circuit or highest state court, 
can assist with this critical level of organization.278 A family court also 
requires a family court administrator, who is directly responsible to the 
state court administrator.279 These key administrative personnel, as well as 
a strong family court judiciary, must display leadership in attempting to 
coordinate family legal proceedings.28o 
4. The Services Component 
To assist judges in the family law case management process, an ef-
fective family court must offer alternative dispute resolution procedures, 
such as negotiation, mediation, and other informal processes, in addition to 
the traditional adversarial model of decisionmaking.281 These alternative 
procedures become important due to the distinctive nature of family law 
proceedings-legal issues with an overlay of highly charged emotional and 
social problems. The earlier the court incorporates these alternatives into 
family law proceedings, the more successful the court becomes at circum-
venting the adversary process and locating services to assist families.282 In 
contrast to alternative dispute resolution programs existing independent of 
the court system, court-connected programs are likely to gain greater ac-
ceptance by the parties; they tend to view procedures in this setting as un-
biased due to the affiliation with the court.283 In addition, nonadversarial 
proceedings can help decrease delays associated with traditional adversar-
iallitigation.284 
A model unified family court also must have available an array of 
social ~ervices that it can offer families to assist court professionals' un-
derstanding of the context of a family's legal problems and to address ef-
fectively social and psychological issues related to the family's function-
ing. While "family courts are not meant to act as social service 
departments armed with the power of coercion,"285 to operate most effec-
tively these courts must allow decisionmakers the opportunity to under-
277. See SZThfANSKI ET AL., supra note 33, at 14. See also Standard Family Court Act, supra note 
44, at II 1. 
278. See Gordon, supra note 34, at 13. 
279. See KA1Z & KUHN, supra note 36, at 10. 
280. See SZ\'MANSKI ET AL., supra note 33, at 14-IS. The authors suggest that achieving judicial 
leadership can occur by active involvement in bar associations and judges' organizations, advising 
organizations, and speaking at public education events. See id. at 16. 
281. See KA1Z& KUHN, supra note 36, at 4. 
282. See SZThfANSKI ET AL., supra note 33, at 28. 
283. See id. at 29. 
284. See id. at 2. 
285. Mulvey, supra note 29, at 56. 
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stand the reasons for behavior underlying a particular family's situation.286 
This infonned decisionmaking enables a judge to fashion a creative reso-
lution to the family problem,287 a resolution generally encompassing a so-
cial dimension.288 The provision of services in this manner contributes to 
a court system that is ecological and therapeutic in its treatment of the 
family and, thus, consistent with the approach to court refonn advocated in 
this Article. 
The nature of the services courts can offer varies widely and depends 
on the needs of the community served by the court.289 These services can 
include, among others, assessment and evaluation, counseling, volunteer, 
community outreach, and family support services, as well as restitution, 
probation, diversion, and detention services for the juvenile delinquency 
component of the family court.290 Establishing and maintaining the serv-
ices component of a unified family court challenges the court to work 
closely with the community to identify existing services and to highlight 
gaps.291 Court management personnel must ensure the coordination of any 
services a family receives.292 While the court can choose to offer some of 
the services itself, and examples of many creative programs abound,293 a 
286. See id. at 57. 
287. See id. at 56. 
288. See Arthur, supra note 236, at 232. 
289. See KATZ & KUHN, supra note 36, at 11 (suggesting that this need to access and coordinate 
services may cause confidentiality laws to be revised to allow access to appropriate infonnation by 
court officials). See also FAMILIES IN COURT, supra note 129, at 2 (urging a reevaluation of court 
confidentiality rules to determine their underlying policy considerations and the nced for such rules); 
SZThfANSKI ET AL., supra note 33, at 25, 35 (advocating regular meetings between judges and services 
providers to review the availability of services and suggesting specific procedures to maintain confi-
dentiality yet permit communication). 
290. See KATZ & KUHN, supra note 36, at 11; SZThfANSKI ET AL., supra note 33, at 27-28. See 
also MuRPHY, supra note 107, at 20-21 (identifying "essential services" to an effective family court as 
mediation in custody and visitation matters, custody investigation, trained social workers to respond to 
emergencies, mental health services to provide evaluations, infonnation services to assist unrepre-
sented litigants, and parenting seminars). 
291. See Mulvey, supra note 29, at 61. "A family court judge can encourage the creation of 
needed services, and present facts about the absence of such services and the consequences to children 
and the community as a result. This calls for a more active involvement than many judges would pre-
fer to take .... " [d. (citation omitted). 
292. See A.B.A. PREsIDENTIAL WORKING GROUP, supra note 10, at 53 ("Services are frag-
mented: the same family may have different case workers from a child welfare agency, a school, a 
community health center, a juvenile delinquency program and a substance abuse treatment program."). 
293. See Babb, supra note 25, at 806 n.l89. The author provides information about court-connected 
programs: 
For examples of existing educational programs designed specifically to assist participants in 
family legal proceedings, see Larry Lehner, Education/or Parents Divorcing in California, 
32 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REv. 50 (1994) (describing a variety of court-connected 
educational programs for family law litigants in California); Virginia Petersen & Susan B. 
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more fiscally prudent option is to link the family with needed services that 
already exist outside the court structure and within community agencies 
and organizations.294 The earlier participants in family law cases receive 
necessary services, the more likely it becomes that the particular family 
experiences fewer problems later-a therapeutic outcome.295 
5. A User-Friendly Court 
The final component critical to a unified family court blueprint is the 
notion that the court remain accessible to and user-friendly for the partici-
pants, including the large proportion of pro se family law litigants.296 The 
mechanisms to achieve this result range from new information technolo-
gies, such as computerized kiosks that ,disseminate prepared legal forms,297 
to the creation of "a new service paradigm in the justice system.,,298 Im-
plementing this new paradigm involves designing court structures for the 
convenience of the users rather than the lawyers and training court person-
nel to treat litigants with courtesy and civility .299 Bringing observers and 
Id. 
Steinman, Helping Children Succeed After Divorce: A Court-Mandated Edllcation Program 
for Divorcing Parents, 32 FAM. & CONCILIATION crS. REV. 27 (1994) (discussing a manda-
tory parent education program in Ohio for divorcing couples with children, the goals of 
which include providing parents infonnation about how to help their children with the di-
vorce process, about divorce-specific resources and services, about options for problem 
solving, and about how to remain independent of the court); Carol Roeder-Esser, Families in 
Transition: A Divorce Workshop, 32 FAM. & CONCILIATION crS. REV. 40 (1994) 
(describing a court-connected mandatory divorce orientation program in Kansas that focuses 
on the psychological, social, legal, and child-related effects of divorce, as welI as enumerat-
ing optional educational programs on other topics, including step parenting, grandparents' 
visitation, and single parenting); Andrew Schepard, War and P.E.A.C.E.: A Preliminary Re-
port and a Model Statute on an Interdisciplinary Educational Program for Divorcing and 
Separating Parents, 27 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 131 (1993) (describing a court connected in-
terdisciplinary parent education program in New York for parents involved in custody, child 
support, and divorce and separation, and detailing the cooperation among the courts, mental 
health professionals, and educators); Bill Miller, Divorce's Hard Lessons: COllrt-Ordered 
Classes Focus on the Children, WASH. POST, Nov. 21,1994, at AI, AI2 (describing parent 
education programs in Maryland, Virginia. and Washington, D.C.). 
294. See A.B.A. PRESIDENTIAL WORKING GROUP, supra note 10, at 55. 
295. See RUBIN & FLANoo, supra note 4, at 9. 
296. See JOHNSON, supra note 102, at 29. See also Henry Goldblatt, Family Law Today: Rife 
with Complexities and Varied Roles, COMPLEAT LAW., Winter 1995, at 20, 22, 62 (discussing a free 
computerized legal kiosk program in Maricopa County, Arizona. that assists pro se family law liti-
gants); Scheiber, supra note 118, at 2076-77 (discussing how unifying trial courts, including family 
courts, can help assure unifonn case processing procedures and caseloads, eliminate local variations in 
rules of practice, coordinate calendars and judges, and establish more streamlined appellate proce-
dures). 
297. See JOHNSON, supra note 102, at 29. 
298. Id. at 34. 
299. See id. 
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volunteers into the court can demystify the court system for the public and 
can serve as a valuable resource to the court system's operation.300 
C. APPROACHING THE VISION 
The unified family court described in this Article offers the family 
law adjudicatory process the following advantages: an enhanced recogni-
tion of the importance of the effective resolution of family proceedings to 
families and to society; coordinated and comprehensive legal and social 
services for the family, aimed at reducing emotional trauma for and im-
proving the lives of family members; more efficient case processing and 
case management; and a more accessible and user-friendly court system.301 
While the cost to establish and maintain a family court is often cited as a 
disadvantage,302 court systems presently allocate resources to resolve fam-
ily law cases in an inefficient and uncoordinated manner. It is likely that a 
unified family court can reduce costs by centralizing and coordinating 
family law decisionmaking, rather than by operating a system requiring 
multiple proceedings in different trlbunals.303 
Some experts believe that, as it presently exists, "[t]he unified family 
court has worked well, generally fulfilling the high expectations of those 
who advocated the reform.,,304 On the other hand, the less positive results 
experienced by some jurisdictions do not justify abandoning the con-
cept.305 Court reform in family law has proceeded since the early twenti-
eth century;306 however, courts continue their struggle to develop a more 
appropriate system for family law adjudication.307 Survey results and 
studies assessing contemporary family law adjudication within America's 
courts consistently reveal unresolved issues that plague this system. 
300. See id. at 35-37 (suggesting court-watching programs to provide judges with objective 
feedback, community focus groups aimed at improving court operation, and opportunities for the 
public to volunteer in the courts). See also Marsha Mah, The People vs. Family Court, DEL. TODAY, 
Mar. 1997, at 34, 40 (mentioning the use of court watchers as a way to improve existing family courts, 
such as the Delaware Family Court). 
301. See Shepherd, supra note 34, at 39. 
302. See id. 
303. See Pound, supra note 46, at 170. See also Barnes, supra note 12, at 22, 23 (reporting that 
New Jersey's family court administrator believes that the family court system saves money, is faster, 
and is less adversarial than traditional means of family law adjudication). 
304. Shepherd, supra note 34, at 38. 
305. See id. at 39 (indicating increased costs, lack of resources, and judicial and staff fatigue as dis-
advantages experienced by some states in operating unified family courts). 
306. See supra Part l.A (discussing the history of the family court movement). 
307. See infra Appendix C. 
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Applying a problem-oriented approach to court reform has uncovered 
an essential element missing among existing family law adjudicatory sys-
tems: a paradigm or framework around which to structure the court.308 
While there is no one ideal court design adaptable for every jurisdiction to 
address systemic family law adjudication problems, family law court re-
form must proceed with a specific vision. The application of an interdis-
ciplinary ecological and therapeutic framework to proposed family law 
adjudicatory system reform is the blueprint critical to the construction of 
any court. As a court reform goal, this means designing anew the type of 
justice system defmed by the Standard Family Court Act in 1959: 
To protect and safeguard family life in general and family units in par-
ticular by affording to family members all possible help in resolving 
their justiciable problems and conflicts arising from their interpersonal 
relationships, in a single court, with one specially qualified staff under 
one leadership, with a common philosophy and purpose, working as a 
unit, with one set of family records, all in one place, under the direction 
of one or more specially qualifiedjudges.309 
More effective resolution of family legal matters can strengthen in-
dividuals' and families' functioning, a benefit to the entire society. State 
and local governments have an interest in providing sufficient funding to 
allow for accomplishment of this goal.310 Because courts must compete 
for scarce resources, collaboration among courts and a broad range of 
community organizations in initiating and organizing reform efforts can 
result in funding from both government and private grant sources.3!! Invit-
ing community representatives to participate in a state "court reform or 
court futures commission,"3!2 designed to identify justice system prob-
308. See Mulvey, supra note 29, at 50. Mulvey discusses the need for a paradigm shift in family 
law decisionrnaking based upon a changing concept of the family. 
[C]onceptual issues arising from the merger of family theory and legal process must be re-
solved. The "paradigmatic assumptions" of legal intervention which have evolved from a 
primarily individual focus must be reexamined in light of family theory. A family must he 
viewed as a "natural social system, with properties all its own." Theoretically, the legal 
system must address the definition and proper place of this entity's interest if it is to adopt a 
true family focus. 
[d. (citations omitted). See also Marcus, supra note 8, at 813 ("To achieve dramatic progress, one 
must have a paradigm."). 
309. Standard Family Court Act, supra note 44, at 106. 
310. See A.B.A. PRESIDENTIAL WORKING GROUP, supra note 10, at 56. 
311. See Brown, supra note 16, at 96 (discussing funding collaboration needed for drug courts). 
See also Edward B. McConnell, Planning jor the State and Federal Courts, 78 VA. L. REV. 1849, 
1866 (1992) (suggesting that academics receive grants to study court problems and to design courts 
due to their objective detachment from daily court operations). 
312. JOHNSON, supra note 102, at 64. 
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lems, propose solutions, and monitor reform implementation,313 constitutes 
a problem-oriented approach toward and a means to begin to implement 
court reform. This community-focused mechanism to achieve court re-
form offers another advantage in that "it offers humanity the opportunity 
to take conscious control of the systems by which we live.,,314 
CONCLUSION 
Fashioning an effective system within which to resolve contemporary 
family legal issues requires a paradigmatic shift in conceptualizing the 
nature of the family and its functioning. "A family must be viewed as a 
'natural social system, with properties all its own.",315 A theoretical social 
science perspective, the ecology of human development,316 provides a 
mechanism for comprehending the true nature and breadth of a family's 
functioning and its legal problems, as well as a framework around which to 
design or to redesign a more effective family law adjudicatory system. 
Once a more responsive court structure exists, this institution can aim to 
dispense therapeutic justice with the goal of improving the lives of indi-
viduals and families in the disposition of family legal disputes. 
Society cannot afford to overlook the opportunity to redesign existing 
family law adjudicatory systems or to fashion new models. Courts are 
likely to remain the forum to which people turu for resolution of their 
family legal matters. As Judge Weinstein has noted, "[i]n theory, if not 
always in practice, everyone is equal in the courts; mechanisms exist to 
help redress imbalances and protect against manifest injustice. Such a 
commitment is absent from many forms of private, extrajudicial dispute 
resolution."317 
This Article has advocated the creation of unified family courts as the 
reform effort having the greatest potential to enhance family law deci-
sionmaking and thereby to improve people's lives. Only eleven states cur-
rently offer all their citizens the ability to resolve family legal matters 
within a family court structure. Reformers within the remaining jurisdic-
tions must address many ongoing family law dispute resolution problems. 
313. See id. at 64-69 (outlining mandates, membership, leadership, funding, and other consid-
erations relevant to a justice system refonn commission). 
3 14. LoPucki, supra note 27, at 522. 
315. Mulvey, supra note 29, at 50 (citations omitted). 
316. See generally BRONfENBRENNER, supra note 31, at 3-4 (describing the treatment of human 
development through an ecological perspective). 
317. Weinstein, supra note 191, at 246. 
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The Article has advanced a problem-oriented approach to court reform. In 
any court system, participants must maintain a constant vigilance and con-
cern about evaluating and attempting to improve the family law court 
process. The systems analysis methodology outlined in this Article pro-
vides a structured mechanism to conduct this evaluation. 
While each jurisdiction needs to build its own court consistent with 
the legal, social, and cultural needs of the community, this Article has pre-
sented a common interdisciplinary ecological and therapeutic framework 
to guide the construction effort. Adherence to this paradigm, which at-
tempts to explain and enhance the development of individuals and fami-
lies, empowers courts to render family justice that promotes the partici-
pants' well-being. This ecological and therapeutic blueprint must direct all 
family court construction or reconstruction efforts. Not only is the 
"substantial betterment"318 of our family law adjudicatory systems possi-
ble, it is a process whose initiation cannot wait. 
318. JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYIH AND REALrrY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE 2 (1949); SII-
pra epigraph to Introduction. 
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STATES WITHOUT FAMILY COURTSIDIVISIONSIDEPARTMENTS 
STATE COURTS THAT HEAR FAMILY LAW CASES I 
Alaska Superior Court, District Court, and Youth Court2 
Arizona Superior Court and Juvenile Court3 
Arkansas Circuit Court, Chancery Court, Probate Court, and Juvenile Court4 
Connecticut Superior CourtS 
Idaho District Court and Magistrate's Division6 
Indiana Circuit Court, Superior Court, County Court, and Probate Court7 
Iowa District Court and Juvenile Court8 
Minnesota District Court9 
Montana District Court and Youth Coureo 
Nebraska District Court, County Court, and Juvenile CourtJl 
North Carolina District Court and Juvenile Coure2 
North Dakota Unified Court System (only one trial court statewide)13 
South Dakota Circuit Courtl4 
Tennessee General Session, Circuit Court, Juvenile Coures 
Utah District Court and Juvenile Coure6 
West Virginia Magistrate Court and Circuit Courtl7 
Wyoming County Court and District/Juvenile Courtl8 
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APPENDIXE 
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR STATE COURT PERSONNEL 
1. Introduction 
a. Name of Research Assistant 
b. Law Student at University of Baltimore 
c. Research Assistant for Professor Barbara A. Babb 
d. Presently conducting research on how states handle family law 
cases 
e. May I please have your 
name: 
title: 
address: 
direct phone number: 
f. Would you like our phone number? Fax number? 
2. What is the volume of cases which deal with family issues? 
a. Will you send us information/documentation? 
3. Does your state have a family court? 
a. How is it structured? 
b. What is the subject matter jurisdiction of the court? 
c. How long is the judge term? 
d. How are cases assigned? 
IF NO FAMILY COURT: 
a. Is your state considering establishing a family court? 
b. Is there any pending legislation to establish a family court? 
1) What is the status of that legislation? 
2) Will you send a copy of the proposed legislation? 
c. Does your state have a family law division? 
d. How are family law cases handled in your court system? 
1) Specialized tracking 
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2) Master system 
3) How quickly do cases move through the system? 
e. Does your state assign specific judges to family law cases? 
1) How long do the judges sit on this docket? 
2) Do they hear exclusively family law cases or a combination of 
family law and other cases? 
3) Do judges who hear family cases have any specialized training 
in that area? 
f. How many different courts in your state deal with family law is-
sues? (circuit, district, juvenile, total number) 
g. In your opinion, is there a need for a family court system in your 
state? Why or why not? 
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Notes for Appendix A 
I. Comprehensive subject matter jurisdiction, in this Appendix, is defined to include divorce, 
annulment, and property distribution; child custody and visitation; alimony and child support; pater-
nity, adoption, and termination of parental rights; juvenile causes Guvenile delinquency, child abuse, 
and child neglect); domestic violence; criminal nonsupport; name change; guardianship of minors and 
disabled persons; and withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining medical procedures, involuntary 
admissions, and emergency evaluations. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 921-928 (1989 & Supp. 
1996). Individual states may vary with regard to inclusion of particular subject matter jurisdictional 
areas. Any state defined to have comprehensive subject matter jurisdiction, however, has jurisdiction 
over a majority of the above subjects. 
2. The Delaware Family Court was established in 1971. See id. 
3. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 906 (1989 & Supp. 1996). 
4. See Telephone Interview with Michael Arrington, Director of Special Court Services (June 
26, 1997). One judge/one family case assignment, in this Appendix, is defined as one judge assigned 
to a family for all proceedings before the court involving that family. 
5. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-1101 (1995); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-2301 to 16-2365 (1997). 
6. The District of Columbia established its Family Court in 1970. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-
902 (1995). 
7. See Telephone Interview with Edward Ricks, Director of Family Division, District of Co-
lumbia, Division of Superior Court (June 27, 1997). 
8. See id. Traditional calendar assignment, in this Appendix, is defined as the standard proce-
dure utilized by the clerk of the court to assign all civil matters to the respective judges on a daily, 
weekly, monthly, or other regnlarly scheduled basis. 
9. Jurisdiction of the Family Division varies by each judicial circuit; however, the Family Di-
vision can hear dissolution of marriage, custody, visitation, property, reciprocal support, name change, 
paternity, adoption, and domestic violence cases. Additionally, the Supreme Court of Florida has rec-
ommended the inclusion of juvenile dependency and delinquency proceedings. See In re Report of 
Comm'n of Family Courts, 588 So. 2d 586, 586-87 (1991); Telephone Interview with Gwen Stewart, 
Senior Attorney for Family Court (Apr. 11, 1997). 
10. Either local rules or administrative orders expressly approved by the Florida Supreme Court 
control implementation of Family Divisions in Circuit Courts. See Telephone Interview with Gwen 
Stewart, supra note 9. 
11. The Commission on Family Courts recommends that the judge term be three years within 
the Family Division. See id. 
12. The Supreme Court of Florida strongly suggests one judge/one family. Each judicial circuit 
may adopt its own case assignment, however. See In re Report of Comm'n of Family Courts, 633 So. 
2d 14, 17 n.2 (1994). 
13. See HAw. REV. STAT. §§ 571-11 to 571-14 (1997). 
14. Hawaii established its Family Court in 1965. See HAw. REv. STAT. §§ 571-73 (1993). 
15. District Court judges are assigned to the Family Court at the District Court level. Rotation 
through the juvenile, domestic, and special dockets of the Family Division occurs at varying intervals. 
The senior Family Court judge is a Circuit Court judge. See Telephone Interview with Richelle Ka-
wasaki, Law Clerk, Office of Senior Judge Michael A. Town, Family Court of the First Circuit (Apr. 
3,1997). 
16. See id. One judge/one case assignment, in this Appendix, is defined as one judge assigned 
to a case for the life of that case, including any motions and modifications related to the case. 
17. The subject matter jurisdiction of the Massachusetts Probate and Family Court Department 
includes probate of wills, administration of trusts and estates, the appointment of guardians and con-
servators, adoption, change of names, divorce, and annulment. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 215, § 3 
(1989). 
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18. Massachusetts established its Probate and Family Court Department in 1978. The Massa-
chusetts Trial Court consists of the following departments: the Superior Court Departmcnt, the Hous-
ing Court Department, the Land Court Department, the Probate and Family Court Department, the 
Boston Municipal Court Department, the Juvenile Court Department, and the District Court Depart-
ment. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 211B, § 1 (Supp. 1996). 
19. See Telephone Interview with William F. Ryan, Jr., Assistant Court Administrator, Probate 
and Family Court of the State of Massachusetts (May 7, 1997). 
20. See id. 
21. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4A-24 (West 1987 & Supp. 1997). 
22. New Jersey established its Family Division by constitutional amendment in 1983 (N.J. 
CONST. art. VI, § 3). N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4-3 (West 1987) addressed court personnel conditions, 
qualifications, and requirements. This statute was repealed and replaced in 1991 by N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 2B:3-1 to 5-3 (Supp. 1997), upgrading certain court employee conditions, qualifications, and re-
quirements; the constitutional provision establishing the Family Division remains effective. See Let-
ter from Jeffrey A. Kuhn, Assistant Director for the Family Division of the Courts of New Jersey (Apr. 
28, 1997) (on file with author). 
23. Judges are assigned to the Family Division on a rotational basis. Once assigncd, they typi-
cally serve for two to three years. See Telephone Interview with Marie Pirog, Staff Attorney for the 
Family Law Division (May 19, 1997). 
24. In the smallest counties, one judge hears all cases; thus, the one judge/one family model 
applies. In slightly larger counties, one judge is specifically assigned to the Family Division, and that 
judge hears all family law cases, again corresponding to the one judge/one family model. In the largcr 
counties, the systems vary. In some counties, individual judges specialize in one aspect of family law 
and only hear cases on that particular issue, suggesting a one judge/one case approach. In other coun-
ties, the cases are assigned on a rotational basis corresponding to a traditional calendar assignment. 
[d. 
25. The Family Court has jurisdiction over child abuse and neglect proceedings; support pro-
ceedings; child custody; distribution of marital property; conciliation; proceedings concerning physi-
cally handicapped and mentally defective or retarded children; paternity; tcrmination of custody based 
on neglect; proceedings concerning whether a person is in need of supervision; and procecdings con-
cerningjuvenile delinquency. See N.Y. FAM. CT. Acr § liS (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1997). 
26. New York established its Family Court in 1962. See N.Y. FAM. CT. Acr § 113 (McKinney 
1988 & Supp. 1997). 
27. See N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 13. 
28. See Telephone Interview with Andrea Hoyt, Court Analyst for the Office of Court Admini-
stration (May 7, 1997). 
29. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-10-3 (Supp. 1996). 
30. Rhode Island established its Family Court in 1961. See id. 
31. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-16.1-7 (Supp. 1996). 
32. See Telephone Interview with Anthony Panichas, Deputy Administrator for the Rhode Is-
land Family Court (May 19, 1997). 
33. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-736 (Law Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 1996). 
34. South Carolina established its Family Court in 1977. S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-2-10 (Law Co-
op. 1985 & Supp. 1996). 
35. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1370 (Law Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 1996). 
36. See Telephone Interview with Mary Schroeder, Deputy Director of Court Administration, 
South Carolina Family Court (May 19, 1997). 
37. The Family Court has jurisdiction over divorce, annulment, and property distribution; child 
custody and visitation; alimony; paternity; juvenile causes (juvenile delinquency, child abuse, and 
child neglect); domestic violence; criminal nonsupport; name change; and mental health. See VT. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 454 (Supp. 1997). There is also an office of magistrate within the Family Court, 
with jurisdiction over child support establishment, modification, and enforcement; reciprocal support 
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actions; and child support in parentage cases after detennining parentage. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit 4, § 
461 (Supp. 1997). 
38. Vennont established its Family Court in 1990. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 451 (Supp. 
1996). 
39. Judges are selected from the Superior and District Courts for a one-year tenn on the Family 
Court; however, in smaller counties, the Family Court judges also serve as Superior and District Court 
judges. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 21a (Supp. 1996); VT. STAT. ANN., Admin. Order No. 13 (Supp. 
1997). 
40. Generally one judge does hear one case. Since judges only serve on the Family Court for 
one year, however, sometimes the same judge cannot hear a case from start to finish, as some cases do 
not conclude during this time period. See Telephone Interview with Lee Suskin, State Court Adminis-
trator (May 23, 1997). 
41. The Family Court has jurisdiction over proceedings involving the detennination or modifi-
cation of parenting plans, child custody, visitation, support, and the distribution of property or obliga-
tions. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.12.010 (West 1997). 
42. Washington established its Family Court in 1949. See WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 26.12.010 
(\Vest 1997). 
43. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.12.020 (\Vest 1997). 
44. In the more rural areas, however, there is only one judge for all Superior Court cases; there-
fore, the case assignment is one judge/one family in rural areas. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 
2.08.061-2.08.065 (West 1988 & Supp. 1997). 
Notes for Appendix B 
1. Family Court Divisions are established by local legislative acts; thus, jurisdiction varies. 
Generally, Family Court Divisions have jurisdiction over cases involving divorce, annulment, custody 
and support of children, granting and enforcement of alimony, and all other domestic and marital 
matters over which the Circuit Court has jurisdiction. See Telephone Interview with Robert H. Mad-
dox, Staff Attorney, Administrative Office of Courts (Mar. 5, 1997). 
2. Family Court Divisions exist in the larger judicial circuits, in areas where the population is 
large enough to support such divisions. Presently, nine out of thirty-two judicial circuits have Family 
Court Divisions. These divisions are referred to by different names, depending on the locality. These 
names include Family Court Division, Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, Family Division, Fam-
ily Court, and Domestic Relations Division. See ALA. CODE § 12-17-24.1 (1995); Telephone Inter-
view with Robert H. Maddox, supra note 1. 
3. Family Court Divisions are established by local legislative acts; thus, judicial terms vary by 
locality. Generally, judges of the Family Court Divisions serve a six-year tenn in that division. See 
Telephone Interview with Robert H. Maddox, supra note I. 
4. Case assignments vary depending on the jurisdiction involved. Generally, it is one 
judge/one case. See Telephone Interview with Peg Walker, Director of Research and Planning at the 
Alabama Administrative Office of Courts (May 20, 1997). One judge/one case assignment, in this 
Appendix, is defined as one judge assigned to a case for the life of that case, including any motions 
and modifications related to the case. 
5. Colorado has established Family Law Divisions internally in Colorado Springs, Denver, and 
Arapahoe County. Subject matter jurisdiction varies, but it can include divorce, annulment, and prop-
erty distribution; child custody and visitation; alimony and child support; paternity, adoption, and 
tennination of parental rights; juvenile causes; and domestic violence. See Telephone Interview with 
Cheri Kester, Office of the State Court Administrator (Apr. 10, 1997). In addition, family law magis-
trates appointed in each judicial district issue, modify, and enforce child support orders. See COLO. 
REV. STAT. § 13-5-301 (Supp. 1997). 
6. Colorado Springs, Denver, and Arapahoe County internally established Family Law Divi-
sions of the District Court. See Telephone Interview with Cheri Kester, supra note 5. 
538 SOUTHERN CAliFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71 :469 
7. See id. 
8. Colorado Springs County follows the one judge/one family method of case assignment, if 
possible. In Denver County, however, any judge assigned to the Family Law Division will hear a 
case. Denver maintains a separate Juvenile Court. If a family has a case involving both family law 
and juvenile issues, a judge from the Juvenile Court hears the juvenile issues and a judge from the 
Family Law Division hears the other aspects. See id. One judge/one family case assignment, in this 
Appendix, is defined as one judge assigned to a family for all proceedings before the court involving 
the family. 
9. There is only one county, Douglas County, that has a true Family Department. The juris-
diction of the Douglas County Family Department includes divorce, annulment, separate maintenance, 
custody, support, paternity, visitation, and related matters; child in need of care, termination, adoption, 
and related matters; juvenile offenders and traffic offenses committed by juveniles: and protcction 
from abuse in domestic violence cases. Sedgwick and Shawnee Counties have modified Family Dc-
partments handling paternity, separations, and divorce. See Telephone Interviews with Kathy Kirk, 
Kansas Judicial Center (May 7, 1996: Apr. 3, 1997). 
10. In 1977, the Kansas Legislature authorized the creation of specialized divisions of the Dis-
trict Court whenever the judges of the District Court deem it necessary and the Supreme Court ap-
proves it. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 20-438 (1995). Douglas County's Family Department was estab-
lished under this statute. See id. 
11. There is presently only one judge appointed to the Family Department of the District Court 
in Douglas County. She will serve as the Family Department judge as long as she pleases. See Tele-
phone Interviews with Kathy Kirk, supra note 9. 
12. There is only one judge of the Family Department in Douglas County: therefore, that judge 
hears all the cases. See id. 
13. The Family Court for East Baton Rouge Parish has jurisdiction over divorce, annulment, 
paternity, spousal and child support, custody and visitation, and all matters incidental to any of the 
foregoing proceedings. The Family Court also has jurisdiction over all proccedings for writs of ha-
beas corpus for the determination and enforcement of rights to the custody of minors or for the release 
of any person in actual custody in any case where the Family Court has original jurisdiction. See LA. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:1401 (West Supp. 1997). 
14. The Family Court for East Baton Rouge Parish shall convene in quarters that the governing 
authorities of the city of Baton Rouge and East Baton Rouge Parish shall provide. See LA. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 13:1407 (West Supp. 1997). 
15. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13:1403 (West Supp. 1997) (per LA. CONST. art. V, § 15). 
16. See Telephone interview with Julie Ray, Family Court Administrator for East Baton Rouge 
Parish (May 20, 1997). Traditional calendar assignment, in this Appendix, is defined as the standard 
procedure utilized by the clerk of the court to assign all civil matters to the respective judges on a 
daily, weekly, monthly, or other regularly scheduled basis. 
17. The Family Court has original jurisdiction in all proceedings concerning any delinquent or 
neglected child and jurisdiction as provided in the Youth Court Law of 1946. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 
43-23-5 (1993). 
18. Harrison County is the only county in Mississippi that has a Family Court. Family Courts 
can be established only in counties which meet certain requirements, namely, counties that are heavily 
populated. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-23-1 (1993). 
19. MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-23-39 (1993) provides that Family Court judges are elected in the 
same manner as Chancery Court judges, who are elected for four-year terms. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 
9-5-1 (1996). 
20. There is only one Family Court judge in Harrison County; therefore, that judge hears all the 
Family Court cases. See id. 
21. The Family Court has jurisdiction over marriage, legal separation, separate maintenance, 
child custody and modification actions; annulment; adoption: juvenile proceedings; paternity; child 
support and enforeement; adult abuse and child protection actions; name change: and marriage license 
waiting period waivers. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 487.080 (Supp. 1997). 
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22. There are presently seven Family Courts throughout the state of Missouri. Six of these 
courts, specifically created by statute, exist in the larger metropolitan areas. Other circuits can choose, 
by local court rule, to establish a Family Court in their circuit See Mo. REv. STAT. § 487.010 (Supp. 
1997); Telephone Interview with Gary Waint, Director of Juvenile and Family Court Programs (May 
20,1997). 
23. See MO. REv. STAT. § 487.050 (Supp. 1997). 
24. Case assignment varies by circuit Generally, the assignments occur by a traditional calen-
dar assignment system. See Telephone Interview with Gary Waint, supra note 22. 
25. See NEV. REv. STAT. § 3.223 (Supp. 1995). Comprehensive subject matter jurisdiction, in 
this Appendix, is defined to include divorce, annulment and property distribution; child custody and 
visitation; alimony and child support; paternity, adoption, termination of parental rights; juvenile 
causes (juvenile delinquency, child abuse, and child neglect); domestic violence; criminal nonsupport; 
name change; guardianship of minors and disabled persons; withholding or withdrawal of life-
sustaining medical procedures, involuntary admissions, and emergency evaluations. See DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit 10, §§ 921-928 (Supp. 1996). Individual states may vary with regard to inclusion of particu-
lar subject matter jurisdictional areas. Any state defined to have comprehensive subject matter juris-
diction, however, has jurisdiction over a majority of the above subjects. 
26. Family Courts are authorized in counties with popUlation greater than 100,000. Currently 
two counties, Clark and Washoe, have Family Courts. See NEV. REv. STAT. § 3.0105 (Supp. 1995); 
Telephone Interview with Kathy Harrington, Assistant Law Librarian, Office of Washoe County Fam-
ily Court Judge Scott Jordan (Apr. 10, 1997). 
27. NEV. CaNST. art. VI, § 5 provides that District Court judges are appointed for six-year 
terms. NEV. REv. STAT. §§ 3.Ql2-3.Ql8 (Supp. 1995) provides that in judicial districts with Family 
Courts, District Court judges are designated as judges of the Family Court. 
28. The clerk's office uses a traditional calendar assignment to assign the cases to the Family 
Court judges; however, the judges transfer the cases among themselves in order to achieve the goal of 
one judge/one family. See Telephone Interview with Kathy Harrington, supra note 26. 
29. The Family Court division has jurisdiction over divorce, annulment, property distribution, 
child custody, visitation, alimony, child support, paternity, termination of parental rights, grandparent 
visitation, and domestic violence. See Telephone Interview with Delores Saavedra, Clerk of the Court 
(May 7,1996); Telephone Interview with Feru Goodman, Staff Attoruey, Administrative Office of the 
Courts (Mar. 27,1997). 
30. Family Court divisions of the District Court, created by District Court rule, only exist in the 
larger districts where the population creates the need for such a division. Presently there are two 
Family Courts. See Telephone Interviews with Feru Goodman, Staff Attorney, Administrative Office 
of the Courts (June 5, 1996; Mar. 27, 1997; Apr. 24, 1997). 
31. Judges are elected to the District Court for six-year terms. Any judge on the District Court 
can request assignment to the Family Court There is no minimum term. See Telephone Interview 
with Belinda Demaree, Office of Judge Anne Kass, Presiding Family Court Judge, 2nd Judicial Dis-
trict (May 27, 1997). 
32. Seeid. 
33. There are eighty-eight counties in Ohio and six different types of domestic relations divi-
sions within the Courts of Cornmon PIcas. One type handles divorce and support (twelve counties). 
A second type hears divorce, support, and juvenile matters (six counties). The third type of domestic 
relations division is part of the general Court of Cornmon Pleas, which also hears juvenile and probate 
matters (seven counties). A fourth type has jurisdiction over divorce, support, and paternity cases 
(five counties). In one county (the fifth type), the domestic relations division has jurisdiction over 
divorce, support, juvenile matters, and probate. The remaining fifty-seven counties do not have do-
mestic relations divisions; the Court of Cornmon Pleas hears domestic cases, as well as criminal and 
civil matters. See Telephone Interviews with Doug Stephens, Project Manager of Family Court Fea-
sibility Study (May 8, 1996; Apr. 24, 1997). 
34. See OmoREv. CODE ANN. § 3105.011 (Banks-Baldwin 1996). 
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35. See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2301.03 (Banks-Baldwin 1994 & SUpp. 1997). 
36. See Telephone Interview with Doug Stephens, Project,Manager of Family Court Feasibility 
Study (May 27,1997). 
37. The jurisdiction of the Family Law Division, which is created by local rule, varies in Okla-
homa and Tulsa Counties. In both counties the Family Law Division hears divorce, annulment, prop-
erty distribution, child custody and visitation, alimony, child support, paternity, and tennination of 
parental rights. The Family Law Division of neither county hears juvenile cases. See Telephone In-
terviews with Sheila Sewell, Deputy Director of the Administrative Office of the Courts (May 7, 1996; 
Mar. 27,1997). 
38. Family Law Divisions exist in two counties: Tulsa and Oklahoma. See Telephone Intcr-
view with Sheila Sewell, Deputy Director of the Administrative Office of the Courts (Mar. 27, 1997). 
39. OKLA. CONST. art. VII-B, § 5 provides that District Court judges may appoint special 
judges to serve with no set tenn to hear probate, divorce, domestic relations, custody or support, 
guardianship, conservatorship, mental health, juvenile, adoption, and determination of death cases. 
See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit 20, § 123 (West 1991). 
40. See Telephone Interview with Dave Hill, Court Administrator for Tulsa County (May 27, 
1997); Telephone Interview with Robert Martin, Trial Court Administrator for Oklahoma County 
District Court (May 27, 1997). 
41. Subject matter jurisdiction includes divorce, child custody, child support, visitation, filia-
tion, proceedings to commit a mentally ill person, guardianship for minors, JUVenile proceedings, do-
mestic violence, adoption, and any other proceedings dealing with domestic relationship disputes. See 
OR. REv. STAT. § 3.408 (1995). 
42. Family Court Domestic Relations Departments exist in at least Marion, Multnomah, 
Clackamas, Deschuts, and Lane Counties. See Telephone Interview with Sue Gerhardt, Office of 
Hugh McIsaac, Director of Family Court Services (Apr. 10, 1997). 
43. Cireuit Court judges are elected for six-year tenns. See OR. CONST. art. VIJ(A), § 1. 
44. Prior to trial, cases are assigned using the traditional calendar assignment method. If a case 
goes to trial, the same judge who conducts the trial hears all subsequent matters related to that case. 
See Telephone Interviews with Susanne Kolar, Lead Worker for Family Law Domestic Relations De-
partment (May 21, 1997; June 26,1997). 
45. The Family Court Division has jurisdiction over desertion or nonsupport of wives, children 
and indigent parents; child custody; divorce, annulment and property mattcrs relating thereto; depend-
ent, delinquent, and neglected children; adoptions; and delayed birth certificates. See PA. CONST. art. 
V, § 16; PA. SCHED. CONST. art. 5, § 16. 
46. Family Court Divisions only exist in Philadelphia and Allegheny Counties. See 42 PA. 
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 951 (West 1981). Each Court of Common Pleas has a domestic relations serv-
ices section, which consists of probation officers and other court staff. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. 
§ 961 (West 1981). 
47. Judges in the Court of Common Pleas serve ten years, then are subject to a nonpartisan re-
tention election. Judges decide how much time they wish to spend hcaring cases in the Family Court 
Divisions. See Telephone Interview with Don Harris, Director of Policy, Research, and Slatistics for 
the Administrative Office of Pennsylvania Courts (May 28, 1997). 
48. See id. 
49. The jurisdiction of the Family District Court includes adoptions, birth records, divorce, an-
nulments, child welfare, custody, child support, reciprocal support, tennination of parental rights, de-
pendency, neglect, and delinquency. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 24.601 (West 1988); Telephone 
Interview with Jim Hutchinson, General Counsel, Office of the Court Administrator (Mar. 27,1997). 
50. In the larger counties, the Family District Courts are separate courts; however, in the 
smaller counties, the Family District Courts are merely divisions of the District Courts. See Tele-
phone Interview with Jim Hutchinson. supra note 49. 
51. A Family District Court judge's qualifications and tenn of office are the same as those for a 
District Court judge. See TEX. GOV'T. CODE ANN. § 24.602 (West 1988). TEX. CONST. art. V, § 7 
provides that District Court judges serve for four years. 
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52. Assignment of cases is done by individual counties. Thus, both one judge/one family and 
traditional calendar assignment are used. See Telephone Interview with Jim Hutchinson, General 
Counsel, Office of the Court Administrator (May 28, 1997). 
53. Subject matter jurisdiction includes divorce, child custody, visitation, child support and 
maintenance, family support, division of property, reciprocal support actions, and guardian ad litem. 
The Family Division does not handle juvenile and adoption matters. See Telephone Interview with 
Ron Witkowiak, Wisconsin District Court Administrator (Aug. 28, 1995); Telephone Interview with 
Cindy Hapka, Office of Wisconsin District Court Administrator (Mar. 20, 1997). 
54. The only Family Division, established by local rule, exists in Milwaukee. See Telephone 
Interviews with Cindy Hapka, Office of Wisconsin District Court Administrator (Mar. 20, 1997; Apr. 
10,1997). 
55. Judges are assigned to various trial divisions: civil, felony, misdemeanor traffic, family, 
children's, and probate and mental health. During a judge's four-year term, she can rotate throughout 
these divisions. See Telephone Interview with Cindy Hapka, supra note 53. 
56. See Telephone interview with Cindy Hapka, Office of Wisconsin District Court Administra-
tor (May 27, 1997). 
Notes for Appendix C 
1. San Mateo County Family Law Pilot Project has jurisdiction over temporary child support, 
temporary spousal support, temporary health insurance, and mediation of contested custody/visitation 
cases. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 20010 (West 1994 & Supp. 1997). Santa Clara County's Family Court 
has jurisdiction over temporary or permanent child or spousal support, modifications of temporary or 
permanent child or spousal support, health insurance, custody or visitation in a proceeding for disso-
lution of marriage, nullity of marriage, legal separation of the parties, exclusive custody, or pursuant 
to the Uniform Parentage Act See CAL. FAM. CODE § 20031 (West 1994 & Supp. 1997); Telephone 
Interview and Electronic Mail follow-up with Jennifer Gaspar, Training Coordinator, Administrative 
Office of the Courts (Mar. 5, 1997). 
2. There were originally two Family Law Pilot Projects: San Mateo County Pilot Project and 
Santa Clara County Pilot Project. The legislature did not specify the reason(s) behind the establish-
ment of the Family Law Pilot Projects in these two counties. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 20000 (West 
1994). Santa Clara County now has a Family Court. San Francisco, Humboldt, and Shasta Counties 
are studying the feasibility of similar systems. See id. 
3. The judicial term for each Family Law Pilot Project was not specified because the duration 
of the pilot projects was two years, ending July 1, 1996. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 20002 (West 1994). 
4. See Telephone Interview with julie Lara, Legal Clerk, Santa Clara County Clerk's Office 
(June 4, 1997). One judge/one family case assignment, in this Appendix, is defined as one judge as-
signed to a family for all proceedings before the court involving that family. 
5. See CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 20000-43 (\Vest 1994). 
6. See STATE BAR OF GA. COMM'N ON FAMll..Y COURTS, REpORTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, 
5-6 (1995) [hereinafter GA. REPORTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS]. Comprehensive subject matter ju-
risdiction, in this Appendix, is defined to include divorce, annulment, and property distribution; child 
custody and visitation; alimony and child support; paternity, adoption, and termination of parental 
rights; juvenile (juvenile delinquency, child abuse, and child neglect); domestic violence; criminal 
support; name change; guardianship of minors and disabled persons; and withholding withdrawal of 
life-sustaining medical procedures, involuntary admissions, and emergency evaluations. See DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit 10, §§ 921-928 (Supp. 1996). Individual states may vary with regard to inclusion of 
particular subject matter jurisdictional areas. Any state defined to have comprehensive subject matter 
jurisdiction, however, has jurisdiction over a majority of the above subjects. 
7. The Commission on Family Courts has recommended the establishment of a Family Court 
Division in each Superior Court to handle family law matters currently within the jurisdiction of the 
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Superior Courts, as well as family law matters currently within the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Courts 
and other classes of courts. See GA. REpORTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 6, at I. 
8. See id. 
9. See id. at 14. 
10. Georgia has enacted enabling legislation for pilot programs, see GA. CODE ANN. § 15-5-26 
(1996), but the Judicial Council has yet to approve any pilot projects. Two judicial circuits have pilot 
proposals pending before the Council: Tallapoosa Judicial Circuit in northwest Georgia and Tifton 
Judicial Circuit in south Georgia. See Letter from Quintus W. Sibley, Reporter, State Bar of Georgia 
Commission on Family Courts (Apr. II, 1997) (on file with author). 
11. The Fifth Municipal District's Unified Family Court Project currently hears "divorce cases 
and other related matters such as child support enforcement, collection and civil orders of protection." 
John Flynn Rooney, 5th Municipal District Opens Unified Family Court Project, DAILY L. BULL., 
July 22, 1997, at 1. The court expects to expand its jurisdiction to include juvenile delinquency and 
child protection matters sometime in the Fall of 1997. See id. 
12. See 750 ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. SIlOS, 35/4 (West 1993). 
13. Assignments are made at the discretion of the chief judge. See Telephone Interview with 
Joy L. Lee, Court Administrator, Sixth Municipal Distict, Circuit Court of Cook County (Aug. I, 
1997). 
14. At present, one judge hears all family court cases. See id. 
15. A Family Court currently operates in the Fifth Municipal District. See Rooney, sllpra note 
II, at 1. Projects are currently planned for the Sixth Municipal District and the Eighteenth Judicial 
District See Telephone Interview with, and Facsimilie Transmission from, Joy L. Lee, COllrt Admin-
istrator, Sixth Municipal Distict, Circuit Court of Cook County (Aug. I, 1997). 
16. There is one Family Court Pilot Project in Kentucky. The Jefferson County Family Court 
Pilot Project hears all cases of divorce, adoption, termination of parental rights, dependency, neglect, 
abuse, paternity, status, and emergency protective order cases. See Telephone Interviews with Jim 
Birmingham, Family Court Administrator (May 8, 1996); Carla Prather, General Counsel for the Jef-
ferson County Family Court (Apr. 24, 1997). 
17. The Jefferson County Family Court Pilot Project hears cases previously assigned to the Cir-
cuit Court and the District Court. Kentucky implemented the Family Court Pilot Project in March, 
1991, by order of the Supreme Court of Kentucky, effective until further order from that court. See 
Kuprion v. Fitzgerald, 888 S.W.2d 679 (Ky. Ct. App. 1994) (documenting the creation of the Jefferson 
County Family Court Pilot Project); Telephone Interview with Carla Prather, supra note 16. 
18. There are nine judges assigned to the Jefferson County Family Court Pilot Project. Four of 
these positions are permanent assignments to the Family Court Pilot Project. The remaining five 
judges can rotate out of the Family Court Pilot Project; only one judge has made such a choice since 
the inception of the project in 1991. See Telephone Interview with Carla Prather, sllpra note 16. 
19. See FAMILY cr. NEWSLETIER, JEFFERSON COUNTY PILOT PROJECT (Jefferson County, Ky., 
Family Court), Mar. 8, 1991, at 4. 
20. Seeid. 
21. The Family Court Pilot Project provides specialized and expedited procedures for all cases 
involving divorce, post-divorce motions, paternity, protection from abuse, parental rights and respon-
sibilities, and unmarried parents. See Telephone Interviews with Judge Joyce A. Wheeler, Director of 
Family Court Pilot Project (Aug. 18, 1995; Apr. 3, 1997). 
22. The Family Court Pilot Project is structured as the Family Court Division of the District 
Court, Superior Court, and Administrative Court. Presently this pilot project is in effect in the Cum-
berland County Superior Court and in the Ninth District Court. The legislature authorized the creation 
of the pilot project in 1990 to handle family law cases. In 1993, the legislature extended the pilot 
project until January IS, 1999. See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, §§ 1,451 (West Supp. 1995). 
23. Only one judge for each pilot project site sits primarily in the Family Court Pilot Project; 
other judges usually sit from one to several days at a time. See Telephone Interviews with Judge 
Joyce A. Wheeler, supra note 21. 
1998] COURT REFORM IN FAMILY LA W 543 
24. See Telephone Interview with Diane Harvey, Clerk of Administrative Court and Clerk of 
Family Court Pilot Project (May 28, 1997). Traditional calendar assignment, in this Appendix, is de-
fined as the standard procedure utilized by the clerk of the court to assign all civil matters to the re-
spective judges on a daily, weekly, monthly, or other regularly scheduled basis. 
25. The legislature authorized the creation of the pilot project in 1990 to handle family law 
cases. In 1993, the legislature extended the pilot project until January IS, 1999. See ME. REV. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 4, §§ 1,451 (West Supp. 1995). 
26. See 1993 Md. Laws 198 and MD. CT. RULE 16-204 (effective July I, 1998). 
27. The Family Division of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City was mandated by 1993 Md. 
Laws 198, 1996 Md. Laws 13, and 1997 Md. Laws 3. Family Divisions for counties with more than 
seven circuit court judges were mandated by MD. CT. RULE 16-204 (effective July 1, 1998). 
28. The judge term in the Family Division presently is undetermined; however, within Balti-
more City, the current practice is a six-month rotation in each of the existing divisions of the Circuit 
Court. See Telephone Interview with Judith Moran, Baltimore City Family Division Case Coordinator 
(May I, 1997). 
29. See id. 
30. See 1993 Md. Laws 198 and MD. CT. RULE 16-204 (effective July I, 1998). 
31. See MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 600.1021 (West Supp. 1997)(effectiveJan. 1, 1998). 
32. See MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 600.1003 (effective Jan. 1, 1998). 
33. See MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 600.1011 (effective Jan. 1, 1998). 
34. See MICH. COMPo LAws ANN. § 600.\023 (effective Jan. I, 1998). 
35. See MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 600.1001 (effective Jan. I, 1998). 
36. The jurisdiction of the Family Division Pilot Project includes divorce, annulment, alimony, 
paternity, child custody and visitation, child support, domestic violence, juvenile delinquency, abused 
and neglected children, children in need of assistance, adoption, guardianships, termination of parental 
rights, and name change. See 1995 N.H. Laws 152:2. 
37. In May 1995, the New Hampshire legislature enacted Chapter 152 establishing a Family 
Division Pilot Program in Rockingham and Grafton Counties. See 1995 N.H. Laws 152:2. 
38. Judges have been asked to serve for the life of the Family Division Pilot Program, which is 
approximately two years. See Telephone Interview with Craig Briggs, Administrator of Family Divi-
sion Project (June 2, 1997). 
39. See id. 
40. The pilot project has operated since July 1996. See id. 
41. See VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-241 (Michie Supp. 1997). 
42. Legislation authorizing the establishment of the Family Court passed in 1993. As of April 
10, 1997, the Virginia legislature has not authorized any funding for the Family Court; therefore, the 
Family Court has yet to become operational. See Telephone Interviews with Office of Lelia Hopper, 
Director, Family Court Project (May 8, 1996; Apr. 10, 1997). 
43. See Telephone Interview with Lelia Hooper, Director, Family Court Project (May 29, 
1997). 
44. Seeid. 
45. Virginia's Family Court Project is presently on hold. Legislation creating the project was 
passed in 1993 and remains in effect until June 1, 1998. The legislature has not funded the project, 
however; thus, the Family Court presently does not exist. See id. 
Notes for Appendix D 
1. Family law, in this Appendix, is defined to include divorce, annulment and property distri-
bution; child custody and visitation; alimony and child support; paternity, adoption, and termination 
of parental rights; juvenile causes Guvenile delinquency, child abuse, and child neglect); domestic 
violence; criminal nonsupport; name change; guardianship of minors and disabled persons; and with-
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holding or withdrawal of life-sustaining medical procedures, involuntary admissions, and emergcncy 
evaluations. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit 10, §§ 921-926 (Supp. 1996). 
2. See ALAKSA STAT. § 47.10.65 (Michie 1996); ALASKA STAT. § 22.10.020 (Michie 1988); 
Telephone Interviews with StephaIiie Cole, Deputy Director, Administrative Office of the Courts (July 
II, 1995; Mar. 5, 1997). 
3. The Superior Court consists of five divisions: Juvenile, Domestic Relations, CitylMuni-
cipal, County, and Justice of the Peace. Domestic cases are heard only in the Juvenile, Domestic Re-
lations, and County Divisions. See ARIz. CONST. art. VI, §§ 14, 15; ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-202 
(West Supp. 1996); ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-311 (West Supp. 1996); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 8-
102.1 (West Supp. 1989); Telephone Interview with Mary Lou Quintana, Division Director of Court 
Services (July I I, 1995); Telephone Interview with Agnes Felton, Division Director of Court Services 
(Mar. 5, 1997). 
4. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-306 (Michie Supp. 1995); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-13-201 
(Michie 1994); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-12-301 (Michie 1993): ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-1-104 (Michie 
1987): Telephone Interview with James D. Gingerich, Director of the Administrative Office of the 
Courts (June 23, 1995); Telephone Interview with Leslie Steen, Clerk of the Supreme Court (Mar. 5, 
1997). 
5. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 46b-42, 46b-93, 46b-121, 46b-174, 46b-180 (Wcst 1993); 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-164 (West 1985): Telephone Interview with Robert Tompkins, Deputy 
Director of the Family Division (a social services arm of the Superior Court) (Aug. 16, 1995): Tele-
phone Interview with Paula Campo, Family Division Administrator (Mar. 5, 1997). 
6. See IDAHO CODE §§ 16-1602, 16-1603 (Supp. 1997): IDAHO CODE §32-715 (1996): IDAHO 
CODE § 16-2oo2(a) (Supp. 1996); IDAHO CODE §§ 20-502 (Supp. 1996); Telcphone Interview with 
Thomas Frost, Legal Counsel, Administrative Office of the Courts (July 7, 1995); Telephone Inter-
view with Jana Saxton, Assistant to Thomas Frost (Mar. 20, 1997). 
7. See IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-2-1.1 (Michie Supp. 1996); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 33-4-4-3, 33-8-
2-9,33-8-2-10 (Michie 1992); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 33-5-4.5-1 to 33-5-50-11 (Michie 1992 & Supp. 
1996); Telephone Interviews with Jack Stark, Staff Attorney, Division of State Court Administration 
(July 17, 1995; Mar. 27,1997); Telephone Interview with Jeff Berkovitz, Director of Probate and Ju-
venile Services (July 3, 1997). 
8. See IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 598.2, 600.3, 602.7101 (West 1996); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 232.61, 
232.109 (West 1994); Telephone Interviews with David Ewert, Director of Appellate Screening (July 
7, 1995; Mar. 20, 1997). 
9. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.111 (West Supp. 1997); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 260.019, 
260.021 (West 1992); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 518.002-518.66 (West 1990 & Supp. 1997); Telephone 
Interviews with Steve Forestell, Director of Judicial Advisory Service (July 27, 1995: Apr. 3, 1997). 
·10. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 40-4-104, 40-6-109, 41-3-103, 41-5-203 (1995): Telcphone In-
terviews with Chris Wcthcm, Staff Attorney, Administrative Office of the Courts (June 29, 1995; Mar. 
20,1997). 
11. See NEB. REv. STAT. § 42-348 (Supp. 1996): NEB. REV. STAT. § 24-517 (1995): NEB. REV. 
STAT. § 43-247 (1993); Telephone Interview with Joscph C. Steele, Court Administrator (June 29, 
1995); Telephone Interview with Sherry Lampe, Assistant Court Administrator (Mar. 27, 1997). 
12. See N.C. CONST. art. VI., § I: N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7A-517(9), 7A-523, 50-4 (1995); Tele-
phone Interview with Fred M. Morelock, DisIrict Court Judge (June 29, 1995); Telephone Interview 
with Betty Wall, Assistant Clerk of the Supreme Court (Mar. 20, 1997). 
13. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-04 (1989); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-12.1-02, 14-15-01 
(1981); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-03 (1974); Telephone Interview with Shcrry Mills Moore, Chair of 
Ad Hoc Commission on Family Law (Aug. 30,1995); Telephone Intcrview with Keithe Nelson, North 
Dakota Courts Administrator (Mar. 27, 1997). 
14. South Dakota's Circuit Court is the only court of general jurisdiction; therefore, all family 
law cascs are heard in the Circuit Court. See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 25-10-2, 26-7A-l (Michie 
1997): S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 25-3-1, 25-5A-5, 25-6-6, 26-7A-2 (Michie 1992); Telephone Inter-
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view with Michael Buenger, State Court Administrator (Aug. 30, 1995); Telephone Interview with 
Ken Olander, State Court Administrator's Office (Apr. 3, 1997). 
15. See TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 37-1-103, 37-1-104, 37-1-203, 37-1-205 (1996); TENN. CODE 
ANN. § 16-15-406 (1994); Telephone Interview with Jean Stone, Staff Attorney, Administrative Office 
of the Courts (June 29, 1995); Telephone Interview with Jona Coppola, Assistant to Director of Ad-
ministrative Office of the Courts (Mar. 20, 1997). 
16. See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 7S-3a-104, 7S-3a-105 (1996); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-16.1 
(1995); Telephone Interview with Brant Johnson, Acting General Counsel, Administrative Office of 
the Courts (July 27, 1995); Telephone Interview with Cheryll May, Public Information Officer (Mar. 
20,1997). 
17. See W. VA. CODE §§ 4S-2-5, 4S-4-14, 49-5-2 (1996); Telephone Interviews with Penny 
Crandall, Assistant Director for Family Law Master Program (Aug. 17, 1995; Mar. 21, 1997). 
IS. See WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-22-104, 5-5-135, 14-1-203, 14-2-106, 14-6-203, 20-2-104, 
(1997); Telephone Interview with Allen Johnson, Senior Staff Attorney, Administrative Office of the 
Courts (July 27, 1995); Telephone Interview with Elaine Kirby, Fiscal Specialist for Administrative 
Office of the Courts (Mar. 20, 1997). 
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